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 A. Introduction  
  
When the Treaty of Rome came into force in 1957, its main focus was to 
ensure peace between the Member States of the then European Economic 
Community(hereinafter EEC) by creating a single market where free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital was provided. The focus 
of the EEC Treaty was mainly on the opening up of national economies to 
transnational cooperation and thus on economic integration. On the other 
hand the founding Member States deemed it not necessary to harmonize 
their social models. This resulted in a decoupling of economic integration and 
social protection. While at Member State level economic and social policy 
continued to have equal constitutional status, it was economic policy that 
prevailed at Community level. In the course of time, this clear cut boundary 
between transnational economic integration and national social protection 
has been blurred. The advancement of European integration and associated 
therewith the many Treaty amendments have gradually increased the social 
competences of the EU, though without seriously touching the autonomy of 
the Member States on their social models. This, however, has changed in 
recent years. This development goes mainly back to the Court of Justice of 
the European Union(hereinafter CJEU) which has expanded the scope of 
application of the derivable rights from the European economic constitution to 
the detriment of the social models of the Member States. To be more precise 
the CJEU caused a great deal of commotion by handing down various 
judgments concerning conflicts of fundamental market freedoms with national 
social rights. It showed in these cases a clear attachment to free market 
thinking by giving fundamental freedoms priority over national social rights. In 
the cases Viking1 and Laval2 the right to strike was held to be inferior to the 
economic freedoms in the European market economy. In Rüffert3, based on 
the same line of reasoning the Court prohibited a German regional 
government to impose social conditions on public procurement. In 
                                                             
1 CJEU Case C-438/05 ITF v Viking Line ABP 2007, ECR I- 10779. 
2 CJEU Case C-341/05 Laval v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 2007 ECR I- 11767. 
3 CJEU Case C - 346/06 Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen 2008 ECR I-1989. 
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Commission vs. Luxemburg4, the CJEU prohibited a Member State to require 
higher labour standards for the employment of foreigners than provided in the 
EU Directive on Posted Workers(hereinafter PWD). These judgments are 
generally traced back to the pre- Lisbon version of the European economic 
constitution which was based on an open market economy with free 
competition. This market economic orientation supported amongst others a 
substantial and procedural precept of rule and exception, favoring  the 
freedom on the market at the expense of social state interventions of the 
Member States. With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 
2009 the question about the relation of the freedom on the market and state 
interventions must be asked anew again. This has amongst others to do with 
the fact, that the open market economy with free competition was replaced 
by the highly competitive social market economy. Article 3 III of the Treaty on 
the European Union (hereinafter TEU) has the following wording:  
 " The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the 
 sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic 
 growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, 
 aiming at full  employment and social progress, and a high level of 
 protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It 
 shall promote scientific and technological advance". 
Against the background that the systematic decision in favour of an open 
market economy played a significant role for the European economic 
constitution prior to Lisbon, the question comes up, which implications the 
constitutionalization of the social market economy has. The answer to this 
question depends in the first place on the meaning of the social market 
economy. As is well known, the concept of the social market economy 
originated in Germany. This could imply that the social market economy, 
according to Article 3 III 2 TEU, is equivalent with the original concept of the 
social market economy. It must be born in mind, that the social market 
economy in Germany is associated with different meanings. Accordingly, 
there is a difference between the ideal and real type of the social market 
economy. In regard of the former, the concept of the social market economy 
consists of two different but complementary approaches, namely 
                                                             
4 CJEU Case C- 319/06 Commission v Luxembourg 2007 ECR I - 4323. 
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ordoliberalism and Alfred Müller- Armack´s concept of the social market 
economy. Ordoliberalism is a well known and important concept in the 
European integration process since it served as a model for the drafting of 
the Treaty of Rome in 1957. In order to define the social market economy 
according to Article 3 III 2 TEU, the original concept of the social market will 
be first investigated. Subsequently and against the background that the 
overall aim of the work is to analyze the legal implications of the social 
market economy on the European economic constitution it will have to be 
analyzed in how far the social market economy is reflected in the economic 
constitution of the German Basic Law and associated therewith in the case 
law of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
hereinafter BVerfG). In regard of the latter, a case study of the BVerfG will be 
elaborated in order to gain information how the resolution of conflicts 
between economic and social interests takes place. The acquired findings 
will then be utilized as an interpretation tool for defining the social market 
economy in Article 3 III 2 TEU. Accordingly, the findings will be used to 
investigate the legal implications  of the move from the open market economy 
towards the social market economy  for the Lisbon version of the European 
Economic Constitution. The focus of the investigation will be on two aspects, 
first, the implications of the social market economy on the material content of 
the European economic constitution, and secondly on the legal reasoning of 
the CJEU. The latter will also comprise a case study in which the CJEU had 
to deal with restrictions of fundamental market freedoms on ground of social 
state interventions. This case study will be split in two parts. In the first part it 
will be dealt with cases which were handed down  by the CJEU in the pre-
Lisbon era. In the second part then, cases belonging to the  post- Lisbon era 
will be analyzed.  The aim of the case study  is to examine, whether with the 
coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty the legal reasoning of the CJEU has 
changed and if so, whether this is attributable to the  constitutionalization of 
the  social market economy as an objective of the European Union. 
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B. The Original Concept of the Social Market Economy 
 
It is no easy task to answer the question for what the notion of the social 
market economy explicitly stands for. In a strict sense, the notion refers to the 
economic concept which has formed the basis of the West German economic 
policy since 1948 when the currency reform in the three Western zones took 
place. In a broad sense, the notion defines the economic and social policy of 
Germany in respect of form and content.5 Seen in historical terms, the social 
market economy was not created on the basis of a single plan but it evolved 
according to different actors with different ideological world views. The social 
market economy can be particularly associated with three names: Alfred 
Müller-Armack, Walter Eucken and Ludwig Erhard. They all have contributed 
to the establishment of an economic order for Germany in the aftermath of 
the World War II although in different ways. The concept and the notion of 
the social market economy itself can be traced back to Alfred Müller-
Armack6. He considered it as a “third way” between laissez-faire liberalism 
and planned economy7. However, the concept of the social market economy 
was inspired by the work of the adherents of the so called Freiburg School 
and the concept of “Ordoliberalism”. It was above all Walter Eucken8 who 
paved the way for the social market economy by laying down the theoretical 
foundation of the economic concept of Ordoliberalism as an integral part of 
the social market economy The practical implementation of the social market 
economy was mainly directed by Ludwig Erhard9. He is generally hailed by 
the public as the father of the Social Market Economy. Thus, the original 
concept of the social market economy is composed of two different but 
complementing approaches: The concept of ordoliberalism and Alfred Müller-
Armacks concept of a social market economy. Altough both approaches 
emphasize the importance of free markets and the need for a competition 
                                                             
5 Quaas in: Social Market Economy : An introduction – History, Principles and 
Implementation – From A to Z, 2008,  393. 
6 Alfred Müller-Armack, „Wirtschaftslenkung und Marktwirtschaft“ (1946) reprinted  in: 
Wirtschaftsordnung und Wirtschaftspolitik. Studien und Konzepte zur sozialen 
Marktwirtschaft und zur europäischen Integration(1966). 
7 Müller Armack 1948: 177. 
8 Walter Eucken- „Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie“(1940), „Die Grundsätze der 
Wirtschaftspolitik“(1952). 
9 Ludwig Erhard was Minister of Economic Affairs from 1949 to 1963 and Federal Chancellor 
of West-Germany between 1963 and 1966. He is author of the book „Wohlstand für alle“( 
Prosperity for all ) (1957). 
5 
 
policy there are fundamental differences between them as will be elaborated 
in the following.  
 
I. Ordoliberalism 
The intellectual foundations of the social market economy were laid down 
by the adherents of the so called ordoliberal Freiburg School10. 
Ordoliberalism provided Germany after the Second World War an overall 
framework within which politics in the market economy could be formulated 
and implemented.11 The scholars of the Freiburg School, above all the 
economic scholar Walter Eucken and the legal scholars Franz Böhm and 
Hans Großmann-Doerth focused upon the intersection between the 
economic and legal orders. They advocated a new liberal economic order 
based on classical liberalism and neo classical theory, in particular as a 
response to the failures of Paleoliberalism12. This concept is different from 
laissez faire liberalism13 to the extent that it considers regulative 
interventions as legitimate provided it is aimed to guarantee the functioning 
of the market. On the other side it differs from Keynesianism as it aims to 
minimize the influence of the state in economic life.  
 
 
                                                             
10 It should be noted that the term Freiburg School needs clarification. It must be 
distinguished between the Freiburg School in a narrow sense and in a broader sense. The 
former one refers to research and teaching community with Walter Eucken(1891-1950), 
Franz Böhm(1895-1977) and Hans Großmann-Doerth(1894-1944) at  the University of 
Freiburg in the 1930s and 1940s. The latter one includes Alexander Rüstow(1885-19963) and 
Willhelm Röpke(1899-1966), who are seen as representitives of the School of Sociological 
Neoliberalism. The group around Walter Eucken focused upon the intersection between the 
legal and economic realms whereas Rüstow and Röpke incorporated stronger sociological, 
historical issues into their writings. In contrast to Eucken and Böhm, Rüstow and Röpke also 
favoured a more far reaching state intervention in the economy, see: Franz Böhm, Die 
Ordnung der Wirtschaft als geschichtliche Aufgabe und rechtsschöpferische Leistung(1937); 
Alexander Rüstow, Freie Wirtschaft- Starker Staat (Die staatspolitischen Voraussetzungen 
des wirtschaftspolitischen Liberalismus(1932); Willhelm Röpke, Die Lehre von der 
Wirtschaft81937), Die Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart(1944). 
11 Gerber 1995, p.40. 
12 Alexander Rüstow introduced the term “Palöliberalism(old liberalism) which can be 
described as a consistent form of liberalism with minimum state interference and without a 
social element, as it seemed desirable in the 19th century, (Alexander 
Rüstow,”Paläoliberalismus, Kollektivismus und Neoliberalismus in der Wirtschafts und 
Sozialordnung(1960). 
13 The term “laissez-faire, laissez passer, le monde va de lui meme” was first used by the 
Frenchman, Marquis d´Argenson in 1751. He stated, to govern better one must govern less, 
Berend, 2006, 13. Laissez faire liberalism demands for as little state intervention in the 
economy as possible. It is assumed that the decisions of the individual agents generate the 
best solutions, coordinated by the market. 
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1. Main Concern of the Freiburg School- The Prevention of Power  
The ordoliberal approach has to be seen as a response to the socio-
economic conditions of the 1920s and 1930s14. Ordoliberals were driven by 
the dramatic events of Germany´s political and economic history, namely a 
highly cartelized and regulated German economy as the state was captured 
by vested rent-seeking interest groups during the Weimar Republic, the 
confrontation with practices of state intervention which resulted in the 
development of a planned economy in the Soviet Union and the destruction 
of civil liberties and the rule of law during the Nazi regime15. All of these 
events had one common thread for the individual liberty16, the concentration 
of power. Eucken criticized the existing market order in the laissez- faire17 
system as it was according to him solely based on the establishment of a 
legal order that guaranteed the autonomy of individual action vis a vis 
others and the state18, but did not contain any kind of rules to direct the 
economic process. He argued that due to the absence of mechanisms to 
prevent and control economic concentrations like monopolies and 
oligopolies, laissez faire contributed in the decline of a performance based 
competition system.  
 Eucken dealt also with the functioning of the command economy. With 
the emergence of alternative economic systems in the years after World War 
I national states changed their economic policy radically. This policy depicted 
the exact opposite of the laissez faire regime. Governments favoured 
interventionist and protectionist economic policies as a response to the 
                                                             
14 see for this Berend 2006, 17. 
15Wohlgemuth, Western Europe: German unification, integration, globalization- the German 
social market economy facing a threefold challenge 2006: 150.  
16 According to Eucken, individual liberty consists of the Kantian notion of autonomy, self- 
legislation and self-determination. Each person is an end in itself and no instrumental mean 
to an end. But the exertion of freedom is not unlimited. The exercise of one´s freedom is 
limited by the freedom of others. Freedom has to be protected by the law giving bodies of the 
state, pointing at the interrelatedness of freedom and the rule of law. The jurisdiction and a 
clear cut definition of the state´s tasks is responsible for averting the threefold dangers 
threatening liberty: private power of producers, semi-public and corporatist powers of 
societal collectives and the powers of the state, Klump/Wörsdörfer,  Ordoliberal 
Interpretation of Adam Smith 2010, 40. 
17 The term “laissez-faire, laissez passer, le monde va de lui meme” was first used by the 
Frenchman, Marquis d´Argenson in 1751. He stated, to govern better one must govern less. 
Laissez faire liberalism demands for as little state intervention in the economy as possible. It 
is assumed that the decisions of the individual agents generate the best solutions, 
coordinated by the market, Berend, 2006, 13.  
18  Sally, Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order 1998, 109. 
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failure of laissez faire capitalism19. This was also the time when central 
planning was introduced in the Soviet Union. Features of the command 
economy are amongst others the absence of economic freedoms such as the 
freedom of trade, movement, association and contract. Private property no 
longer conferred the right to plan and act autonomously. Eucken argued that 
the individual freedom under the rule of law was incompatible with the central 
direction of the economic process. The latter destroyed fundamental 
economic freedoms in the sense that individuals no longer had the equal 
protection of the laws with regard to the use and disposal of their property.  
These historical considerations indicate the fundamental problem in the view 
of Eucken, namely, that of power. The rise of private power resulted in a 
degeneration of the market and legal orders and influenced also the political 
life in Germany. This prepared the ground for experimental economic policy, 
resulting in the rise of state power and the collusion of public and private 
power in cartel-like, corporatist arrangements. Governmental intervention in 
the economy necessarily reduced the effectiveness of the market economy.  
 The adherents of ordoliberalism saw the way out of this dilemma in 
embedding the market in a constitutional framework. They argued that this 
would protect the process of competition from distortion and minimize 
governmental interference in economic life. The core of this idea was the 
establishment of an economic constitution20. " Gerber states that the main 
idea of the Freiburg School behind the establishment of an economic 
constitution was "that a community should make decisions about the kind of 
economy it wants in the same way that it makes decisions about the political 
system it wants. These decisions represent fundamental choices, and, once 
made, the legal system should be required to implements  
them"21.This economic constitution had to consist of a competitive order 
(Wettbewerbsordnung) constituted and regulated by the institutional order 
policy (Ordnungspolitik) of the state, compatible with the state under the rule 
of law (Rechtsstaat). In this concept the it is the task of the state to enable 
free and fair competition by providing the appropriate economic order. 
                                                             
19 Berend 2006, 60. 
20 David J. Gerber, Constitutionalizing the Economy : German Neo-Liberalism, Competition 
Law and the "New Europe", 42 American Journal of  Comparative Law L. 25(1994); David J. 
Gerber, Competition Law and International Trade: The European Union and the Neo-Liberal 
Factor Pacific Rim Law& Policy Journal 1995, Vol.4. No.1,  37-57. 
21 Gerber 1995, 42.  
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Moreover, competition is not seen as an end in itself, but a means to reach 
the overall aim of a functioning and humane socioeconomic order. In 
Euckens point of view the state’s task must be limited to institutional order 
policy (Ordnungspolitik) instead of process policy (Prozesspolitik)22 “The 
state should influence the design of an economic framework, but not itself 
direct economic processes […] State planning of forms-Yes! State planning 
and control of the economic process-No!”23 . The state as an ordering and 
regulating power has the responsibility for consciously and consistently 
designing and shaping the “rules of the game” and for implementing a 
judicial-institutional framework24 . State interventions into economic 
processes which did not conform to the price mechanism and the automatism 
of the market derived from it, should be avoided.  
 
2. The Ordoliberal Economic Order25  
Eucken elaborated a model with ideal conditions for a resilient competitive 
order to safeguard the task of the state to set the regulative framework for the 
economy. These economic control variables comprised the so called 
constitutive principles, the regulative principles and the interdependency of 
orders26. 
 
 
 
                                                             
22 To clarify,  the term economic policy refers to all government activities implemented and 
administered in order to influence and control  the economy in line with political objectives. 
There are two kinds of economic policies to be distinguished: institutional order policy and 
process policy. Institutional order policy refers to a kind of economic policy which constitutes 
the content of an economic system. It aims at achieving the desired economic order. To this 
extent, an institutional framework is implemented to coordinate the activities of the market 
participants in such a way that an economically integrated process results which will produce 
advantageous outcomes for the society as a whole. The main actor in the institutional order 
policy is the legislative power.  Process policy contains measures which are used to intervene 
in the actual economic process. The main actor in process policy is the executive(states, 
authorities, central banks, monopoly commissions). Areas where process policy actions 
might be implemented are goods or factor markets, specific industries or the entire 
economy(price levels, employment, income policy). Eucken rejected the latter. Governmental 
interventions in the market process were in his point of view not necessary and even more, 
they were not legitimate; Hans Jörg Thieme, Institutional order policy and process policy in: 
Social Market Economy, History, Principles and Implementation- From A to Z, 2008, 270. 
 23 Walter Eucken, 1951,95; Nils Goldschmidt  2012, 2.  
24 Klump/Wörsdörfer 2010, 41. 
25 see for this, Eucken, A Policy for Establishing a System of Free Enterprise, 1952, 115;  Zinn, 
1992,29; John 2007, 5. 
26 Eucken, 1955, 254. 
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2.1. Constitutive Principles27  
The constitutive principles form the cornerstones of Eucken’s model and are 
designed to establish the competitive order. Eucken defined the constitutional 
principles as follows: " By constitutive principles, we mean those principles 
making up a country´s economic constitution whose joint application at a 
specific point in history establishes a certain envisaged economic system. 
This is done by creating conditions which serve to bring that system into 
being. Hence, all the principles in question help to promote the adoption of an 
overall economic decision and also represent the instruments used in 
practice to enforce that overall decision"28. The constitutive principles are 
composed of the following:  
 
Workable Price System with Perfect Competition  
The most important principle is the establishment of a market structure with a 
sound pricing system, which has to reflect relative scarcity combined with a 
high degree of competitive pressure. The competitive pressure increases 
with the number of suppliers and buyers who are active in the market. This 
makes a general ban on cartels and monopolies the necessary 
consequence29.  
 
Primacy of Monetary Policy 
The primacy of monetary policy aims at stabilizing the value of money as a 
necessary condition for a functionally competitive economy. Eucken states 
that all efforts to translate a system for regulating competition into reality are 
fruitless until a certain degree of stability in the value of the money has been 
ensured. He blames the “faulty design of the monetary system” for the 
emergence of inflation and deflation in the recent German history. 
 
Private Property of Means of Production 
The existence of private property rights gives incentives to work, enables 
entrepreneurs to innovate, creates new jobs and initiates economic growth 
and welfare. As is well known among economists private property means 
                                                             
27 Walter Eucken, 1990, 254. 
28 Eucken,  A Policy for Establishing a System of Free Enterprise 1952, 130.  
29 Gerken, 2008, 38. 
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freedom and power of entrepreneurial disposition as well as the incapacity to 
limit freedom and power of disposition of all others in the society. Only 
Individuals rights and freedoms which derive from the private property of 
means of production allow the flexibility of entrepreneurial decisions. 
 
Free Access to Markets 
The freedom of access to markets includes both the freedom of entry and the 
freedom of exit. The freedom of market entry involves the removal of public 
and private economic barriers. Only in the absence of restrictions to the 
market entry prices can discern their signally function and the safeguarding 
of competition can be guaranteed. 
 
Freedom of Contract 
The free choice of the contractual partner is an essential complement to the 
principle of the private ownership. The review of market decisions depends 
on the possibility of changing the contractual partner or the content of the 
contract. Associated therewith market power can be reduced and competition 
can be promoted more easily. But not all kind of contracts are allowed. 
Especially contracts limiting the degree of competition, excluding agents, and 
promoting cartels, oligopolies and monopolies are prohibited 
 
Complete Liability of Property Owners 
Eucken stated that those who benefit from something must also be prepared 
to bear a loss if need be30. The criterion of unlimited liability therefore aims to 
ensure that market participants have to take the responsibility for their 
mismanagement in the crisis. A dissipation of capital when doing business 
and associated with that, the "moral hazard" phenomenon should be 
avoided. 
 
Steadiness of Economic Policy 
In order to avoid uncertainty, the economic policy of the state should be 
predictable and steady and be oriented on political objectives. Companies 
                                                             
30Eucken, A Policy for Establishing a System of Free Enterprise, 1952,122.  
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should be enabled to plan their business on a long term basis and to 
organize it reliably. Investment decisions are calculated in the long term. 
  
2.2. Regulative Principles  
The constitutive principles are supplemented by the so called regulative 
principles. In Eucken´s opinion the constituting principles were not adequate 
to ensure the creation of an undistorted competition order. He was aware that 
despite the existence of a competition order individual hardship and 
loopholes could evolve. The compliance of the regulating principles as part of 
the economic policy of the state should therefore modify and adjust inefficient 
market outcomes, i.e. in the case of market failures, so that the functioning of 
the competitive order could be permanently maintained. The regulative 
principles are composed of the following: 
 
Reduction and Control of Monopoly Power 
The main task of the state is to combat the creation of monopolies. The 
control over cartels and monopolies should be carried out by the state31. If 
monopolies already exist they should either be destructed or their market 
behavior should be regulated, if destruction is not possible. 
 
Income Policy  
Eucken stated that a redistributive income policy was ethically imperative. 
Explaining this stand he argued that the market process caused an unequal 
distribution of income32. Accordingly, it was the task of the state to correct the 
unequal distribution of income through its fiscal policy. As regards this 
subject, he recommended the introduction of a progressive income tax 
system. By saying this, he was aware about possible negative side effects of 
income redistribution. He therefore pleaded that a decline of investment and 
economic efficiency had to be avoided. 
 
Correction of Externalities 
The correction of negative externalities is related to costs that are not 
associated with the economic activity of market participants. Eucken 
                                                             
31 Eucken, 1955, 294. 
32 Eucken, 1955, 300. 
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discussed these externalities mainly in ecological terms, having in mind costs 
which were caused by environmental destructions. 
 
Regulation in the Case of Non-Normal Reactions of Supply 
Euckens forth regulative principle concerned non normal reactions of supply 
on the market. As regards this, he referred explicitly to the labour market 
where in his point of view imbalances between supply and demand could 
appear. Here, it was the task of the state to take corrective measures. These 
shall include amongst others regulations of the working conditions, in 
particular occupational health and safety, protection of children and women 
but also trade unions and the implementation of minimum wages. Eucken 
further carried out, that it was a necessary task of the government to actively 
engage in the labour market during situations of drastic structural 
unemployment, for example by subsidizing minimum wages, such that lower 
labour costs encouraged additional hiring.  
 
2.3. Interdependency of Orders 
The constituting and regulating principles are in the view of Eucken mutually 
complementary33. He pleaded for integrating them in a unified approach. 
Economic, social, legal and other policies as sub-orders of the society 
needed to be compatible so that the institutions mutually support each other. 
By taking only selective measures without putting the constituting and 
regulating principles altogether into practice would not bring about the 
desired result. Eucken emphasizes in this regard the importance of thinking 
in terms of order, meaning that all acts of policy should be judged in terms of 
how they fit in with the total economic process and its steering mechanism. 
This is particularly important given the complex interdependence brought 
about by an extensive division of labour in the modern economy. In such a 
complicated apparatus, the process of coordination of economic activities, 
that is, the "steering mechanism" of the economy, is highly sensitive to 
particular measures in any one area of policy. Thus, "all economic policy 
questions get back to the question of economic order and have sense only in 
this context. This is the core of Eucken´s concept of the interdependence of 
                                                             
33 Eucken 1955, 304. 
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policy within an economic order, which he extended to a political -economic 
interdependence of orders: the mutual interdependence of the economic 
order with the other orders of the society. 
 
3. Ordoliberalism and the Formation of Social Policy  
Social Policy in the ordoliberal concept takes only place in the realm of the 
institutional order policy. Accordingly, Eucken wished to realize social policy 
aims only by shaping and developing an acceptable economic system, thus 
bringing about an increase and a more equitable distribution of income and 
wealth, in particular through the effectiveness of competition. Moreover, 
according to Eucken an important principle for shaping the social life has to 
be seen in the principle of subsidiarity. This principle which originates from 
the Catholic social teaching prescribes that public tasks should always be 
executed at the lowest level in the hierarchy of authorities. Only if that level is 
not up to the task it can be transferred to the next level. This principle should 
also be applied in the citizen/state relationship. This means that as many as 
possible decisions should be left to the citizens themselves. It is therefore 
first down to self-initiative, self help and the personal responsibility of an 
individual and the community before the state intervenes. The state should 
only assist those citizens who were not able to help themselves. Only then 
should the social security system as a last resort intervene. 
 
4. Ordoliberalism as "Authoritarian Liberalism"34 
Ordoliberals criticized parliamentarism, democracy and pluralism35. In their 
point of view the parliamentary decision making process is subject to the 
influence of socio- political rent seeking and power groups. The development 
of norms should therefore take place in an anti- pluralistic way, namely 
without the approval of legitimate interest groups and without the citizens 
involvement and participation in a democratic decision making process(non 
consensus seeking approach).They were worried about democracy regarding 
the influence of masses in combination with the impact of interest groups and 
pleaded as a matter of fact for a prevention of mass influence. In their point 
                                                             
34 See for this, Dieter Haselbach, 1991 , Ptak, Ralf, Vom Ordoliberalismus zur Sozialen  
Marktwirtschaft. Stationen des Neoliberalismus in Deutschland, 2004, 43;  
35 Manuel Woersdoerfer 2010, Ordoliberalism and the evolution of norms:14 
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of view the mass population had to be led by educated elitist experts36. Elite 
in the ordoliberal point of view has nothing to do with exclusive privileges and 
prerogatives in the realm of aristocracy, bourgeoisie or oligarchy, but rather 
with education. They call it Leistungs-and Wertelite(elite based on merits and 
individual qualifications. But it should be noted, that ordoliberals supported 
without any doubt the rule of law37. They evidently opposed unlimited 
government and the rent-seeking society and they sought to implement 
institutional precautions in order to prevent a turning back into a state of re-
feudalisation and collusion of private and public power in cartel-like 
corporatist arrangements in which the state authorities are captured by 
vested interests. Eucken favoured that institutional order policy is guarded by 
independent experts which do not have to fear to be ousted from power for 
taking unpopular decisions. 
 
II. Alfred Müler-Armack´s Social Market Economy  
Ordoliberalism was substantially supplemented with sociological and political 
elements after the Second World War by the Cologne School of Economics 
around the economist Alfred Müller-Armack. In the concept of Alfred Müller-
Armack the state is given a more comprehensive role than in the concept of 
the Freiburg School. Müller Armacks work on Economic Control and Market 
Economy, published in 1946, reflects his core concept of the social market 
economy38. In the preface of his book Wirtschaftsordnung und 
Wirschaftspolitik he outlined the origin of his idea of a market economy 
designed in a way that was socially sensible39:"Already during the last years 
of the war, I gratefully picked up thoughts by Walter Eucken and his circle 
that aimed at a renewal of competition. The strong emphasis on the 
competitive order as the means to design economic policy I sure enough 
always felt to be too narrow. Thus, I additionally called for a system of social 
and socio-political, yet market conform measures"40. Müller-Armack 
considered contrary to Eucken and Böhm the idea of social balance as a 
potentially conflicting relationship that needed to be reconciled by ways of “a 
                                                             
36 Wörsdörfer, 2010,  14; Röpke 1944/1949, 210. 
37 Wörsdörfer, 2010, 9. 
38 Quaas 2008, 52. 
39 Goldschmidt/Wohlgemuth in:Social Market Economy: origins, meanings and 
interpretations: 270. 
40 Müller Armack, 1965/1976, 10, Translation: Nils Goldschmidt 2012, 4. 
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regulative policy which aimed to combine on the basis of a competitive 
economy free initiative and social progress”41. The social market economy 
should go beyond liberalism and central planning in terms of a third way. 
Contrary to types of guided market economics, the social market economy 
should become a socially managed market economy which was oriented 
towards the unparalleled dominance of the market mechanism with its 
flexible price system beyond any planning illusion. Therefore planning 
mechanisms were rejected for the objective of social cohesion and balance 
was to be achieved under the primacy of market related instruments. 
However, according to Müller-Armack the market economic model had to 
focus on the acknowledgement of market failures, the possible incongruence 
of market process and social justice and the necessity of embedding the 
competitive order in an institutional framework that provided most promisingly 
for integrative as well as reconciliatory moments and established common 
norms and values.42. Thus, Müller-Armack saw his social market economy as 
the "dissolution of libertarian and socialist antagonisms through the ideas of 
balance, equilibrium and compensation"43.  
 
1.Social Market Economy as Social Irenics 
The whole conception of the social market economy is based on Alfred 
Müller-Armacks idea of social irenics44. Müller-Armack dealt with the question 
how diverging religious and philosophical ideologies could be reconciled and 
transformed into unity in order to establish a broad acceptance in favour of a 
free and fair market economy. To achieve this aim, he developed the concept 
of social irenics.45 Social irenics proposes in which way one should cope with 
the inevitable co-existence of differing world-views46. Müller-Armack 
conceptualized social irenics against the background of the intellectual 
situation of post war Germany. He took into consideration four philosophical 
positions, namely Catholicism, Protestantism, Marxist Socialism and Laissez-
                                                             
41 Müller Armack, 1989, 83. 
42 Alexander Ebner 2006, 212. 
43 Goldscmidt, 2012, 20.  
44 Müller Armack in: Soziale Irenik, 1950, 563. 
45The term is derived from the Greek word eirene(peace) and from the name of the Greek 
goddess of peace Eirene, daughter of Zeus, Quaas, Social Market Economy:Social irenics 
2008, 416. 
46 Quaas, 2008:417. 
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faire Liberalism. He took into consideration the “Westphalian Peace, too, and 
hoped that the post World War II era would become very much like the 
second half of the 17th century47. This period of time can be characterized as 
an era or reconciliation, confidence and harmony between contradicting 
worldviews.  Hence, Müller- Armack´s aim was to adopt this thought to the 
opposing world views of the 19th century, socialism and liberalism. These 
ideological groups were in his view confronted with the task of overcoming 
their intellectual isolation by integrating the perspectives of others into their 
own thinking. He pleaded for the co-existence of these philosophical 
positions, having the idea in mind that none of them should become absolute 
dominant over the others. To combine the efficiency of a free market with 
social balancing in such a way that politically and economically both aspects 
receive sufficient attention, it required the ability to look at issues from 
different angles and to weigh up the existing options against each other48. 
Müller- Armack did exactly this when he created the concept of the social 
market economy. To this end, Müller – Armack´s concept in itself is an 
example of a social irenic approach.  
 From this it can also be inferred that for Müller-Armack the concept of 
the Social Market Economy was open and accordingly constituted a certain 
economic and social style rather  than a closed theory like the concept of 
Ordoliberalism49. With an open system he aimed at making it possible to 
undertake necessary adjustments to changing socioeconomic conditions in 
society. The dynamics of the economic style of the social market economy 
made in his point of view openness to social change a necessity50. 
Conceptual adjustments and variations should be introduced in such a 
manner that the basic idea of the concept was not harmed and did not lose 
its meaning. Müller-Armack expressed this basic idea of the concept of the 
social market economy in an abstract and generalized abbreviated formula51. 
                                                             
47 Müller-Armack 1950, 559,   in: Soziale Irenik : Über die Möglichkeit einer die 
Weltanschauungen verbinden Sozialidee. 
48 Quaas 2008 , 417. 
49 Quaas 2008, 394. 
50 Glossner:2010, 48. 
51 „Our concept is abstract, it can only gain acceptance if it sets a concrete meaning and 
demonstrates the man in the street that it will redound to its advantage” Alfred Müller 
Armack at the 1953 annual meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society(quoted from Ptak 2009). 
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During political transformation, the content of this formula should be 
translated into practice under consideration of the prevailing social condition. 
 
2. Social Elements in the Social Market Economy 
Müller-Armacks concept differed fundamentally from Ordoliberalism as it was 
in many respects incompatible with key features of the ordoliberal economic 
order. Müller- Armack agreed with the concept of the Freiburg School to the 
extent that the task of the state was to establish a functioning competitive 
order within an institutional framework based on institutional order policy. But 
he disagreed with the Freiburg School in regard of the government’s role in 
the realm of economic and social policy . Eucken argued that both economic 
and social objectives had to be reached via Ordnungspolitik. In contrast, 
Müller-Armack pleaded for a regulative state policy to shape the social 
sphere. From this it can be inferred that in Müller-Armack´s concept the 
social and economic policy of the state are put on a par, meaning that social 
matters are seen as equivalent principles with economic matters52 and are 
not subordinated to the institutional order policy. 
  It is important to note  that the idea of freedom in the concept of the 
social market economy is not granted unlimited. The market economic 
component within the social market economy cannot be compared with the 
laissez faire liberalism of the 19th century, where an unlimited enforcement of 
individual interests took place. The idea of freedom as such includes 
amongst others the right to freedom of personal development. This right 
however has to be limited to a certain degree when the life of other members 
of the society is concerned. The social component of the Social Market 
Economy constitutes restrictions of the economic freedom where the action 
of economic agents are incompatible with the values of the society or where 
human dignity is violated. Müller-Armack aims in  this regard to combine the 
principle of a free market with that of social balancing.  Müller -Armack 
mentions four  aspects that aim at the social correction of market results53. 
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53 Müller-Armack 1978, 326. 
18 
 
2.1. The Social Effects of an Undistorted Market Economic Order54  
Müller-Armack took the view that a market economic order which was 
structured and maintained according to the principles of ordoliberalism was 
basically social in itself 55. In comparison with socialism, such a market 
economy was in the first instance more able to satisfy the needs and 
interests of consumers. Furthermore, the permanent growth of productivity as 
a result of undistorted economic competition provided for goods with high 
quality and let to higher incomes. Both must be understood as social 
achievements of markets.  
 
2.2. The Adjustment of Social Imbalances56  
The requirement of adjustment of social imbalances refers to situations 
where the market is incapable to master social tensions and problems. 
Müller-Armack saw the principles of “freedom” and “adjustment” of social 
imbalances in a complex relationship. The market process could at best 
provide for a fair distribution of income which reflected the efforts undertaken 
in the market. But this distribution did not take care of incapacitated or 
partially incapacitated individuals like children, the aged, the sick, the 
disabled and the unemployed that cannot participate in the market57. Müller- 
Armack considered it for these reasons as a necessary task of the state to 
shape the market economy on the basis of redistributive social policies in 
social terms and to establish a comprehensive social security system, 
including amongst others pension-, health and unemployment schemes, 
albeit he conceded the tension to the incentives for the willingness to 
perform58.  
 
2.3. Business Cycle Policy59  
Contrary to Eucken who rejected policies which aimed at preventing 
economic fluctuations, Müller-Armack regarded business cycle policy as an 
                                                             
54 Müller Armack, Wirtschaftsordnung und Wirtschaftspolitik 1966, 131; Joerges 2004, 15. 
55 Müller Armack, Wirtschaftsordnung und Wirtschaftspolitik 1966, 131. 
56 See for this, John 2007, 8; Joerges, Social Market Economy as Europe´s Social Model? 
2004, 15.  
57 Lampert, 2008, 420. 
58 Müller Armack in „Soziale Marktwirtschaft“ Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften 
Bd. IX 1956, 391. 
59 see for this John, 2007, 8.  
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important style of his concept to diminish fluctuations in economic activities, 
which are inherent in industrial societies
60
. He furthermore favoured full 
employment programs and did not reject the extension of state demand as 
an approximate instrument. He advocated a sound structural policy in cases 
where long term difficulties in structural adaptation would arise and branches 
of industry or certain regions of the country would get into difficulties. 
 
2.4. Limits of Governmental Intervention
61
 
Governmental Interventions in the market process are limited mainly by the 
principle of market conformity and the principle of subsidiarity To avoid a 
possible contradiction between economic and social policy, Müller-Armack 
elaborated the criteria of the market-conform measures. As regards this, 
Müler-Armack utilized Wilhelm Röpkes idea of market conformity according 
to which government interference into the economic mechanism must not 
render the market processes less effective 62.  
  
3. Interim Conclusion  
It was shown, that the original concept of the Social Market Economy is 
made up of two different but complementary approaches. Both emphasize 
the role of open and free markets, the importance of a stable value of the 
money and the need for competition policy. In addition, both strands 
acknowledge the need for a policy to adjust social imbalances. But there are 
fundamental differences between the adherents of the Freiburg School and 
the Alfred Müller-Armack as to what degree the government should intervene 
in the economic process. Whereas ordoliberalism focuses solely on 
institutional order policy ,the social market economy according to Alfred 
Müller-Armack is based on both, institutional order policy and process policy. 
Both approaches underline the importance of market conformity and 
subsidiarity. Notwithstanding the disparities in regard of the degree of 
governmental interventions in the market process, Alfred Müller-Armack 
accomplished to incorporate the ordoliberal ideas in the original concept of 
the social market economy 
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C. The Social Market Economy and the Economic Constitution of the 
Basic Law  
 
After having analyzed the original concept of the social market economy, it 
will be dealt with the question, in how far the original concept of the social 
market economy is reflected in the economic constitution of the German 
Basic Law. In particular, it will be analyzed whether the main idea of the 
social market economy, namely the combination of the freedom on the 
market with social justice by taking market conform measures has been 
constitutionalized. This question is insofar of importance as it makes clear in 
how far the original concept of the social market economy is justiciable 
according to the Basic Law. Moreover, it gains even more significance when 
taking into account that the provisions of the Basic Law occupy the highest 
position in the hierarchy of norms within the German legal system, thus 
making it obligatory for the state and citizens to comply with them.  
 
1. Academic Debate on the Economic Constitution of the Basic Law 
When taking a look at the Basic Law which was signed on 23 May 1949 one 
will vainly search the notion social market economy or any other expression 
referring to a particular economic system. Unlike the Weimar Constitution the 
Basic Law does not contain a section explicitly dealing with an economic 
constitution63. The founding fathers of the Basic Law deliberately refrained 
from making reference to a specific  economic system. This has to do with 
the fact that a legal hindrance for the reconstruction of Germany after World 
War II wanted to be avoided64. In addition, the Basic Law was rather seen as 
a provisional constitution, meaning that against the background of a divided 
nation it should remain in place only until Germany’s reunification. This 
provisional intention is especially reflected in the preamble of the Basic Law 
where instead of “Constitution” the notion “Basic Law” was chosen. Given to 
this fact, shortly after the adoption of the Basic Law a discussion among 
academic scholars about the issue of the economic constitution of the Basic 
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64 Ulrich Karpen, 1990, 40; Ernst Benda, 1981, 6. 
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Law evolved. The absence of a clear determination in favour of a specific 
economic system and the normative uncertainty of the 
Sozialstaatsprinzip(social state principle) resulted in the emergence of 
intensive academic discussions among German constitutional scholars in the 
early 1950s. There was in particular no consensus whether and if so which 
economic constitution could be derived from the Basic Law. Ernst Rudolf 
Huber65 was of the opinion that the provisions of the Basic Law offered room 
for the realization of a mixed economic constitution, bringing together 
elements of liberal and social rights in a balancing order. According to this 
view the Basic Law precluded both, a laissez faire market economy and a 
command economy. He furthermore argued that the concept of the social 
market economy complied with the provisions of the Basic Law and 
constituted a possible economic order for Germany, but not the only possible 
one. In contrast, Carl Nipperdey66 argued that the social market economy 
was the economic constitution of the Basic Law. Although the Basic Law did 
not contain a special section on the economic life, it incorporated according 
to him economic, constitutional and legal principles which corresponded only 
to the system of the social market economy. Nipperdey  based his view on 
Article 2 I GG, which refers to the general principle of freedom and as such 
covers amongst others the freedom of enterprise, -competition,- contract, -
production, -consumption and price formation. Furthermore, he referred to 
the freedom of association, Article 9 I GG, the freedom of occupation, Article 
12 I GG and the guarantee of private property, Article 14 I GG. These 
economic guarantees had to be socially balanced by the social state 
principle. According to this view, other economic orders than the social 
market economy were not allowed. Krüger67 on the other hand argued, that 
the Basic Law was from an economic point of view neutral. He traced his 
assumption back on the non-existence of an explicit decision in favour of a 
particular economic system in the Basic Law. 
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22 
 
 
2. The Neutrality of the Basic Law  
The BVerfG provided clarity to the then ongoing discussion by handing down 
a judgment in the landmark Investment Aid I case, which dates back to 1954. 
The Court made unambiguously clear, that the concept of the social market 
economy did not constitute the economic constitution of the Basic Law. The 
factual situation underlying the judgement in the Investment Aid case68was 
the following: 
After World War II the iron and coal industries lacked the necessary 
capital to finance their reconstruction. On the recommendation of the 
common market, the federal parliament enacted the Investment Aid Act in 
1952(as amended in 1953) for the purpose of creating an investment fund for 
the benefit of these industries. The fund was created by compulsory 
contributions from the profits of other manufacturers and traders. Several 
corporations lodged a constitutional complaint claiming that the legislation 
imposing a special tax on them were unconstitutional. Complainants alleged 
among other things a violation of their constitutional guarantee of free 
development of personality, Article 2 I GG, due to the restriction of free 
business activities. Furthermore, it was claimed that the Investment Aid Act 
did neither comply with the neutrality of the Basic law nor was it in line with 
principles of a market economy since it was not a market conform.  
The BVerfG considered the constitutional complaints as unfounded 
and referred especially to the Basic Law’s image of man and the neutrality of 
the economy69. In regard of the former it stated that: 
 "The picture of the human being in the Basic Law is not that of an 
 isolated sovereign individual; the Basic Law has resolved the tension 
 of the individual with society much more in the sense of relations to 
 society and ties of a person to society, without at the same time 
 infringing his own worth. That follows in particular from looking at Art. 
 1, 2, 12, 14, 15, 19 and 20 of the GG  together. But this means: the 
 individual must put up with those limitations on his freedom of action 
 which the legislator draws for the care and advancement of communal 
                                                             
68Investment Aid Case, 4 BVerfGE 7, (1954), partially translation of the case in: Kommers 
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 social life within the boundaries of what is generally reasonable in the 
 given circumstances, provided that the independence of the person is 
 preserved at the same time. The Investment Aid Act keeps within this 
 framework"70. 
In regard of the neutrality of the economy71 the Court stated that: 
 "The basic law guarantees neither political-economic neutrality of the 
 executive and legislative powers nor a‘ social market economy’ to be 
 controlled only by measures in conformity with the market. The 
 ‘political-economic neutrality’ of the basic law consists only in the fact 
 that the draftsman of the constitution did not decide expressly in 
 favour of a particular economic system. This enables the legislator to 
 follow the economic policy which seems to him at any time to be 
 proper, as long as he observes the basic law at the same time. The 
 present economic and social order is certainly a possible order under 
 the basic law, but definitely not the only possible one. It is  based on 
 an economic and socio-political decision produced by the will of the 
 legislator. This decision can be replaced or annulled by another 
 decision. Therefore it is of no importance from a constitutional law 
 point of view whether the investment aid act is in harmony with the 
 present economic and social order and whether the method used for 
 economic direction is in ‘conformity with the market"72.  
In the Codetermination case73 which will be analyzed in detail later, the 
BVerfG confirmed the doctrine of neutrality. The Court stated that the 
discretion of the legislator to shape the economy was bound by the Basic 
Law which did not incorporate any particular economic framework of 
organization prior to or independent of guaranteed individual rights. The 
legislator was allowed to pursue any economic policy as long as particular 
fundamental rights of the Basic Law are not violated. It stated that: 
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 “It accords with this when the BVerfG has ruled that the GG is neutral 
 with regard to economic policy; the legislator may pursue any 
 economic policy which appears pertinent to him, in so far as, in doing 
 so, he takes account of the GG, and in particular of fundamental 
 rights. He therefore possesses a far-reaching freedom of formation. 
 The element of relative openness of the constitutional order which 
 comes to light therein is necessary in order to take account of the 
 historical change which characterizes economic life to a particular 
 extent and, on the other hand, not to put the regulatory power of the 
 constitution at risk. Of course, the taking account of the legislator's 
 freedom of formation must not lead to any curtailment of what the 
 constitution intends to guarantee unaltered through all change, 
 especially not to any curtailment of the individual freedoms guaranteed 
 in the individual fundamental rights, without which, according to the 
 conception of the GG, a life in human dignity  is not possible. The 
 task consequently consists in reconciling the essential freedom of 
 formation in economic and social policy, which must remain 
 accorded to the legislator, with the protection of freedom to which the 
 individual citizen precisely also vis-à-vis the legislator has a 
 constitutional  right”.74 
From these judgments it can be clearly inferred that the concept of social 
market economy does not constitute the economic constitution of the Basic 
Law. This is even more so, given the fact that the Court unambiguously made 
clear that the market conformity which is a major element of the concept of 
social market economy is not a criterion for assessing the constitutionality of 
legislative action. In addition, the BVerfG decided against the ideal typical -
ordoliberal understanding of the economic constitution and did instead 
interpret the economic constitution in the constitutional law sense. According 
to the latter, the economic constitution refers to “the sum of legal 
constitutional structural elements of the system of economy75. It must be 
borne in mind which consequences it would have had if the BVerfG accepted 
the social market economy as the economic constitution of the Basic Law in 
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the ordoliberal sense. It would have meant that every state action had to be 
assessed on the criterion of market conformity and this in turn would have 
entailed a restriction of the legislators decision making power to the extent 
that only market conform measures could have been taken. The Court 
instead established the doctrine of neutrality of the Basic Law, allowing the 
legislator to pursue any policy it wants, as long as the values of the Basic 
Law were respected.  
 In order to avoid misunderstandings, the neutrality of the Basic Law 
must be further clarified. In the first instance and as a result of the two rulings 
of the BVerfG it is right to say that the Basic Law does not contain any 
explicit systematic decision in favour of an economic system. However, this 
does not mean that a market economic system cannot be realized. The Court 
made it clear that the realization of the social market economy or any other 
economic order as such is a political task depending on the will of the 
legislator and associated therewith on political majorities. It is therefore 
important to draw attention to the following particularity: while it is true that 
the social market economy is not the economic constitution of the Basic Law 
there is no doubt that  the social market economy is constituting the 
established economic order of Germany. Accordingly, the legislator has 
decided in favour of the social market economy as the economic order of 
Germany76. In particular, at the end of the parliamentary term in 1957 the 
legislator adopted the Treaty on the German Federal Bank(Gesetz über die 
Deutsche Bundesbank) and the Act against Restraints of Competition(Gesetz 
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen). Thus, ordoliberal ideas started very 
early to play a significant role in the economic policy of Germany.  
  Moreover, the social market economy has been enshrined in a formal 
law. With the German reunification in 1990 which was finalized by the Treaty 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic establishing a Monetary, Economic and Social Union 77 the social 
market economy has gained legal status as Germany's economic system. In 
Article 1 (3) the social market economy is characterized by the particular 
                                                             
76 See for this Christian Otto Schlecht, Social Market Economy: Political 
Implementation,2008, 401.  
77Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik über die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands(Einigungsvertrag), BGBl. 1990 II S. 
889. 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/einigvtr/BJNR208890990.html.  
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features “private property, competition, free price formulation and generally 
total freedom of movement in terms of work, capital and services”. According 
to Article 1(4) the social order is characterized by a labour market order 
compatible with the social market economy and a comprehensive system of 
social security services based on the principles of justice of achievement and 
social compensation. It can be clearly seen that the description of the basic 
characteristics of the social market economy in the Treaty of the reunification 
are based on both, Ordoliberalism and Alfred Müller Armack´s concept of the 
social market economy with the inclusion of social balancing.  
 It is furthermore important to note, that the social market economy is 
enshrined in two Länder Constitutions. Article 38 of the constitution of the 
Freistaat Thüringen (Land Thuringia) states that: "The regulation of economic 
life must be compatible with the principles of a social and ecological market 
economy"78. Article 51 of the constitution of Rheinland-Pfalz(The Land 
Rheinland-Palatinate) states the following: "The social market economy is the 
basis of the economic life. It contributes to the safeguarding and 
improvement of the living and working conditions by linking economic 
freedoms with social balancing, social security and the protection of the 
environment79.  
 In addition, against the backdrop of the ongoing European integration 
process the question of the neutrality of the Basic Law must be viewed in a 
new light. The decisions to the Investment Aid and Co-Determination cases 
were handed down to a time when the European integration process was not 
well advanced and accordingly the influence of Community law on the 
economic constitutions of the Member States was rather limited. This 
however has essentially changed. The BVerfG has in several rulings80 
gradually accepted the transfer of sovereign rights to the EU. Furthermore, 
                                                             
78 Die Ordnung des Wirtschaftslebens hat den Grundsätzen einer sozialen und der Ökologie 
verpflichteten Marktwirtschaft zu entsprechen, Artikel 38 der Verfassung des Freistaats 
Thüringen (Auszug) Vom 25. Oktober 1993 (GVBl. S. 625), zuletzt geändert durch Gesetz 
vom 11. Oktober 2004 (GVBl. S. 745). 
79 Artikel 51 [Wirtschaftsordnung] Die soziale Marktwirtschaft ist die Grundlage der 
Wirtschaftsordnung. Sie trägt zur Sicherung und Verbesserung der Lebens- und 
Beschäftigungsbedingungen der Menschen bei, indem sie wirtschaftliche Freiheiten mit 
sozialem Ausgleich, sozialer Absicherung und dem Schutz der Umwelt verbindet.  
80 see for this BVerfGE 37, 271- Solange I; BVerfGE 73, 339- Solange II, BVerfG 89, 155- 
Maastricht; BVErfGE 2- BvE 2/08, 2 BvE 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 2 BvR 1022/08, 2 BvR 
1259/08, 2 BvR 182/09 - Lissabon.  
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Article 23 GG of the Basic Law has been amended in 1992, which allowed a 
further transfer of power to  the European Union. The CJEU on the other 
hand has declared the primacy and superiority of EU law over the law of the 
Member States. As a matter of fact, the economic constitution of the Basic 
law cannot be assessed anymore isolated from the European economic 
constitution. This development has implications on the German legislator´s 
leeway of discretion to shape the social market economy. In contrast to the 
economic constitution of the Basic Law, the European economic constitution 
cannot be considered as neutral. This has to do with the fact that the 
European economic constitution is more specific than the constitutional laws 
of the Member States as regards the constitutional determination of 
economic structure and process81. In contrast to the Basic Law, the (social) 
market economy has been constitutionalized in Community law. According to 
Article 3(3) TFEU one of the objectives of the European Union is the creation 
of a highly competitive social market economy. Furthermore, Article 119(1) 
TFEU obliges the Member States to conduct their economic policies with a 
view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union in 
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free 
competition. Against the background that the European economic 
constitution cannot be termed neutral and comprises a systematic decision in 
favour of a market economic system the question arises whether the 
neutrality of the Basic Law can be still maintained. This question is 
controversially discussed in Germany. On the one hand it is argued that the 
decision in favour of a market economic system in the EU Treaty had no 
influence on the neutrality of the Basic Law82. On the other hand it is argued, 
that European Union law has repealed the neutrality of the economic 
constitution of the Basic Law83 which prohibits a change in system to a 
planned or centrally administered economy84. In the absence of further case 
law of the BVerfG on the neutrality of the Basic Law, it is not necessary to 
decide this controversy. As a matter of fact, it must be still assumed that the 
Basic Law is neutral in economic terms. 
                                                             
81 Julio Baquero Cruz, Between Competition and  Free Movement- The Economic 
Constitutional Law of the  European Community 2002, 76,  
82 Jungbluth EUR 2010, 471. 
83 Peter-Christian Müller Graf, Unternehmensinvestitionen und Investitionssteuerung im 
Marktrecht, 1984, S. 316. 
84 Hatje, 2010, 629. 
28 
 
 The social market economy finds also broad support by political 
parties. Despite the fact that  in the political landscape of Germany political 
parties hold different opinions concerning the degree of state intervention in 
the economy, all political parties which have governed Germany after the 
establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 had and still have 
one thing in common: the commitment to  the social market economy as 
Germany’s economic system85. Accordingly it has not only been the CDU, 
but also the FDP86 the SPD87 and the Green Party88 that have invoked the 
social market economy for their idea on socioeconomic policy making. 
Interestingly enough, the social market economy is interpreted variously by 
the above mentioned political parties. The SPD as Germany’s social 
democratic party traditionally underlines the importance of social justice as 
part of the social market economy. Initially the SPD refused the idea of the 
social market economy in the 1950s. With the Godesberger Programm89 of 
November 1959 the SPD then changed fundamentally its party goals and 
turned away from the ideal of Marxist socialism towards a capitalist system 
with private property and free market principles complemented by the social 
policy of the state. The SPD was no longer only the party of the working class 
but the party of the people. The social democrats incorporated the social 
market economy in their party programme in 2007 and 2013. The FDP 
traditionally emphasizes the importance of the liberal elements of the social 
market economy whereas the Green Party highlights the importance of an 
ecological-social market economy. But it is without doubt the CDU that can 
claim to be the originator of the concept of social market economy. The 
Christian democrats propagated the social market economy in its campaign 
for the first elections after World War II in 1949. The CDU won the elections, 
Konrad Adenauer became Chancellor and Ludwig Erhard became minister 
                                                             
85 Jeremy Leaman 2009, The Political Economy of Germany under Chancellors Kohl and 
Schröder, 30. 
86 Karlsruhe Programme of the Liberal Democratic Party 2012  
http://www.freiheit.org/files/288/2012_Karlsruher_Freiheitsthesen.pdf.  
87 Entweder wir modernisieren, und zwar als soziale Marktwirtschaft, oder wir werden 
modernisert, und zwar von den ungebremsten Kräften des Marktes, die das Soziale beiseite 
drängen würden. 
Schroeder Regierungserklärung 14.03.2003. 
88 Berlin Programme of the Green Party 2002 
http://www.boell.de/downloads/publikationen/2002_003_Grundsatzprogramm_Buendnis
90DieGruenen.pdf 
89 http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3049. 
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for economic affairs , who started to apply and implement the social market 
economy in German economic politics and became father of the so called  
German economic miracle. Alfred Müller-Armack, one of the founding fathers 
of the concept, belonged as well to the CDU. In its so called Dusseldorf 
guidelines from 1949 the CDU defined the social market economy as 
follows90:  
 "The social market economy is the socially bound constitution of the 
 commercial economy, in which the endeavours of free and able people 
 are set in an order which yields a maximum of economic advantage 
 and social justice for all. This order is created by freedom and 
 obligation which in the social market economy express themselves 
 through genuine competition and independent monopoly control".  
 It is important to note that the established neutrality of the Basic Law does 
not mean that the discretion of the legislator is unlimited. On the contrary, 
there are normative provisions in the Basic Law restricting the freedom of the 
legislator in organizing economic life. The entirety of these provisions 
constitutes the economic constitution of the Basic Law. The realization of the 
social market economy as Germany's economic order is subject to 
compliance with the commitments of the economic constitution of the Basic 
Law. In the following the economic constitution of the Basic Law shall be 
further analyzed.  
 
3. The Economic Constitution of the Basic Law 
The Basic Law contains in its first section a catalogue of enforceable 
fundamental rights and liberties91.These rights and liberties, as they comprise 
classical freedoms in the liberal tradition are first and foremost aimed at 
guaranteeing the freedom of individuals to participate in civil and political life 
without being subject to discrimination and to protect this freedom from 
unwarranted infringement. It is important to note that the Basic Law does 
hardly contain fundamental economic or social rights. Basic social rights as 
such must be distinguished from classical civil rights and liberties. Basic 
social rights are aimed to complement the civil rights and liberties since they 
                                                             
90 http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3094. 
91 The Basic Rights in the Weimar Constitution recognized basic rights as goals which were 
not directly enforceable, see Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, 2012, 38. 
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cannot be enjoyed without a certain degree of social security. Basic social 
rights in the form of subjective rights may entitle individuals to refer directly to 
such rights, whereas basic rights included in provisions defining objectives of 
the state do not endow individuals with rights but oblige the state and its 
institutions to respect them. Unlike the Weimar Constitution of 1919, the 
Basic Law is very cautious in formulating enforceable fundamental social 
rights. The only reference to social fundamental rights is Article 6IV GG 
which states that every mother is entitled to protection and care. The main 
reason for refraining from incorporating norms protecting social entitlements 
is that the authors of the Basic Law wanted to avoid the need for such rights 
to be constantly adjusted to changing economic and social conditions92.  
 In detail, the constitutional framework offered by the Basic law 
contains several fundamental rights which form the backbone of the German 
economic constitution. As regards this, Article 2 I GG has to be seen as the 
most important provision of the economic constitution. This fundamental right 
refers in particular to the right of self- determination and contains constitutive 
elements of a market economy, like the general freedom of action, the 
freedom of contract, the freedom of commerce and industry and the freedom 
of economic initiative. To continue, the freedom of profession, work and trade 
guaranteed by Article 12 I GG aims to ensure free competition among market 
participants which is a precondition for a proper functioning market order 
based on supply and demand. Article 14 I GG of the Basic Law guarantees 
the right to property including corporate ownership and its economic usability. 
The right to form corporations and other associations is covered by Article 9 I 
GG. Article 9 III GG refers to the right to form and join economic or trade 
association which are entitled to negotiate the basic conditions of the 
economic system on the micro and macro level through free collective 
bargaining, strikes and lock-outs. The entirety of these economic rights is an 
integral part of the Rechtsstaatprinzip93. This constitutional principle is 
commonly translated as a state under the rule of law. However, such a 
translation is imprecise and can be deceptive. This has to do with the fact 
that the German concept of the Rechtstaatsprinzip is in its scope wider than 
the traditional principle of the rule of law which is an integral part of other 
                                                             
92http://www.europarl.europa.eu/workingpapers/soci/pdf/104_en.pdf. 
93 Nigel Foster, 2002:163-171; Ulrich Karpen, 1988, 169-188. 
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constitutions. The notion itself- Rechtsstaat- portends the supremacy of law 
(Recht) within the state (Staat). The earlier concept of a formal 
(formeller)Rechtsstaat has been complemented by the concept of a 
substantial (materieller)Rechtsstaat. Formeller Rechtstaat means the formal 
guarantee of the supremacy of the law and control of state power, whereas 
the materieller Rechtsstaat means that that administrative authorities and 
courts are bound by both, law and statute, and this includes a duty to take 
into account basic constitutional values, particularly the basic rights. It can be 
inferred from this, that the limitation of the power of the state by the 
establishment of fundamental rights is an integral part of the 
Rechtsstaatsprinzip. To summarize, in economic terms the Basic Law 
guarantees labour, capital, associations and coalitions, as keystones of the 
German economic order94.   
 
4. The Social State Principle (Sozialstaatsprinzip)  
It is generally acknowledged among German constitutional scholars that the 
social market economy constitutes an approach to meet the requirements 
imposed on the German state by the social state principle"95. This principle is 
one of the basic tenets of the Basic Law and as such enshrined in two 
constitutional clauses. In Article 20 (1) GG Germany is defined as a 
democratic and social federal state. Article 28(1) GG stipulates that the 
constitutional order in the Länder must conform to the principles of a 
republican democratic and social state governed by the rule of law within the 
meaning of the Basic Law. Worth to mention is furthermore, that the social 
state principle has been incorporated in Article 23 of the GG, which allows for 
the transfer of sovereignty to the European Union. The involvement of 
Germany in the development of the European Union is bound to a specific 
normative framework : the European Union must be committed to 
democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law and to the 
principle of subsidiarity. Furthermore the European Union must ensure a 
level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by 
                                                             
94 Ulrich Karpen, 1991: 87-110. 
95 See Hans Zacher 1995, 1060; Hans F. Zacher 1989, 124;  Joerges/ Rödl, Social Market 
Economy- as Europe´s Social Model? 2004, 13; Horst Küsters, 2007, 9. 
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the Basic law. Article 23 GG makes reference to the provisions of Article 79 
II, III which contain the unchangeable constitutional state policy goals. 
 As regards its constitutional meaning and scope, it is rather difficult to 
exactly determine the content of the social state principle. This can be traced 
back to the fact, that the social state principle is rather a not well-defined 
provision of the Basic Law. As a matter of fact, it is above all the case law of 
the BVerfG that  further defines the social state principle. As regards this 
subject, it is important to note that the Sozialstaatsprinzip is very often 
operated in connection with other basic rights, such as the right to human 
dignity, Article 1 I GG, the right to freely develop one‘s personality Article 2 II 
1 GG and the inviolability of the person, Article 2 II GG. The combination of 
the Sozialstaatsprinzip with other constitutional rights allows the BVerfG to 
give the principle some concrete meaning96. 
 In one of its earliest judgments- the so called 
Hinterbliebenenversorgung case97, the BVerfG laid down the basis for 
subsequent judgments on the scope of the social state principle. The factual 
situation underlying the decision was the following: The complainant was a 
widow of an attorney who had lost his life as a soldier during World War II. As 
a mother of three children between the ages of 6 and 16 the woman 
complained that the money she had received in accordance with the relevant 
law providing for the dependants of war victims amounting to 183 German 
Marks per month, was not enough to make ends meet. In addition, the 
complainant made clear that she was incapable of working because of her 
disability. The plaintiff among others invoked her right to human dignity. The 
Court came to the conclusion that the right to human dignity did not entitle 
individuals to claim directly social benefits from the state. Despite this fact, 
the Court stated that Germany was committed to the Sozialstaatsprinzip. The 
Court made clear that the Sozialstaatsprinzip was addressed to the legislator 
and obliged him to strike for the creation of bearable living conditions for 
those who suffered hardship resulting from the Hitler regime. Moreover, the 
legislator was obliged to balance conflicting interests and thus, to ensure a 
fair social order. Only in cases where the state deliberately neglected its 
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97BVerfGE 1, 97; Hinterbliebenenrente; see for this: Manfred Hinz, Namibia Law Journal 
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obligation resulting from the social state principle,  holders of fundamental 
rights had the right to invoke social benefits from the state.98. 
 It can be inferred from this judgment that the primary goal of the 
Sozialstaatsprinzip is the creation of social justice. The social state principle 
is a normative binding constitutional principle addressed to the state and all 
its organs binding them to social activity. As a Staatszielbestimmung, 
meaning a norm describing a goal to be pursued by the state, the 
Sozialstaatsprinzip gives the state not only the right but also the duty to 
shape a social just order99. The Sozialstaatsprinzip is not a directly applicable 
law, but rather an appeal to all state organs to engage in social activity. While 
the BVerfG set the objective to be achieved by the state it did not lay down 
any guidelines in which manner the creation of social justice has to be 
realized. According to consistent case law of the Federal Constitutional Court 
this task is up to the legislator who has a large discretion to determine what is 
social in particular cases. As regards this, the BVerfG stated  in the 
Freelance Broadcasting Employees case the following100: 
 "This principle of the social State may certainly be of 
importance for the $interpretation of basic rights, as well as for the 
interpretation and constitutional evaluation of laws that restrict basic 
rights pursuant to a proviso of law. It is, however, not capable of 
limiting basic rights in the absence of specification by the legislature, 
i.e., directly. It places a duty on the State to provide for a just social 
order in fulfilling this duty, the legislature is endowed with a broad 
 margin of discretion In other words, the principle of the social 
State sets a task for the State but does not say anything as to how this 
task is to be accomplished in detail -- in any other case, the principle 
would come into conflict with the principle of democracy: the 
democratic order established by the Basic Law would, as the system 
of a free, political process, be decisively restricted and curtailed if 
                                                             
98 According to Alexy, the right to an existential minimum is a unwritten constitutional right, 
interpretatively derived from the above mentioned constitutional rights provisions  Robert 
Alexy 2002:290. 
99  Phillip Kunig 1988, 194. 
100 BVerfGE 59, 231/ See for the Translation:  
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political decision making were to be made subject to a constitutional 
obligation that could only be met in a specific, stipulated  manner". 
 From this it can be inferred that the Court grants the legislator a wide leeway 
of discretion to fulfil his obligations resulting form the social state principle. 
The social state principle has therefore to be seen as a provision with a 
rather programmatic character. Notwithstanding, the social state principle is 
constitutionally protected and cannot be changed by legislation. According to 
Article 79 III GG constitutional principles are fundamental components of the 
German constitution and immune from any constitutional amendment. Due to 
the fact that it is the only provision of the Basic Law which explicitly refers to 
social conditions, the social state principle plays a pivotal role.  
 Moreover, the provisions of the Basic Law and all other laws below the 
constitution must be interpreted in the light of this constitutional principle. 
Thus, the social state principle establishes the boundaries and infuses the 
meaning of all economic rights created by the Basic Law101. Accordingly, 
there is a large number of judgments in which the BVerfG made reference to 
the social state principle as a means to interpret individual basic rights..  
 
5. Interim Conclusion 
It was shown that the original concept of the social market economy is not 
explicitly reflected in the economic constitution of the Basic Law. Market 
conformity, which is a major element of the original concept of the social 
market economy is not used by the BVerfG as a yardstick for assessing the 
constitutionality of legislative action. The Court established the doctrine of 
neutrality of the Basic Law, allowing the legislator to pursue any policy he 
wants, as long as the Basic Law is respected. The doctrine of neutrality, 
however, must be seen in relative terms. While it is true that the Basic Law 
lacks a clear statement on a specific economic model, its provisions do not 
give room for extreme economic models. The embodiment of the social state 
principle rules out a laissez faire market economy and the fundamental basic 
rights of the economic constitution rule out a planned economy 
respectively102. In the view of the former justice at the BVerfG Di Fabio the 
economic order under the Basic Law as a general rule must reflect a market 
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economic system103. By saying that he refers to the functional guarantees of 
a market economic system reflected in the basic rights, namely in the Article 
2,9,12,14 GG through which a market economic system could be 
established. Thus, these fundamental rights formed the backbone of the 
economic constitution of the Basic Law. The former president of the Federal 
Constitutional Court, Hans Jürgen Papier went even further and stated that 
there was no alternative to the “social market economy” in Germany104. The 
same view was shared by the former justice of the BVerfG and former 
president of the Federal Republic of Germany Roman Herzog105, who stated 
that it was not right to see the social market economy only at the discretion of 
the legislature. According to him, the social market economy had its firm 
place in the basic principles of the constitution.  
 
 
 
D. The Reconciliation of Economic Freedom with Social Justice in the 
Case Law of the BVerfG   
 
In the previous section it was shown that the formation and guarantee of a 
social market economy is a political task depending on the will of the 
legislator and associated therewith on political majorities, provided that the 
values of the Basic Law are respected. Against the background that the 
market conformity which constitutes a major element of the original type of 
the social market economy is not considered as an absolute criterion for the 
assessment of the constitutionality of state interventions in the economy it is 
therefore necessary to examine how conflicts between individual and 
collective self- determination on the one hand, and social state intervention 
                                                             
103“Die Wirtschaftsordnung unter dem Grundgesetz muss daher eine grundsätzlich 
marktwirtschaftliche sein”. Udo Di Fabio in Maunz/Dürig, GG Art.2 Rn. 76, 2013. 
104 Hans Jürgen Papier; Grundgesetz und Soziale Marktwirtschaft, 2009, 21: „ Das 
Grundgesetz bildet eine solide und tragfähige Grundlage einer freiheitlichen 
Wirtschaftsordnung. Es ist zwar nicht auf ein bestimmtes Wirtschaftssystem gerichtet,, 
ermöglicht aber gerade auch die „Soziale Marktwirtschaft“; von Verfassungs-und 
Gemeinschaftsrechts wegen ist sie dem Grunde nach – letztlich alternativlos“.  
105 “Es ist falsch, dem Grundgesetz zu entnehmen, daß es die soziale Marktwirtschaft ins freie 
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on the other, are resolved. The BVerfG emphasizes in its subsequent case 
law  that it is the legislator´s task to adopt regulations that pays regard to 
"constitutional requirements that gives effect to the concerns of all those 
involved and affected106. This means that the legislator, on the one side has 
the task to respect  fundamental rights, and on the other, to take into 
consideration duties following from the social state principle to bring about 
social justice. This task can only be achieved by intervening in the economy 
which as a result narrows down the economic freedom of fundamental rights 
holders. This situation reflects as well the uneasy relationship between the 
Rechtsstaatsprinzip and the Sozialstaatsprinzip107. To recall, whereas the 
Recthsstaatsprinzip protects the individual from state encroachments - the 
social state principle createsduty for the state to realize a- just social order 
arising from the needs of the modern industrial society108.  
 As stated above, the resolution of these conflicts is in the first instance 
addressed to the legislator who himself is bound to the Basic Law. However, 
the BVerfG plays an equally crucial role in this process. This is due to the fact 
that the social market economy needs necessarily to comply with the Basic 
Law and only the BVerfG is allowed to interpret the Basic Law. The 
provisions of the Basic Law are rather indeterminate and thus the scope of 
protection offered by the Basic Law to fundamental rights holders  on the one 
                                                             
106 BVerfGE 59, 231(Freie Mitarbeiter), See for Translation: 
https://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/german/case.ph
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107 In the 1950s a discussion concerning the “Rechtsstaat versus Sozialstaat” controversy 
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See Forsthoff , Ernst. 1954. “Begriff und Wesen des sozialen Rechtstaates.” 
Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 12:8–35; Abendroth, 
Wolfgang. 1954. “Zum Begriff des demokratischen und sozialen Rechtsstaates im 
Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” Pp. 279 et seq. in Festschrift Ludwig 
Bergsträsser, edited by A. Herrmann. Düsseldorf: Droste; Christian Joerges, Rechtsstaat and 
Social Europe, 2010,  66f.  
108 Elisabeth Pascal, 2008, 884. 
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hand and the duties and obligations  resulting form the Basic Law on the 
other  are determined by the constitutional review of the BVerfG which has 
the monopole to interpret the Basic Law. Constitutional review  in Germany - 
understood as  the power of BVerfG to assess the constitutionality of 
legislative or administrative acts plays a significant role in German politics. 
This can be mainly attributed to Germany´s experiences during the Nazi 
dictatorship. Accordingly,in the course of negotiations of the Constitutional 
Convention in 1948 to draft the Basic Law in Bavaria at Herrenchiemsee, 
Konrad Adenauer made the following statement: "Dictatorship is not only 
necessarily dictatorship by a single person. There is also dictatorship by a 
parliamentary majority. And we want protection against such dictatorship in 
the form of a constitutional court"109. As a matter of fact, the BVerfG as the 
highest court in Germany is entitled to safeguard the values of the 
constitutional order and to defend the rights of individuals against 
governmental intrusion. The BVerfG provides the legislature with guidance 
on the content and scope of constitutional provisions and associated with that 
influences the formation of the social market economy. The task of the Court 
is to find the balance between shaping political reality according to the 
constitution and adapting the constitution to the needs and possibilities of 
reality.110 But the BVerfG is not only the guardian of the Basic Law but also 
an "countermajoritarian institution"111, which provides politics with guidance. 
It moves between the poles of law and politics as Donald Kommers states 
correctly112. In the following, the methodologies of constitutional interpretation 
and justification of restrictions of fundamental rights as utilized by the BVerfG 
will be further examied. 
 
 
  
                                                             
109 Verhandlungen des Parlamentarischen Rates, 2nd session, p.25, cited in: Georg Vanberg, 
2005, 1. 
110 Karpen, 1988, 179. 
111 Georg Vanberg, 2005, 175. 
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especially, are parts of political systems is a proposition no longer to be denied; Kommers, 
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Beverly  
Hills – London 1976, p. 11. Cited in: Robert Chr. van Ooyen · Martin H. W. Möllers in: Das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht im politischen System, 2005,  9. 
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I. Methods of Constitutional Interpretation  
The Basic Law as being only an outline of the body of doctrine becomes the 
real "constitution" only in the course of judicial interpretation113. Since the 
wording of provisions of the Basic Law is very general, constitutional 
interpretation is of significant relevance to determine the scope of protection 
offered by fundamental rights. As a written constitution the Basic Law is not 
self-actualizing and it therefore needs to be maintained over time which as a 
matter of fact necessitates both interpretation and adaptation to changing 
circumstances114. Accordingly, it is important to examine which judicial 
technique  the BVerfG employs to interpret  the substance of provisions of 
the Basic Law,  in particular when fundamental rights and or fundamental 
principles are in conflict. 
 
1.Classical Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation 
The classical methodology of constitutional as well as statutory interpretation 
used in Germany goes back to Friedrich Carl von Savigny, the founder of the 
historical school of jurisprudence115. Savigny distinguished between four 
methods of interpretation, namely grammatical-, systematic-, historical and 
teleological interpretation. The latter is also referred to as purposive 
interpretation. These methods are principally recognized and utilized by the 
BVerfG as methods for the interpretation of the Basic Law, as the Tax Levy 
Case116 reveals. As regards this subject, grammatical interpretation refers to 
the determination of the meaning of a particular word or sentence of a 
constitutional provision. In systematic interpretation, the emphasis lies on 
clarifying the meaning of a legal norm by reading it in combination with the 
constitution as a whole. This approach relies upon the unity of the legal 
world.117. In the Southwest – State case118 the BVerfG handed down an 
                                                             
113 Peter E. Quint 2009, 1-14. 
114 Kommers 2007, 35, Germany: Balancing Rights and Duties in: Interpreting Constitutions: 
A Comparative Study. 
115See Friedrich Carl von Savigny 1840, System des heutigen römischen Rechts, Berlin, Veit 
und comp., 1840, vol. 1, p. 213;Winfried Brugger 1994, 396. 
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117 Brugger 1994, 398. 
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essential decision for the systematic interpretation of the Basic Law. The 
Court made clear that the Basic Law was internally coherent and constituted 
a structural unity. Accordingly the Basic Law must to be interpreted as a 
whole, meaning that clauses or provisions have not to be interpreted 
independently, but instead, every constitutional provision must be interpreted 
in such a way that it was compatible with the fundamental principles of the 
constitution and the intensions of its authors119. With employing the 
teleological analysis the interpreter attempts to identify the ratio legis, 
meaning the spirit and purpose behind the various provisions of the Basic 
Law or the document as a whole120. Historical interpretation of a 
constitutional provision attempts to explore the intention of the founding 
fathers at the time when the constitution was adopted, whereby both the 
specific and the general declarations of intension are of relevance121. The 
grammatical, historical, and systematic modes are strongly based on 
constitutional textualism which means that the Court is adhering to the 
constitutional text while doing the interpretation. The teleological method, on 
the other hand, is a more open – ended approach to judicial decision 
making122. These modes of interpretation do not preclude each other but are 
complementary. However, the chosen mode of interpretation must be in 
conformity with the Basic Law (Verfassungskonforme Auslegung123). 
Accordingly, if several methods of interpretation are applicable and one leads 
to an unconstitutional, the other to a constitutional result, then the method of 
interpretation which complies best with the Basic Law must be given 
priority124.  
 
2. Objective Order of Values  
The Basic Law constitutes according to the BVerfG an objective order of 
values (Objektive Werteordnung des Grundgesetzes). This doctrine of 
German constitutional law is of particular importance for the interpretation 
                                                             
119 Kommers 1997,47. 
120 Bruggers 1994, 397; Kommers 2012, 67. 
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and application of the provisions of the Basic Law. The BVerfG created this 
doctrine in its landmark decision to the Lüth case125. In this case the Court 
had to deal with the question whether fundamental rights have in addition to 
its vertical effect also horizontal effect. To clarify, the vertical effect refers to 
the applicability of fundamental rights in protecting individuals against the 
state. Horizontal effect refers to the ability of fundamental rights to affect legal 
relations between private parties126. It classified the relationship between 
fundamental rights and private law as follows:  
 The primary purpose of the basic rights is to safeguard the 
liberties of the individual against interferences by public authority. 
They are defensive rights  of the individual against the state127. (...)It is 
equally true, however, that the Basic Law is not a value-neutral 
document [citation from numerous decisions].Its section on basic 
rights establishes an objective order of values, and this order strongly 
reinforces the effective power of basic rights. This value system, which 
centers upon dignity of the human personality developing freely within 
the social community, must be looked upon as a fundamental 
constitutional decision affecting all spheres of law [public and private]. 
It serves as a yardstick for measuring and assessing all actions in the 
areas of legislation, public administration, and adjudication. Thus it is 
clear that basic rights also influence [the development of] private law. 
Every provision of private law must be compatible with this system of 
values, and every such provision must be interpreted in its spirit.128 
The significance of the Lüth decision has to be seen in the fact that the scope 
of applicability of fundamental rights was extended. Fundamental rights are 
considered negative and positive as well as subjective and objective in 
                                                             
125 BVerfG, 15.01.1958 - 1 BvR 400/51 Lueth, BVerfGE 7, 198, 205.  
126 See for this Chantal Mak 2008, Introduction xxvii. 
127 Kommers 1997: 369, BVerfGE 7, 198, 204:’ Ohne Zweifel sind die Grundrechte in erster 
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nature129. Thus, fundamental rights do not only constitute guarantees of 
negative rights of citizens against the state authority but to the same time 
they contain a value. This results in the obligation of the state to ensure that 
this objective order of values becomes a constituent element of the general 
legal system. To clarify, a positive right is distinct from an objective value. 
The latter refers to the organization of the state and its duty to create and 
maintain an environment conducive to the realization of values. Conversely, 
a positive right as stated above is an entitlement of individuals against the 
state130. Accordingly, the fundamental rights of the Basic Law have an effect 
on the development of private law meaning that each private law provision 
must be in accordance with this objective system of values and interpreted 
within the meaning of it131. In regard of the way how this should be realized, 
the BVerfG stated the following:  
 "The influence of the scale of values of the basic rights affects 
particularly those provisions of private law that contain mandatory 
rules of law and thus form part of the order public- in the broad sense 
of the term- that is, rules which for reasons of the general welfare also 
are binding on private legal relationships and are removed from the 
dominion of private intent. Because of  their purpose these provisions 
are closely related to the public law they supplement. Consequently, 
they are substantially exposed to the influence of constitutional law. In 
bringing this influence to bear, the courts may invoke the general 
clauses which, like Article 826 of the Civil Code, refer to standards 
outside private law. 'Good morals' is one such standard. In order to 
determine what is required by social norms such as these, one has to 
consider first the ensemble of value of concepts that a nation had 
developed at a certain point in its intellectual and cultural history and 
laid down in its constitution".132 
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From this it can be inferred that the BVerfG tasked ordinary courts to make 
the influence of fundamental rights on private law provisions effective by 
invoking general clauses like good morals and good trust which refer to 
standards outside private law. 
Moreover, the objective order of values of the Basic Law is ordered 
hierarchically. On top of this free democratic basic order is the value of 
human dignity followed by the values of human life and the free development 
of one´s personality.133 
 
3. Human Dignity in Constitutional Interpretation 
It can be inferred from the foregoing that it comes as no surprise that human 
dignity plays a pivotal role in German constitutional law. This centrality is 
expressed by giving human dignity a prominent place in Article 1 I GG which 
has the following wording: Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and 
protect it shall be the duty of all state authority. The guarantee of human 
dignity in German constitutional law constitutes a “fundamental constituent 
principle”134, meaning that it is the” basis of all that follows, the highest 
value135 within the system of constitutionally protected values 136” in the Basic 
Law. The commitment to the social state principle has to be understood in 
connection with the commitment to human dignity. As will be shown below in 
the case study section, the BVerfG utilizes human dignity very often for the 
concretization of the common good, the main criterion for assessing the 
constitutionality of encroachments upon citizens basic rights by the 
legislature. 
The term human dignity poses difficulties as there is no universally accepted 
way of how to define it. Human dignity is often said to have originated in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, according to which man was made in the image of 
God137. From this it follows that a divine spark is reflected in the heart of 
humans which "establishes man´s humanity and grants him unique status 
among the creatures in God´s creation,  or in other words his dignity"138. In 
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the course of the Enlightenment, it was Immanuel Kant139 with his ideal of the 
autonomy of the individual who further developed the term human dignity. 
According to his famous "categorical imperative" man should never be seen 
merely as a means to an end but always at the same time as an end140.  
In evolutionary terms, human dignity found first mentioning in a constitutional 
text in Germany in the Weimar Constitution from 1919. Article 151(1) of the 
Weimar Constitution (hereinafter WRV) stated that the economic order must 
correspond to the principles of justice with the aim to guarantee everybody 
an existence in human dignity141. The wording of Article 151(1) of the WRV 
clearly refers to the “socio-economic dimension” of human dignity. Human 
dignity then found with Article 1 I GG a prominent place with the coming into 
force of the Basic Law in 1949 as a response to Germany´s Nazi regime142.  
For the interpretation of the term human dignity the BVerfG draws on Günter 
Dürigs so called “object formula” which as such is based on Kant´s 
categorical imperative and thus emphasizes the significance of individual 
autonomy. This formula states that: "Human dignity is violated if man, 
individually, is degraded to an object, to a mere means, to a fungible 
factor143. Following Dürigs definition the BVerfG in the Life-
Imprisonment144stated that:  
 “It is contrary to human dignity to make persons the mere tools of the 
state145”.  
The BVerfG then modified and supplemented Dürig´s object formula in it´s 
decision on wiretapping (Abhörurteil) when it stated that:   
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 (…) “everything depends on determining under which 
circumstances human dignity might be violated. For general formulas, 
like the one that man must not be degraded to a mere object of state 
power, can only ‘indicate’ a direction where cases of a violation of 
human dignity may be found”146.  
Dürigs object formula was criticised for its vagueness, particularly for not 
reflecting the community oriented image of man of the Basic Law. 
Accordingly, it was then the BVerfG which made clear that human dignity in 
German Constitutional Law has not only an individual-autonomous 
dimension, but complementary to that, also a communitarian dimension 
which obliged the state to ensure conditions for the realization of dignity, 
particularly to give individuals the opportunity to participate in a political and 
social community147. In the Mephisto case- which addressed the conflict of 
human dignity and freedom of speech, the BVerfG explained that the right to 
artistic liberty is based on the Basic Law´s image of man as an autonomous 
person developing freely within social community. In the Life Imprisonment 
case then it stated that: 
 "The constitutional principles of the Basic Law embrace the 
respect and  protection of  human dignity. The free human person and 
his or her dignity are the highest values of the constitutional order. The 
state in all of its forms is obliged to respect and defend it. This is 
based on the conception of human persons as spiritual-moral beings 
endowed with the freedom to determine and  develop themselves. 
This freedom within the meaning of the Basic Law is not that of an 
isolated and self-regarding individual but rather that of a person 
related to and bound by the community. In the light of this community-
boundedness, personal liberty cannot be "unlimited in principle". The 
individual must accept those limits on freedom of action that the 
legislature deems necessary in the interest of the community´s social 
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life; yet the autonomy of the individual also has to be protected. This 
means that the state must regard every individual within society with 
equal worth148. 
From these rulings, the subjective-negative and the objective- positive 
dimension of human dignity can be clearly seen. The duty to respect human 
dignity(Article 1 I 2 GG) refers to the former 149. It gives subjects of 
fundamental rights a claim against the state to refrain from violating their 
human dignity150. The duty to protect human dignity(Article 1 I 2 GG) refers to 
the latter. It gives on the one hand subjects of basic rights a claim against the 
state to protect their human dignity against third party violations and on the 
other obliges the state to establish a legal order that makes the realization of 
a life in human dignity possible. The latter refers to human dignity as an value 
as it imposes an obligation on the state to insure that human dignity becomes 
an integral part of the general order151. Accordingly, the BVerfG interprets 
human dignity very frequently in connection with other provisions of the Basic 
Law, such as the freedom of personal development Article 2 I GG. This kind 
of constitutional interpretation takes place to oblige the state to “affirmatively 
protect human dignity against third persons”152. When taking a look at the 
case law of the BVerfG it will be seen that the Court has very rarely handed 
down a decision solely on the basis of human dignity. Conversely, there are 
numerous cases in which human dignity in connection with other provisions 
of the Basic Law formed the basis of decisions. In these cases, human 
dignity serves as an interpretation tool for other provisions of the Basic Law. 
Generally, the combination of another right with Art 1 GG extends the scope 
of that right153. 
From this it can be concluded that human dignity is inseparably linked to the 
image of man of the Basic Law and associated with that to the interest of the 
common good. This is also expressed in the jurisprudence of the BVerfG as 
will be shown below, when it concretizes the common good on the basis of 
the Basic Laws human dignity.  
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II. The Method of Justifying Restrictions of Fundamental Rights  
The Basic Law as interpreted by the BVerfG constitutes a liberal legal and 
economic order154. Accordingly, holders of fundamental rights are granted a 
general right to liberty. This has significant implications for the understanding 
of fundamental rights in the frame of review of legislative acts by the BVerfG. 
Every act of legislation that limits the freedom of action of a fundamental 
rights holder requires constitutional justification"155. Against this background, 
the Basic Law provides for a precept of rule and exception in the sense that 
all fundamental rights and associated therewith also the fundamental rights 
belonging to the economic constitution are characterized as rules156. These 
fundamental rights as negative rights make it holders of fundamental rights 
possible to engage in economic activity free from any state interference. Any 
derogation from these rules is exceptional and needs justification. This 
indicates that the derivable fundamental rights from the economic constitution 
of the Basic Law are not absolute. A restriction is allowed under the 
consideration of the Rechtsstaatsprinzip and within the limits set in each of 
the basic rights itself. However, the essence of a fundamental right may in no 
case be affected, Article 19 II GG. The legislator is furthermore only allowed 
to intervene in the economy and thus in the protected sphere of fundamental 
rights holders, if the restriction is justified and proportionate.  
 
1. The Principle of Proportionality157 
The principle of proportionality (Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit) is the 
most important judicial technique for resolving conflicts between a right and a 
competing right or interest. At the core of this technique is the balancing 
procedure which requires that rights have to be balanced against competing 
rights or interests.158 Having its origin in Germany159, the principle of 
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proportionality was for the first time applied in the Police Law of Prussia in 
1794. § 10 II 17 of this statute obliged the police authorities to take 
appropriate measures to ensure the public order, peace and security160. At 
the end of the nineteenth century then, the Prussian Supreme Administrative 
Court (Preussisches Oberverwaltungsgericht) invoked the principle of 
proportionality to examine the discretion of the police in the sphere of law and 
order(Gefahrenabwehr)161.  
 The principle of proportionality as such has no textual basis in the 
Basic Law, but notwithstanding it has constitutional status. The BVerfG 
derives it from the Rechtsstaatsprinzip and as such it found its place in 
German constitutional law for the first time in the landmark decision of the 
BVerfG to the Pharmacy-Case in 1958162. This judgment constitutes 
furthermore the starting point of application of the principle of proportionality 
in constitutional law163. The principle of proportionality also served as a 
model for other national constitutional courts164 as well as for the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court for the 
Protection of Human Rights(ECtHR). The principle of proportionality stems 
from the premise, that any state action capable of encroaching on the private 
sphere of individuals needs not only a legal basis (Vorbehalt des Gesetzes) 
but the state action itself must also serve the public interest and comply with 
a proportionality test. This means that the state may only impose restrictions 
that are justified by a legitimate purpose and which must be absolutely 
necessary. Thus, dogmatically seen the principle of proportionality belongs to 
the level of constitutional justification (Verfassungsrechtliche Rechtfertigung) 
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and associated with that it has to be subsumed under the concept of limits of 
limits (Schranken- Schranken) of fundamental rights.  
 The principle of proportionality must be seen in relation with the fact 
that the BVerfG interprets fundamental rights as principles rather than 
rights165. Principles as such constitute opitimization requirements requiring 
proportionality analysis in their application 166. This approach, which goes 
back to Rober Alexy´s work " A Theory of Constitutional Rights" has major 
implications on the resolving of constitutional rights conflicts. Alexy explains 
the need for the distinction between rules and principles as follows: 
 (…) the decisive point in distinguishing rules from principles is 
that principles are norms which require that something be realized to 
the greatest extent possible given their legal and factual possibilities. 
Principles are optimization requirements, characterized by the fact that 
they can be satisfied to varying degrees, and that the appropriate 
degree of satisfaction depends not only on what is factually possible 
but also on what is legally possible. The scope of the legally possible 
is determined by opposing principles and rules. By contrast  rules are 
norms that are always either fulfilled or not. If a rule validly applies, 
then the requirement is to do exactly what it says, neither more or less. 
In this way rules contain fixed points in the field of the factually and 
legally possible. This means that the distinction between rules and 
principles is a qualitative one and not one of degree. Every rule is 
either a rule or a principle167. 
The distinction between rules and principles is of the utmost importance for 
the rationale behind the idea of resolving of constitutional conflicts by 
optimization. For Alexy a conflict between legal rules is solved either by 
subsuming one of the rules under the other as an exception to it or by 
declaring one of them invalid. In his point of view a rule is valid or is not168. 
The collision between two principles, by contrast must take place on the 
basis of the Law of Balancing which states that: “ The greater the degree of 
non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater must be the 
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importance of satisfying the other”169. Accordingly, the conflict is solved in a 
process of weighing in which none of the colliding principles loses their 
validity, but the losing principle is considered merely to have less significance 
in the situation at hand than its counter-principle. This means, that in cases 
where competing fundamental rights are opposed, the Court weighs the 
fundamental right of the one group against the fundamental right of the other 
opposing groups. Whenever the advantage achieved is out of proportion to 
the disadvantage inflicted, the means is considered to be an unconstitutional 
infringement on the relevant fundamental right. Almost every decision of the 
BVerfG that strikes down a statute has its roots in the optimization procedure. 
 In regard of its structure, the principle of proportionality consists of 
several principles, namely the legitimacy of the goal, the principles of 
suitability, necessity and proportionality in the narrow sense. In the first place 
the state interference in question must pursue a legitimate goal. As such it 
must be objectively justifiable. As regards this subject, the relevant measure 
of the state has to serve the common good. The BVerfG determines the 
common good by considering the image of man of the Basic Law. As was 
shown, the image of man of the Basic Law is not based on an isolated 
sovereign individual but rather on that of a person related to and bound by 
the community. The individual must, according to the subsequent case law of 
the BVerfG, accept limits of his freedom of action that the legislature deems 
necessary in the interest of the community´s social life. The value system of 
the Basic law furthermore centers according to the BVerfG upon the dignity 
of the human personality developing freely within the social community. The 
legislator can very often invoke the social state principle and the doctrine of 
human dignity to restrict derivable fundamental rights from the economic 
constitution.  
 The principle of suitability refers to the fact that there must be a 
rational connection between the interference and the goal: the interference 
must be suitable to accomplish the purpose of the statute at least to a small 
extent170. The question of the suitability of a policy must be answered from an 
objective point of view, subjective judgments must not be carried out. An 
                                                             
169Alexy, 2002, 49. 
170 Kai Möller 2012:713, Proportionality: Challenging the critics, International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 2012, Vol. 10 No. 3. 709- 731.  
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interference which does not serve or is contrary to the purpose of the statute 
is intelligibly not suitable and accordingly inadmissible. In the same vein, an 
interference is unsuitable if it is factually impossible to accomplish the 
purpose of the statute.  
 The principle of necessity, which is also referred to as the principle of 
the mildest means, requires that out of several available means for achieving 
the legitimate goal of the statute the one which is less drastic should be 
pursued. The precondition for the application of this principle is the existence 
of more than one suitable means for achieving the goal of the statute. 
Accordingly, if this precondition is not met the question of the mildest means 
is not at issue. The forth element of the proportionality test is the most 
important one and it requires the BVerfG to assess whether the state 
interference is proportional in the narrow sense. In concrete terms, this 
means, that a state measure is unacceptable if the burden created thereby is 
disproportionate to the purpose intended by the measure.  
 The determination of the appropriateness requires a balancing 
exercise. According to Alexy’s theory, it is in the last step where the 
balancing of the rights or principles is made and it is where it is looked for the 
optimization of opposed interests. In Alexy´s theory, the suitability and 
necessity are seen as factual while the last step the proportionality in the 
narrow sense is seen as the legal balancing of the rights or interests at 
stake.171. 
 It is important to draw attention on the following peculiarity. The 
principle of proportionality might find application in two different situations, 
namely in conflicts between the state and a holder of a fundamental right  on 
the one hand and between the state and between two or more fundamental 
rights holders on the other. In regard of the former, the principle of 
proportionality is utilized to resolve the precept of rule and exception. 
Accordingly the state must justify why it has intervened in the derivable rights 
form the economic constitution of the Basic Law. In this situation fundamental 
rights holders as a rule enjoy freedom vis a vis the state and fundamental 
rights may be restricted only inasmuch as this is indispensable. The conflict 
is solved by the principle of proportionality and associated therewith by 
                                                             
171 See Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional adjudication in Europe and the United States: 
paradoxes and contrasts International Journal of Constitutional Law(2004) 2(4): 663-688. 
51 
 
balancing the conflicting interests. In constellations where the state and two 
or more fundamental rights holders are in conflict the precept of rule and 
exception finds no application as in this situation, two fundamental rights 
holders are in conflict and as a matter of fact two rules are in conflict. This 
has also implications on the application of the principle of proportionality. To 
recall, the principle of proportionality is based on the idea to limit the action of 
the state and its encroachment on fundamental rights. Here, fundamental 
rights holders face each other and the legislator is obliged to bring about a 
practical concordance between the fundamental right holders.  
 
3.2. The Doctrine of Practical Concordance(Praktische Konkordanz) 
As an expression of the structural unity of the Basic Law, the principle of 
practical concordance (Praktische Konkordanz) appears to be particularly 
important for the resolving of conflicts of constitutional rights. This judicial 
technique belonging to the systematic method of interpretation goes back to 
the German constitutional lawyer and former president of the BVerfG Konrad 
Hesse172. According to him practical concordance implies that constitutional 
rights must be harmonized with each other when they are in conflict in such a 
way that one value does not lose ground against the other. Hesse pleads for 
finding a balance by way of optimizing the relevant values against each other 
and thus allowing both values to be exercised to the same time. He puts his 
idea in the following way:  
“The principle of the Constitution's unity requires the optimization of 
[values in conflict]: Both legal values need to be limited so that each 
can attain its optimal effect. In each concrete case, therefore, the 
limitations must satisfy the principle of proportionality; that is, they may 
not go any further than necessary to produce a concordance of both 
legal values173  
                                                             
172 Konrad Hesse 1988, 23. 
173 Kommers 2012, p. 68.; Konrad Hesse 1988, 76: (…) „ Verfassungsrechtlich geschützte 
Rechtsgüter müssen in der Problemlösung einander so zugeordnet werden, dass jedes von 
ihnen Wirklichkeit gewinnt. Wo Kollisionen entstehen, darf nicht in vorschneller 
„Güterabwägung“  oder gar „ abstrakter Werteabwägung“  eines auf Kosten des anderen 
realisiert werden. Vielmehr stellt das Prinzip der Einheit der Verfassung die Aufgabe der 
Optimierung: beiden Gütern müssen Grenzen gezogen werden, damit beide zu optimaler 
Wirksamkeit gelangen können. Die Grenzziehungen müssen daher im jeweiligen konkreten 
Falle verhältnismäßig sein: sie dürfen nicht weitergehen als es notwendig ist, um die 
Konkordanz beider Rechtsgüter herzustellen.“ 
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According to Kommers, constitutional interpretation in Germany is anything 
but a zero-sum game174. Practical concordance thus has to be seen in 
relation with the principle of proportionality which as such is an integral part 
of the Rechtsstaatsprinzip. Notwithstanding that there are similarities 
between the principle of proportionality and the doctrine of practical 
concordance, they are not the same. De Schutter puts it in a nutshell:  
"Whereas balancing in the frame of the principle of proportionality 
means that the right with the highest value or the most important 
weight will trump above the other, the principle of practical 
concordance instead rejects the very idea that this may be a desirable 
outcome: it is not right , it insists in substance, to set aside one claim 
simply because a competing claim appears, in the particular 
circumstances of a case, to deserve to be recognized more weight".175  
The principle of practical concordance should not be confused with the direct 
effect (Drittwirkung) of fundamental rights. The latter refers to the applicability 
of fundamental rights in private relationships whereas the former to a 
situation in which the legislator has enacted a law to regulate the legal 
relationship between constitutionally protected conflicting interests. Initially, 
the principle of practical concordance was mainly applied in cases where 
unconditionally granted fundamental rights were in conflict. Accordingly, in 
the most prominent cases in which the BVerfG has employed the doctrine of 
practical concordance, like in the Mephisto176 -, Mutzenbacher177-, Classroom 
Crucifix Case178- and Muslim Headscarf179 cases unconditionally granted 
fundamental rights like the freedom of speech or freedom of religion were at 
the center of the constitutional conflicts. However, as will be shown below, 
the BVerfG extended in the course of time the application of the doctrine of 
practical concordance also to conditional granted basic rights. 
 
 
                                                             
174 Donald Kommers, Interpreting Constitutions, Germany: Balancing Rights and Duties 
2007, 203. 
175See Oliver De Schutter/Francois Tulkens, 2007, 33.  
176 BVerfGE 30, 173. 
177 BVerfGE 83, 130. 
178 BVerfGE 93, 1. 
179 BVerfGE 108, 282. 
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III. The Social Market Economy in the Case Law of the BVerfG  
In the following, an analysis of several legislative acts and respective 
judgments of the BVerfG in a chronological order will take place. The cases 
are related to the core of the social market economy in Germany, namely co-
determination in large scale enterprises, dismissal protection in small 
establishments, free collective bargaining and the bipartite health care 
system. By analysing these cases it is aimed to gain information on how the 
BVerfG resolves conflicts between derivable rights from the economic 
constitution of the Basic Law and social state interventions. In this way it will 
be possible to draw conclusions on the constitutional bounds of the social 
market economy.  
 
1. Co-Determination in Large Scale Enterprises   
Co-Determination, also referred to as industrial democracy has a long history 
in Germany which goes back to the beginning of industrialisation180. It found 
for the first time constitutional recognition in Articles 156(2)181 and 165(1)182 
of the Weimarer Reichsverfassung183. As an institutionalised process of 
employee information-, consultation- and participation in the decision-making, 
Co-Determination may take places at two different levels184. First, at the level 
of the workplace where workers interests in companies with 5 or more 
employees are represented by works councils (Innerbetriebliche 
Mitbestimmung). This form of codetermination is regulated by the Works 
Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz). Secondly and alongside the 
workers’ representation in works councils, codetermination may takeplace at 
                                                             
180 See for this Kommers 2012, 660. 
181 Article 156(2) Weimarer Reichsverfassung: Moreover, in case of pressing need, the Reich 
may, in the interest of collectivism, combine by law, on a basis of administrative autonomy, 
economic enterprises and associations, in order to secure the cooperation of all human 
elements of production, to give to employers and employees a share in management, and to 
regulate the manufacture, production, distribution, use, and prices, as well as the import and 
export, of economic goods upon collectivist principles 
182 Article 165(1) Workers and employees shall be called upon to cooperate in common with 
employers, and on an equal footing, in the regulation of salaries and working conditions, as 
well as in the entire field of the economic development of the forces of production. The 
organizations on both sides and their agreements shall be recognized. Workers and 
employees shall, for the purpose of looking after their economic and social interests, be given 
legal representation in Factory Workers Councils, as well as in District Workers Councils 
organized on the basis of economic areas and in a Workers Council of the Reich 
183 BVerfGE 50, 290 
184  Jelle Visser, Joris Van Ruysseveldt 1996, Industrial Relations in Europe, 125-174; Christel 
Lane 1989, Management and Labour in Europe 226. 
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the level of the enterprise(Unternehmensmitbestimmung). In comparison to 
one-tier management systems like in the UK, Germany has a two-tier 
management system where the executive and administrative management of 
corporations is separated in two different bodies namely the executive 
management board (Vorstand in a joint stock corporation or Geschäftsleitung 
in a limited liability company) and the non-executive supervisory board, 
where the co-determination of employee’s takes place(Aufsichtsrat).  
 There are different forms of co-determination to be distinguished, 
depending on the form and size of the enterprise. In companies with more 
than 1000 employees in the mining and steel industry codetermination is 
regulated by the Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz from 1951. In these 
enterprises workers have extensive rights to codetermination as the 
supervisory boards have equal numbers of employers’ and workers’ 
representatives. In enterprises with between 500 and 1999 employees co-
determination is regulated by the One-Third Participation 
Act(Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz) which provides that two thirds of the 
supervisory board members are shareholder representatives and one third 
employee representatives. In large scale corporations with more than 2000 
employed co-determination takes place on the basis of the Co-determination 
Act (Mitbestimmungsgesetz, hereinafter MitbG) from 1976185, which was at 
the center of a constitutional complaint.  
 According to § 1 MitbG the following companies are covered by the 
Co-Determination Act186: public limited companies limited partnerships by 
shares, limited liability companies mutual insurance companies, and 
cooperatives outside the Montan sector. Under § 7 I MitbG an equal 
representation of workers and shareholders in the supervisory board of large 
scale incorporated enterprises is foreseen187.  
                                                             
185   Act on Co-determination by Employees (Co-determination Act) dated 4 May 1976 
("Bundesgesetzblatt", Part I, p. 1153),  last amended by the Act dated 23 March 2002 
("Bundesgesetzblatt", Part I, p. 1130). 
186§1(1) MitbG:  Subject to the provisions of this Act, employees shall have a right of co-
determination in  companies which - 1. are run in the legal form of a joint stock company, a 
partnership limited by shares, a limited  liability partnership or a trade and industrial 
cooperative; and  2. normally employ over 2,000 employees. 
187§ 7 MitbG: (1) The supervisory board of a company - 1. normally employing not more than 
10,000 employees shall consist of six shareholders‘ members and six employees‘ members; 2. 
normally employing more than 10,000 but not more than 20,000 employees shall consist of  
eight shareholders‘ members and eight employees‘ members;  3. normally employing more 
than 20,000 employees shall consist of ten shareholders‘ members  and ten employees‘ 
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The election of the chairman and the vice chairman of the supervisory board 
takes place on the basis of § 27 I MitbG whereupon a two- third majority of 
the members of the supervisory board is required188. If this majority is not 
reached in the first ballot, then in a second ballot, the chairman is elected by 
the shareholders’ supervisory board members and the vice chairman by the 
workers supervisory board members on the basis of the majority of the votes, 
§ 27 II MitbG189. Against this background it is common practice that the 
chairman of the supervisory board belongs to the shareholders side. 
According to § 29 I MitbG the supervisory boards decisions usually require a 
majority of the votes. In cases of disagreement between shareholders and 
workers’ representatives in a voting, also referred to as deadlock, the voting 
has to be repeated. If also in the second voting a tie takes place, it is the 
chairperson who normally belongs to the shareholders side having a double, 
tie breaking vote which results in a slight predominance of the shareholders 
in the supervisory board, § 29 II MitbG190. The supervisory board is entitled 
with several tasks. Its central functions are to appoint and to remove the 
members of the management board which requires according to § 31(2) 
MitbG a majority of at least two-third of the members of the supervisory 
                                                                                                                                                                            
members.  In the case of companies covered by clause 1 of the first sentence of this 
subsection, provision  may be made in the by-laws (the shareholders‘ agreement, the articles 
of association) for clause  2 or 3 of the first sentence of this subsection to apply. In the case of 
companies covered by  clause 2 of the first sentence of this subsection, provision may be 
made in the by-laws (the  shareholders‘ agreement, the articles of association) for clause 3 of 
the first sentence of this  subsection to apply.  
(2) The employees‘ members of a supervisory board must include -  
1. four employees of the company and two trade union representatives, where the board has  
six employees‘ members;  2. six employees of the company and two trade union 
representatives, where the board has  eight employees‘ members;  3. seven employees of the 
company and three trade union representatives, where the board  has ten employees‘ 
members. § 7 Mitbestimmungsgesetz 
188 § 27 I MitbG: The supervisory board shall elect a chairman and vice-chairman from 
among its own number  by a majority of two-thirds of the total number of members of which 
it is required to be  composed. 
189§ 27 II MitbG:  Where the requisite majority under subsection (1) is not attained during the 
election of the  chairman or vice-chairman of the supervisory board, a second vote shall be 
taken. In this vote  
the shareholders‘ members of the supervisory board shall elect the chairman and the  
employees‘ members shall elect the vice-chairman, in each case by a majority of the votes 
cast. 
190 § 29 MItbG: (1) The decisions of the supervisory board shall be taken by a majority of the 
votes cast, save as otherwise provided in subsection (2) and in §§ 27, 31 and 32.  (2) Where 
voting in the supervisory board results in a tie and a further vote on the same subject  also 
results in a tie, the chairman of the board shall have a casting vote. Subsection (3) of §108 of 
the Joint Stock Act shall also apply to the casting vote. The vice-chairman shall  not have a 
casting vote. 
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board191. Furthermore it is entitled to monitor the management of the 
company’s business operations, however the supervisory board is not 
allowed to interfere with the active management of corporate affairs. The 
legislator pursued with the formation of the MitbG several objectives192, 
namely to rebalance the unequal powers between labour and capital, the 
democratization of the economy- meaning that conflicts should be solved by 
discourse and not by power; the improvement of the working and living 
conditions of employees; the control of economic power of companies; co-
operation between labour and capital.  
 
 
 
 
 
Case 1: The Co-Determination Act 1976193 
 In this case the BVerfG had to deal with the question whether the Co-
Determination Act 1976(Mibestimmungsgesetz) was in compliance with the 
Basic Law. A large number of business forms as well as employers´ 
associations and a shareholder in an affected company lodged constitutional 
complaints against the Co-Determination Act 1976. The complainants argued 
that the above mentioned §§, 7, 27, 29, 31 of the Co-Determination Act 
violated their right to property, freedom of occupation and freedom of 
economic activity. In particular it was claimed that the Co-Determination Act 
violated the property rights of shareholders and firms and constituted a shift 
towards labour’s domination of management. 
   The Court dismissed the constitutional complaints and upheld the 
conformity of the Co-Determination Act with the Basic Law. In its reasoning, 
                                                             
191 § 31(2) MitbG: The members of the body responsible for the legal representation of the 
company shall be  appointed by the supervisory board by a majority of at least two-thirds of 
the votes cast by its  members.  
192Draft Law Codetermination Act  1974,  
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/07/021/0702172.pdf; Heiner Michel 2007, Co-
determination in Germany- the recent debate; Walter Muller Jentsch 2008, “Passt die 
Mitbestimmung zur sozialen Marktwirtschaft?”in: Mitbestimmung 3/2008; Franz Josef 
Stegmann 2008, From "Cost factor" to "Co-Entrepreneur" Christian Social Teaching, Social 
Market Economy and the Changing Role of the Worker in Modern Economy,  
Gregory S. Alexander 2003, Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German 
Example  Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers Faculty Scholarship 3-1-2003. 
193 BVerfGE 50, 290 Mitbestimmung[1979]. 
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the Court first made reference to the plaintiffs claim after which the Co-
Determination Act conferred absolute parity between capital and labour. The 
Court rejected this claim by stating that in the event of a deadlock between 
shareholders and workers, the chairman of the supervisory board who 
belonged to the shareholder’s side had the tiebreaking vote.  
 The Court then went on to assess the constitutionality of the relevant 
provisions of the MitbG on the basis of Article 14 I GG. The Court concluded 
that the provisions in question neither infringed the property of  shareholders 
nor that of enterprises. In the view of the BVerfG the legislator had exercised 
with the adoption of the Co-Determination Act his discretion to define the 
content and limit of property, Article 14 I 2 GG194 in an unobjectionable way. 
The Court started its constitutional review of the MitbG on the basis of 
the right to property of shareholders. In this regard the Court first intensively 
dealt with the scope of protection provided by Article 14 I 1 GG and held 
that195: 
‘[The property guarantee], according to its historical as well as its 
present significance, is a fundamental basic right which is closely 
linked with personal freedom. In the system of the basic rights as a 
whole, it has the task of guaranteeing the holder of the basic right a 
sphere of freedom in the financial area and therefore enables him to 
determine his life autonomously]. The constitutionally protected 
property is characterised in its legal content by private use, that is, the 
attribution to a person entitled to rights in whose hands it is intended to 
be `of use' as the basis of private initiative and in self-responsible 
private interest, and by the power of disposal in principle over the 
subject of the property, which is not always clearly separable from this 
use. The use of property is at the same time intended to serve the 
welfare of people at large Art. 14 II 2 GG.  
                                                             
194   Article 14 I GG has the following wording: Property and the right of inheritance shall be 
guaranteed. Their content and limits shall be defined by the laws. 
195Michalsky 1999, 319, BVerfGE 50, 290, 338:”Geschichtlich und in ihrer heutigen 
Bedeutung ist diese ein elementares Grundrecht, das im engen inneren Zusammenhang mit 
der persönlichen Freiheit steht. Ihr kommt im Gesamtgefüge der Grundrechte die Aufgabe 
zu, dem Träger des Grundrechts einen Freiheitsraum im vermögensrechtlichen Bereich zu 
sichern und ihm dadurch eine eigenverantwortliche Gestaltung seines Lebens zu 
ermöglichen die verfassungsrechtliche Gewährleistung des Privateigentums als 
Rechtseinrichtung dient der Erfüllung dieser Aufgabe”. 
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The court went on and made in regard of the contents and limits of property 
the following statement:196 
The concrete scope of the protection afforded by the property 
guarantee only emerges from the determination of the contents and 
limits of property, which, under Article 14 I 2 GG is a matter for the 
legislature. He must be guided by the welfare of people at large, which 
is not only the reason, but also the limitation of the restriction of the 
owner. At the same time, the permissible extent of a social binding 
must also be determined on the basis of the property itself. The 
guarantee of continuation contained in Article 14(1) 1 GG, the task of 
regulation contained in Article 14 I 2 GG, and the social liabilities 
attached to property under Article 14 II GG stand in an unseverable 
connection. None of these factors must be curtailed beyond what is 
proper; rather all of them must be brought into a proportionate 
compromise.  
With regard to the protective purpose and the rationale of the right to property 
the BVerfG then made the following distinction: 
"In so far as the function of property as a safeguard for the personal 
freedom of the individual is concerned, property enjoys particular 
protection… On the other hand, the legislature may delimit the content 
of and define the restrictions to property more strictly the greater its 
social relevance of function is. The relevant aspect is expressed in 
Article 14, section 2, i.e. that use and power of disposal do not remain 
in the sphere of the individual owner, but concern also the interests of 
other individuals, which are depending on the use of this object of 
property. Under these circumstances the constitutional command of a 
common weal-oriented use of property comprises the command of 
showing consideration of the interests of non-owners, who are 
                                                             
196 BVerfGE 50, 290, 340 “Die konkrete Reichweite des Schutzes durch die 
Eigentumsgarantie ergibt sich erst aus der Bestimmung von Inhalt und   Schranken des 
Eigentums, die nach Art. 14 Abs. 1 Satz 2 GG Sache des Gesetzgebers ist. Dieser ist nicht 
gänzlich frei: Er muß sich am Wohl der Allgemeinheit orientieren, das nicht nur Grund, 
sondern auch Grenze für die Beschränkung des Eigentümers ist). Zugleich muß das zulässige 
Ausmaß einer Sozialbindung auch vom Eigentum selbst her bestimmt warden. Die 
Bestandsgarantie des Art. 14 Abs. 1 Satz 1 GG, der Regelungsauftrag des Art. 14 Abs. 1 Satz 2 
GG und die Sozialpflichtigkeit des Eigentums nach Art. 14 Abs. 2 GG stehen in einem 
unlösbaren Zusammenhang. Keiner dieser Faktoren darf über Gebühr verkürzt werden; 
vielmehr müssen alle zu einem verhältnismäßigen Ausgleich gebracht werden.” 
59 
 
themselves depending of the use of the property to safeguard their 
existence and to shape their life on the basis of self-responsibility".197 
The Court then made clear that responsibilities following from property must 
always be proportionate198. In this respect, limits were set all the more tightly 
on the legislator, the more the use and disposal of property remained within 
the sphere of the owner, since, in that case, a purpose extraneous to the 
latter which could justify a proportionate property binding would be harder to 
find. The Court stated that the legislators´ area of discretion with regard to 
the social relation and the social function of property was relatively was wide 
in view of its social binding and it became narrower if these conditions were 
either not or only to a limited extent present. 
  
 The Court proceeded to make clear  that property according to the 
Basic Law included also the property of shareholders and that of enterprises. 
As regards this subject, it distinguished between property in shares and 
tangible property rights. This distinction was according to the BVerfG for the 
determination of the extent of social obligation and social function of property 
of utmost importance.  The Court expressed its view as follows:  
 With regard to the extent of permissible social binding of share 
property in the case of enterprises its particular nature is of 
importance. Share property is property conferred under company law 
which determines and limits the rights of the shareholder. The owner 
cannot as a rule use its property immediately  and avail himself of the 
powers of disposal associated with it, but is limited, in respect of use, 
to the property value, whereas he only indirectly possesses powers of 
disposal – apart from alienation or encumbrance- over the organs of 
                                                             
197 Gunnar Folke Schuppert 111, in: The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 
1988(ed. Ulrich Karpen) BVerfGE 50, 290, 341: “Soweit es um die Funktion des Eigentums 
als Element der Sicherung der persönlichen Freiheit des Einzelnen geht, genießt dieses einen 
besonders ausgeprägten Schutz.(…) Dagegen ist die Befugnis des Gesetzgebers zur 
Inhaltsbestimmung und Schrankenbestimmung um so weiter, je mehr das Eigentumsobjekt 
in einem sozialen Bezug und einer sozialen Funktion steht. Maßgebend hierfür ist der in Art. 
14 Abs. 2 GG Ausdruck findende Gesichtspunkt, daß Nutzung und Verfügung in diesem Fall 
nicht lediglich innerhalb der Sphäre des Eigentümers bleiben, sondern Belange anderer 
Rechtsgenossen berühren, die auf die Nutzung des Eigentumsobjekts angewiesen sind. Unter 
dieser Voraussetzung umfaßt das grundgesetzliche Gebot einer am Gemeinwohl orientierten 
Nutzung das Gebot der Rücksichtnahme auf den Nichteigentümer, der seinerseits der 
Nutzung des Eigentumsobjekts zu seiner Freiheitssicherung und verantwortlichen 
Lebensgestaltung bedarf.  
198 Michalski,1999, 323. 
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the company. Unlike the case of material property in which the 
freedom to use the property, the decision as to this and the attribution 
of the effects of use coincide in the person of the owner, this 
connectedness is therefore largely dissolved in the case of share 
property.(…) In principle, the smaller personal relation of share 
property as against material property shows itself in  the divergence, 
discussed above, of use of the property and responsibility for this use. 
Unlike the entrepreneur-owner, the shareholder can only operate 
indirectly with his property; the liability under property law for the 
economic consequences of wrong decisions does not affect him as a 
person, but it relates to a limited part of his property sphere. As 
against this, the important  social function of share property is obvious 
for all to see. Its social relation shows itself in the mere fact that, as a 
general rule, it consists in the mutual participation with others in a 
company which is the owner of the means of production. Above all, in 
order to use the share property, the collaboration of  the workers is 
always needed. The limitations of share property by §§ 7, 27, 29 and 
31 MitbestG corresponds to the resultant social binding.  
The limitation of the shareholders property in the present case was according 
to the Court proportionate. For regulations under Article 14 I 2 GG to be 
constitutional, the right to property could only be limited for reasons of the 
common good, a faire balance between the owners interest in the free 
exercise of his/her property rights, and the interests of the community in a 
certain use or the omission of a certain use of this right must be created199. 
Accordingly, when reviewing the proportionality of the MitbG the Court 
weighed up the interests of the common good on the one hand and the 
interests of shareholders on the other. The Court acknowledged that the 
relevant provisions of the MitbG reduced the power of shareholders as 
members of the board. This restriction however remained within the ambit of 
the commitments of property owners in society in general. The Court first 
stated that according to the government report the MitbG was intended to 
introduce `a co-participation of shareholders and workers on the basis of 
equal rights and equal weight in the decision making processes of 
                                                             
199 Michalski, 1999, 323. 
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enterprises.' Altough the adopted version of the MitbG did not fully achieve 
this purpose, it likewise had the task of mitigating by means of allowing 
participation in the entrepreneurial decision making process the heteronomy 
of employees´(Fremdbestimmung), which resulted from their subordination 
under management and organisational power in larger enterprises,  and of 
complementing the economic legitimation of the enterprise management by a 
social legitimation.  Codetermination was also a legitimate political means to 
safeguard the market economy. It served the common good and could not be 
regarded as unsuitable or not necessary to achieve this objective. The 
limitation of the property rights of shareholders was also proportionate in the 
narrow sense. In this regard the Court only stated that in any case the right of 
final decision remained with the shareholders.  
 The BVerfG then went on and assessed the constitutionality of the 
relevant provisions of the MitbG on the basis of the freedom of occupation, 
Article 12 I GG. By making reference to its decision in the Pharmacy case200it 
first addressed the issue of the scope of protection offered by Article 12 I GG 
and stated that201: 
Article 12 I GG protects the freedom of the citizen in an area of 
particular importance in modern society which is based on the division 
of labour; it  guarantees the individual the right to exercise 
as”occupation”, i.e. to base his life-style upon, every activity the 
individual thinks he is able to perform (…) The guarantee goes beyond 
the freedom of independently carrying out a business. Even though 
the basic right aims to protect- economically meaningful- work, it sees 
it as “occupation”, i.e. in its reference to the human personality, which 
is only fully formed and completed if the individual devotes himself to 
an activity which is the objective and basis of his life, and through 
which he can, at the same time, contribute to the overall functioning of 
society. The basic right thus is important for all social classes; work as 
an “occupation” is of equal value and dignity for everybody’. 
The Court went on and made clear that also the occupational freedom of 
entrepreneurs was protected by Article 12 I GG. It stated that Article 12 I GG 
                                                             
200 BVerfGE 7, 377(397). 
201 Translation: Sabine Michalowski, Lorna Woods, 299;BVerfGE 50,290(194). 
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protected both the setting up and running of a small or medium sized 
business but also large scale enterprises. The Court added that while in 
small and medium sized businesses the personal element of the fundamental 
right was fully achieved in the economic sphere, this was almost completely 
lost in the case of large scale enterprises. The freedom of occupation of large 
scale enterprises was also not an element of the shaping of personality of a 
human being, but a practice, whose effects went far beyond the economic 
destiny of the enterprise. This however did not mean that large scale 
enterprises were excluded from the scope of Article 12 I GG. However, it had 
implications on the  legislator's leeway of discretion to regulate the 
occupational freedom of large scale enterprises. 
 The BVerfG then affirmed that the challenged provisions of the 
MitbestG encroached upon the freedom of occupation of companies running 
the large scale enterprises.The companies´ representation organs were 
confined by the new composition of the supervisory board in their freedom of 
corporate planning and decision making. The BVerfG went on and made it 
clear that against the background of the size of the enterprises falling in the 
scope of the MitbG the freedom of occupation of the relevant enterprises 
lacked the necessary personal feature which formed the core of Article 12 I 
GG. It stated that those entitled to the freedom of occupation could only 
exercise this freedom with the support of their employees who were likewise 
entitled to the fundamental right under Article 12 I GG. In this respect the 
freedom of occupation had a ‘social relation and social function’.  
 The Court then went on and carried out a proportionality test. It 
considered the restriction of the freedom of occupation of the companies 
running the enterprises as justified by appropriate and reasonable 
considerations of the public good, however without further concretizing the 
latter. The Court also had no doubts on the suitability and necessity of the 
challenged provisions of the MitbG to achieve the goal pursued. The Court 
also affirmed the proportionality in the narrow sense as the core of Article 12 
I GG was only marginally affected. The involvement of workers in the 
supervisory board would not result in a decisive exertion of influence on the 
company management, since the right of final decision remained with the 
supervisory board members, elected by the shareholders. 
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 This case shows clear how far the legislator may go in regulating the 
economy. The BVerfG and associated with that the Basic Law grants the 
legislator a wide ranging discretion in regulating the economy. It was shown 
that the then legislature was not driven by pure economic reasoning when it 
adopted the Codetermination Act. The functionality of the market process 
and associated therewith the consideration of market rules, more particular 
the market conformity did not play a role. On the contrary, the legislator 
aimed with the formation of the MitbG to rebalance the unequal powers 
between labour and capital, the democratization of the economy- meaning 
that conflicts should be solved by discourse and not by power; the 
improvement of the working and living conditions of employees; the control of 
economic power of companies; co-operation between labour and capital. The 
Codetermination Act was according to the BVerfG constitutionally 
unobjectionable as the management had the tiebreaking vote. 
The yardstick to assess encroachments upon fundamental rights is the 
common good which allows the legislator to encroach upon derivable 
fundamental rights from the economic constitution of the Basic Law. As 
regards the scope of protection offered by Article 14 GG it was shown, that 
the right to property is not absolute but can be limited if there is a concern of 
the community at stake. As regards this subject, the social obligation of 
property is the higher the more the particular property is in a social context 
and has social functions. This has implications for large scale enterprises 
with more than 2000 employees as they have to accept limitations of their 
right to property to a greater extent than small and medium sized companies. 
 
 
2. Dismissal Protection in Small Scale Enterprises202 
Ideas of the social market economy are reflected in numerous laws in 
Germany, especially in the field of labour law. One of these laws is the Act on 
Protection against Dismissal (Kündigungsschutzgesetz, hereinafter KSchG), 
                                                             
202 See for this Manfred Weiss/Marlene Schmidt Labour Law and Industrial Relations in 
Germany , 125, 126, Jens Kirchner 2010, Key Aspects of German Employment and Labour 
Law, 137; Judith Sawang 2006, Termination of employment legislation digest- country 
profile Germany, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/eplex/docs/23/Germany.pdf; 
Achim Seifert, Elke Funken Hötzel 2005, Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, Volume 
25, Number 4, 2005, 487-518. 
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with which employees are protected against arbitrary dismissals203. Dismissal 
protection is a typical area of law in which a conflict of interests takes place 
as within this domain both employers and employees are affected in their 
freedom of occupation. The basic function of protection against wrongful 
dismissals in Germany has to be seen in the preservation of existing 
employment relationships (Bestandsschutz) and accordingly to reinstate 
wrongfully dismissed employees. In the majority of cases however, provided 
the dismissal was unlawful, a reinstatement for several reasons does not 
take place but instead the dismissed employees are entitled to severance 
pay. There are several reasons which may be taken into consideration for 
terminating an employment relationship. In the following the focus will be only 
on the ordinary dismissal. 
 The employment relationship in German enjoys far reaching 
protection. An employer can only terminate an employment relationship 
where he is allowed to do so. Accordingly, an ordinary dismissal is lawful if 
the employer complies with the requirements of the KSchG. The core 
element of employment protection is the social justification of the dismissal 
as provided in § 1 KSchG. This provision states that a dismissal is only lawful 
if it is socially justified. As regards this subject, there are only three statutory 
grounds where a termination is socially justified and lawful, namely if the 
dismissal is based on reasons related to either conduct, person or urgent 
operational business. The employer has the burden of proof in regard of the 
existence of a reason of dismissal. Additionally, the employer must carry out 
a social selection among comparable employees before selecting the 
employee to be dismissed by taking into consideration the length of 
employment, obligations to pay family support and disability, §1 III KSchG. A 
dismissal related to misconduct or the employee’s personality is less likely to 
be declared as justified by Labour Courts due to strict employment protection 
standards set by jurisdiction and case law. As a matter of fact employers 
either terminate the employment relationship for urgent operational reasons 
or offer severance payments to dissolve an employment relationship even 
                                                             
203 See:  Kündigungsschutz- Alles was Sie wissen sollten, Federal Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs 2013. 
www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/.../DE/.../a163_kuendigungsschutz 
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though the real reason behind the dismissal lies in the behaviour or the 
capability of the employee 204. 
 It is important to note, that the requirement of social justification and 
associated therewith the KSchG is not applicable to all kind of employment 
relationships. This is only the case if the employment relationship exists at 
least six months. Furthermore, dismissal protection according to the KSchG 
does not take place in small scale enterprises which means that statutory 
protection against dismissal takes only place in companies of a certain size. 
The so called small scale business clause in § 23 I KSchG states that small 
establishments with ten or fewer employees are not covered by the statutory 
dismissal protection. § 23 I KSchG has been changed and amended several 
times over the last decades and associated therewith the scope of protection 
has changed. At the beginning of the 1980s and with the change of 
government in 1982 a paradigm shift in German labour market policy towards 
the deregulation of the labour market took place. This happened as a 
response to Germany´s structural unemployment problem. The center-right 
coalition under the leadership of Helmut Kohl undertook several measures to 
make the labour market more flexible. The motto was "more market-less 
state". Accordingly, the Employment Promotion Act was adopted in 1985 
which paved the way for the introduction of fixed-term contracts without valid 
reasons. With this novelty the government aimed to remove hiring barriers by 
making it possible for employers to employ part-time employees205.  
 The Employment Promotion Act had also an impact on the applicability 
of the KschG. While until 1985 establishments with five or less employees 
were excluded from the application of the KschG- irrespective whether or not 
the employees concerned were full time employees- the Employment 
Promotion Act extended the scope of this exclusion. Accordingly only 
employees having been employed for at least 10 hours a week or 45 hours a 
month have had to be taken into consideration for calculating the necessary 
                                                             
204 Elke J. Jahn 2009, Do firms obey the law when they fire workers? Social criteria and 
severance payments in Germany, International Journal of Manpower 2009, Vol. 30, No. 7, 
672-691(676). 
205 This reform also constituted a turning point in German labour market policy towards a 
two tier labour market wit a core of labour market insiders enjoying a high level of protection 
and less protected labour market outsiders, see for this: Patrick Emmenegger/Paul Marx 
2011, Business and the development of job security regulations: the case of Germany, Socio-
Economic Review 2011, 729(747). 
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minimum numbers of employees. By hiring part time employees employers 
could circumvent employment protection rules in a legally unobjectionable 
way. The same government adopted in 1996 the Act on the Improvement of 
Employment Opportunities and raised the number of employees for the 
application of the KSchG from 5 to 10. In doing so, the then acting 
government aimed to stimulate small employers to create 200.000 new jobs. 
This amendment of the KschG however was not uncontested and at the 
center of an concrete review of an statute in the small establishment 
case(Kleinbetriebsklausel) which will be analyzed below206. With the change 
of government in 1998 then § 23 I KschG was amended and the threshold 
was lowered again to 5 employees. In 2004 the same government raised the 
threshold again to 10 employees. 
 
Case 2: The Small Establishment Clause 207 
In the Small Establishment Clause case the BVerfG had to deal with the 
question whether § 23 I KSchG was compatible with the Basic Law. The case 
concerned a baker who worked for 18 years in a small scale enterprise which 
employed in total 4 employees and 2 apprentices. The employer terminated 
the employment relationship with notice due to a long term sickness of the 
employee. The employee lodged a complaint against this dismissal before 
the Labour Court Reutlingen which suspended the proceedings and referred 
to the BVerfG in the frame of a concrete judicial review the question whether 
Article 23 I KSchG was compatible with the Basic Law. The Labour Court 
took the view that the exclusion of small firms from the scope of application of 
the Dismissal Act was not compatible with the freedom of occupation, Article 
12 I GG Basic Law.  
 The BVerfG disagreed with the Labour Court and concluded that § 23 I 
KschG was in compliance with the Basic Law. The BVerfG stated that, § 23 I 
KSchG did not violate fundamental rights of employees. This provision rather 
modified the employment relationship which was a matter of contract law. As 
                                                             
206 There is no empirical evidence that a deregulation of dismissal protection in small 
businesses tends to promote job creation, see: Wagner, J.; Schnabel, C.; Kölling, A. (2001), 
Wirken Schwellenwerte im deutschen Arbeitsrecht als  Bremse für die Arbeitsplatzschaffung in 
Kleinbetrieben?, in: D. Ehrig, P. Kalmbach (Hrsg.): Weniger Arbeitslose – aber wie?, Marburg; Elke 
Jahn 2004, Der Kündigungsschutz auf dem Prüfstand, 
http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/arbeitspapiere/7_dokument_dok_pdf_5115_1.pdf,  
207 BVerfGE 97, 169 Kleinbetriebsklausel.[1998]; See for the following also: Cremer 2012, 188 
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regards this subject, the Court made clear that private law regulations like the 
KschG which imposed limits on the contractual freedom of fundamental rights 
holders concerned the balancing of differing fundamental rights positions. 
The BVerfG stated that, in the present case the interest of the employee in 
preserving his workplace was confronted with the interest of the employer to 
give work only to employees who met his requirements. The Court made 
clear that both, the employer and employee could invoke their freedom of 
occupation within the meaning of Article 12 I GG. The legislator was 
therefore confronted with the problem of practical concordance (praktische 
Konkordanz). The conflicting fundamental rights needed to be conceived of in 
their interrelatedness(Wechselwirkung) and to be limited in such a way that 
for those involved they become effective to the farthest extent possible. 
 The BVerfG made it clear that the Basic Law guaranteed a minimum 
of statutory dismissal protection. The freedom of occupation, Article 12 I GG 
and the social state principle, Article 20 (1) GG, 208 obliged the legislature to 
establish a minimum of statutory dismissal protection. The BVerfG went on to 
make clear that the legislator had a broad leeway of discretion to fulfil this 
task. Accordingly, an infringement of Article 12 I GG could be only affirmed, if 
the legislator did not take adequate measures to comply with its obligation to 
protect employees from dismissals.  
By making reference to the discretion of the legislator to reconcile the 
conflicting interests the BVerfG emphasized that the appraisal of the 
economic and social conditions as well as the forecast on the future 
development but also the effects of the regulation was in the political 
responsibility of the legislator. The Court made it clear, that the legislator 
infringed its duty to protect fundamental rights only if a fundamental rights 
position was subordinated to the fundamental rights position of the other 
contracting partner in a manner that in consideration of the meaning and 
range of the affected fundamental right it could not be spoken of an adequate 
balance any more. The BVerfG rejected such a subordination and stated that 
the legislator had fulfilled its duty by considering the conflicting interests 
appropriately. By doing so, the Court did not fail to recognize the fact that the 
workplace was the economic livelihood of employees. On the other hand, it 
                                                             
208  See for dismissal protection as a reflection of the social state principle, BAGE 1, 128 (132) 
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stated that the right of employers to dismiss was also worthy of protection. In 
a small scale enterprise with few workers, the business success depended 
more than in large-scale enterprises on the performance and the personality 
of every single worker. The Court further emphasized the high costs for 
employers resulting from the protection against dismissal and the high 
administrative burdens employers were exposed to, due to the dismissal 
procedure.  
 The Court concluded that with the amendment of § 23 KSchG the 
conflicting interests has found a balance which was constitutionally 
unobjectionable. The Court added, however, that employees who did not fall 
under the scope of § 23 I KSchG were not unprotected against unfair 
dismissals. The employers' freedom to dismiss was limited by the general 
clauses of public policy(§ 138 German Civil Code) and of good faith(§242 
German Civil Code). These general clauses of civil law had to be interpreted 
in light of the employees' constitutionally-guaranteed freedom of occupation. 
The employer therefore had to respect a minimum of social protection when 
dismissing employees.  
 
 This case shows again the legislators wide leeway of discretion to 
regulate the economy and associated with that dismissal protection in 
Germany. This becomes even more obvious when taking into consideration 
the evolution of § 23 I KSchG. Dismissal protection in Germany enjoys 
constitutional status as it is covered by the social state principle but also the 
freedom of occupation. However, as it was shown, the social state principle 
did not constitute an obstacle for the legislator to relax the rules on protection 
against dismissal. In the present case, the legislator was backed by the 
BVerfG as with adopting the small establishment clause the minimum level of 
dismissal protection was not undermined. Moreover, this case illustrates very 
well how the BVerfG reconciles competing fundamental rights. It resolved the 
conflict between the employers´ freedom of occupation guaranteed by Article 
12 I GG as a defensive right with the state´s protective duty, also arising from 
Article 12 I GG towards employees by the doctrine of practical concordance. 
It gave on the one side the employers´ freedom of occupation priority over 
the employees´ freedom of occupation. On the other side, it granted 
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employees the constitutional required minimum protection through the 
general provisions of private law209. This line of reasoning reflects  very well 
the objective order of values of the Basic Law.  
 
 
3. The Autonomy of Collective Bargaining(Tarifautonomie) 
The doctrine of the autonomy of the collective bargaining (Tarifautonomie) 
constitutes another fundamental element of the Social Market Economy. As 
the “Magna Carta210” of the German industrial relation system it is 
characterized by two basic ideas: first trade unions and employers 
associations as collective interest organizations are granted the right to 
regulate terms and conditions of employment independently within legally 
defined limits and secondly, pricing in the labour market must remain free 
from any state influence.  
 The autonomy of collective bargaining is constitutionally guaranteed 
and derives from the freedom of coalition as enshrined in Article 9 III GG. 
This provision grants individuals and professions the right to establish 
associations to regulate and improve working conditions including amongst 
others wages, working time, holidays and to adjust it on a regular basis to 
socioeconomic conditions by way of concluding collective agreements to 
bring social peace to the community211. In the Lock-out case the BVerfG 
made clear that the Tarifautonomie is distinct from the general freedom of 
association as enshrined in Article 9 I GG. It stated that212: 
                                                             
209 see for this Alexy, 2002, 415. 
210 Detlef Radke 1995, The German Social Market Economy- An Option for the Developing 
and Transforming Countries, 35. 
211 The right of collective bargaining autonomy following from freedom of coalition pursues 
the purpose lying in the public interest of regulating reasonably and in detail by collective 
agreements the area of working life that is free from state regulation, in particular to 
determine the salary for different professions, thereby ultimately bringing social peace to the 
community, BVerfGE 18,18(1962) in:Michalowski/Woods, 278. 
212 BVerfGE 84 212 [Aussperrung]: “Von der allgemeinen Vereinigungsfreiheit des Art. 9 Abs. 
1 GG unterscheidet sich die Koalitionsfreiheit durch die Einbeziehung eines bestimmten 
Vereinigungszwecks in den grundrechtlichen Schutz. Die Bildung von Vereinigungen zum 
Zweck der Wahrung und Förderung der Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsbedingungen war in der 
Vergangenheit vom Staat zeitweilig besonders heftig bekämpft worden. Daraus erklärt sich 
der besondere, über Art. 9 Abs. 1 GG hinausgehende Grundrechtsschutz, den der 
Zusammenschluß zu solchen Vereinigungen in der sozialstaatlichen Ordnung des 
Grundgesetzes genießt”. For the translation see:  
http://www.hrcr.org/safrica/freedom_assoc/84bverfge212.html  
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“From the general freedom of association of Article 9 I GG the freedom of 
coalition [of Article 9 III GG] differs in that it includes in the basic right 
protection a certain purpose of [the right to freedom of] association. The 
formation of associations with the purpose to safeguard and improve working 
and economic conditions has been fought against by the state especially 
strongly at times in the past. This explains the particular basic right protection 
going beyond Article 9 I GG  which [applies] to the formation of such 
association in the social order of the state”. 
 The autonomy of collective bargaining as such entails different 
elements213. In this regard it must be distinguished between the positive and 
negative freedom of association. Positive freedom of association refers to the 
opportunity for employees and employers to become members in coalition 
organizations, such as trade unions or employers associations, which are 
able to conclude collective agreements without any state influence. Negative 
freedom of association refers to the right to decide against joining a trade 
union and instead  to regulate working conditions on an individual basis. The 
freedom of coalition covers also the freedom to take collective action and the 
right to strike214 as a means to bring about a certain degree of equality of 
bargaining power between workers and employers. The right to strike is 
counterbalanced by the right of employers’ associations to lock out215. 
                                                             
213Already in its first judgment concerning Article 9(3) GG in 1954  the BVerfG recognized the 
constitutional status of free collective bargaining for coalition organizations, BVerfG, 
18.11.1954 - 1 BvR 629/52, Hutfabrikant case ;In the Co-Determination Case the BVerfG 
defined the scope of protection offered by the freedom of coalition as follows:‘ It guarantees 
the freedom to form associations for the promotion of work and economic conditions and the 
freedom to pursue these goals jointly (…); in respect of both, the persons concerned should 
themselves make decisions autonomously, in principle free from state interference. The 
guarantee refers to the freedom to form, to join, to leave and to stay away from coalitons, it 
protects the coalition as such and its right to pursue the goals listed in Article 9(3) GG 
through activities that are specific to coaltions (…). Part of this is the conclusion of collective 
agreements by the means of which the coalitions regulate, in particular, wages and other 
financial work conditions in an area in which the state widely refrains from regulations, on 
their own responsibility and essentially without state influence. BVerfGE 50, 290, 
Translation: Michalowski/Woods 1999, 284. 
214BVerfGE 91, 365(1995), Translation: Michalowski/Woods 285: The right of the 
associations themselves to pursue the purposes listed in Article 9(3) GG by specific activities 
is protected(…) Article 9(3) GG leaves in principle the  choice of the appropriate  means for 
the achievement of this purpose to the coalitions. The basic right protects as activities of 
coalitions measures of industrial disputes which are directed at the conclusion of collective 
agreements. They are at least insofar protected by the right to freedom of coalition as they 
are necessary to safeguard efficient free collective bargaining (…) Part of this is the right to 
strike. 
215 BVerfGE 84, 212 (1991), Translation: Michalowski/Woods 285: (…) It does not have to be 
conclusively decided to what extent a lockout in general is constitutionally protected. The 
protection at leas embraces lockouts (…) which are used with suspensory effect to repel 
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However the social partners are only allowed to conduct industrial disputes if 
negotiations and following arbitration procedures were not successful. The 
right to strike and lockout are mainly based on case law and associated 
therewith these rights have been shaped over the course of time by 
judgments of the BVerfG and the BAG(Federal Labour Court). These courts 
are also the main bodies which protect and upheld the Tarifautonomie. As 
the right to freedom of coalition does not have a statutory reservation any 
limitation needs a legal basis and can only be justified by other fundamental 
rights or other rights guaranteed by the Basic Law having higher priority. 
Furthermore, any kind of limitation has to uphold the principle of 
proportionality216.  
 For a long time the German system of industrial relations and 
associated with that free collective bargaining was rather not subject to state 
interventions. This has however changed over the course of time. The 
legislator adopted several legislative acts in the last decades by which an 
encroachment upon the free collective bargaining took place. This happened 
mainly to respond to two main developments on  the German labour market , 
namely the high level of unemployment and the decreasing wage level. The 
latter is related to the fact that the German system of industrial relations has 
been faced by a process of creeping erosion217. The reasons for this process 
are manifold: the decline in bargaining coverage as well as a in the extension 
of collective agreements, the trend towards differentiation and 
decentralisation of collective bargaining through the widespread use of 
opening clauses in sectoral agreements which allows companies under 
certain circumstances to go below collectively agreed standards, the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
partial or targeted strikes to establish parity in negotiations. Such lockouts are not generally 
suitable to impair the establishment of parity in negotiations through the acceptance of 
industrial action to the disadvantage of the workers. 
216 Buecker/Warneck 2011, Reconciling Fundamental Social Rights and Economic Freedoms 
after Viking , Laval, Rueffert, 45-101. 
217 Anke Hassel 1999, The Erosion of the German System of Industrial Relations,British 
Journal of Industrial Relations 1999, pp. 483-505; Otto Jacobi 2003, Renewal of the 
Collective Bargaining System? In “The  Changing Contours of the German Industrial 
Relations System, ed.  Hans Joerg Wietbrecht, Walter Muller Jentsch 2003; Reinhard 
Bispinck, Heiner Dribbusch ,Thorsten Schulten 2010,   German Collective Bargaining in a 
European Perspective: Continuous Erosion or Re-Stabilisation of Multi-Employer 
Agreements? WSI Diskussion Paper No. 171, August 2010,  
http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_wsi_diskp_171.pdf;  Nicola Duell 2013, Collective wage 
agreement and minimum wage in Germany, European Employment Observatory 2013 , 
http://www.eu-employment-observatory.net/resources/reports/1-Germany-
NationalAdHocRequestMinimumWage%20-%20final%2005%20Feb2013.pdf 
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persistently high level of unemployment which shifted the balance of power in 
favour of employers since the 1990s and in turn weakened the marketplace 
bargaining power of employees, the trend away from the standard 
employment relationship  towards non -standard forms of employment in the 
form of temporary agency work, fixed term contracts and marginal part – time 
jobs, the decline in union membership, the ongoing European integration 
process with the accession of new Member States in the EU. All these 
reasons have contributed to the massive expansion of a huge low wage 
sector in Germany. The traditional actors of the industrial relations system 
were not able anymore to negotiate fair wages in collective agreements. As a 
reaction to this development the state has to a certain degree taken over this 
role by creating and amending legislative acts. This has resulted in the 
restriction of fundamental rights of the actors in the industrial relations system 
in Germany. Some of these legislative amendments were brought before the 
BVerfG which has backed the legislator in its social market economic 
policies. In the following some of these legislative acts including the relevant 
judgments of the BVerfG will be analysed. This will make it possible to gain 
information on the constitutionally allowed scope of state intervention in the 
autonomy of collective bargaining. 
 
Case 3: The Introduction of Wage Subsidies 218  
In this case the BVerfG had to deal with the question whether the introduction 
of wage subsidies for the implementation of job creation measures in the 
German Social Code Part III(Sozialgesetzbuch III, hereinafter SGB III) was in 
compliance with the Basic Law. In 1996 the German legislature introduced in 
the SGB III wage subsidies applicable for job creation schemes 
(Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahmen). § 275 II 2 in conjunction with § 265 I 
SGB III entitled the Federal Employment Office to pay wage subsidies for the 
creation of community service jobs on the second labour market to promote 
unemployed who were difficult to place in employment. This included 
particularly jobs to preserve the environment and to improve youth welfare 
service. The subsidy was only paid out in full if the agreed remuneration did 
not exceed 80 percent of the standard wages for comparable jobs in the first 
                                                             
218BVerfGE 100, 271, Lohnabstandsklausel, [1999]; 
Government draft:  http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/008/1400873.pdf 
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labour market. With this measure the legislator aimed to create new jobs in 
the public service for hard to place unemployed and to integrate them again 
in the labour market. The metal workers trade union IG Metall claimed that 
this regulation violated their freedom of coalition resulting from Article 9 III 1 
GG and lodged a constitutional complaint to the BVerfG. The IG Metall 
argued that at the core of the freedom of coalition was the wage setting 
competence of the social partners, which was also true for the second labour 
market. The IG Metall further claimed that the legislator was not allowed to 
intervene in the wage setting mechanism as long as efficient social partners 
existed. The plaintiff furthermore argued that the regulation weakened her 
position in collective negotiations, since the legislator had created wage 
guidelines which would predetermine the result of collective negotiations. If 
the relevant trade union did not agree with lowered remunerations, the 
working conditions would not be regulated collectively, but by single 
contracts. In doing so, the legislator gave incentives to abandon collective 
agreements and weakened therefore the position of employees.  
 The Court rejected the constitutional complaint. It found § 275 II SGB 
III in conjunction with § 265 I SGB III compatible with Art. 9 III GG.  
 To start with, the Court confirmed that the challenged provisions 
indeed restricted the plaintiffs freedom of coalition. It stated that the relevant 
provisions had an indirect impact on the plaintiffs scope of action in the frame 
of collective negotiations and accepted in so far the plaintiffs claim. However, 
the Court found the restriction as justified by overriding reasons of the 
common good. The justification provided was that the freedom of coalition 
was not an absolute right. It could be limited to safeguard interests of the 
common good which enjoyed likewise constitutional status. The aim to fight 
mass unemployment by promoting the creation of new jobs had constitutional 
status. The Court referred in this respect to the social state principle, Art. 20 
(1) GG which obliged the legislator to social balancing. The Court highlighted 
here again the wide discretion of the legislator to fulfil this obligation. 
Moreover, the creation of new jobs helped the unemployed to develop their 
personality, and to have respect for oneself and others. In this regard, the 
legislator could also invoke Article 1 I GG and Article 2 I GG. The Court 
stated that public welfare service in times of unemployment was not limited to 
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passive labour market policy by giving the unemployed financial support. The 
legislature could also pursue an active labour market policy to increase the 
number of jobs by co-financing labour costs and to combat in this manner the 
unemployment. The social state principle lent to such efforts legitimising 
weight which also justified the limitation of the autonomy of collective 
bargaining. 
 The BVerfG then proceeded to state that § 275 III 2 SGB in 
conjunction with § 265 SGB met all requirements of a detailed proportionality 
assessment. After acknowledging the suitability and necessity of the 
Lohnabstandsklausel it went on to discuss the last step of the proportionality 
test, the  proportionality in the narrow sense. As regards this, the Court 
balanced the interest of the legislature with the interest of the IG Metall. The 
BVerfG stated that statutory requirements which limited the leeway of the 
trade unions´ position in wage bargaining were particularly burdensome as 
the improvement of the working conditions belonged to the domain of the 
social partners. The BVerfG went on to make clear that wage bargaining on 
the second labour market was not the same as on the first labour market, 
due to the fact that remuneration on the second labour market was primarily 
not paid in return for performed work. The jobs to be created on the second 
labour market were non- profit oriented and the employer was only given an 
incentive to hire workers he otherwise would not have hired by receiving the 
subsidy.. The Court acknowledged that the plaintiff as a trade union could not 
exercise pressure on the employers´ side by means of threats to strike in the 
course of collective agreements. This had to do with the fact that employers 
could refuse to hire the unemployed in the frame of the job creation schemes 
if this was not in accordance with their interests. The Court then went on to 
state that there was no equal bargaining position between the social partners 
on the second labour market. The intensity of the intervention in the wage 
setting autonomy of the social partners therefore was limited. Employment 
relationships in job creation schemes on the second labour market were 
partially complemented by the employment promotion law and the 
preservation of employees´ interests in the realm of the Tarifautonomie, to 
this extent, was therefore constrained. On the other hand, the Court stated 
that the argument of the legislator to adopt the relevant provisions weighed 
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heavily and justified encroaching upon the complainant's right under Article 9 
III GG. With a number of 4 million unemployed the creation of jobs was a 
high-ranking social concern. The Unemployed were often faced with 
existential threats. The loss of the basis of life could result in a loss of the 
unemployed's self-esteem and personality. This was particularly the case 
with long-time unemployed who were difficult to place and had little prospect 
of finding a job. The BVerfG came to the conclusion that all requirements of 
the principle of proportionality were met and accordingly the constitutional 
complaint was not successful. 
 
 In this case, the BVerfG classified for the first time the fight against 
unemployment as a concern of the common good. Associated with that, the 
Court declared the supply - side oriented active labour market policy of the 
legislator as constitutionally unobjectionable. As regards this subject, the 
legislator could invoke the social state principle, human dignity and the 
freedom of self development to fight unemployment. It is interesting to see 
that the Court justified the legislator in its intention to fight unemployment by 
the introduction of statutory wages below standard wages on the basis of  the 
social state principle, which obliges the state and all its organs to promote 
social justice. The BVerfG gave the fight against unemployment priority over 
the freedom of coalition of the IG Metall. The scope of free collective 
bargaining on the second labour market is not the same as on the first labour 
market. On the second labour market it is constitutionally unobjectionable to 
make an exceptions from the general principle that wage agreements in the 
labour market must remain free from any state influence. In this case 
however, the state, albeit indirectly, has intervened in the wage negotiations. 
In this regard the Court emphasized the wide discretion of the legislature to 
fulfill its obligations and stated that it was up to the legislator how he fulfilled 
this constitutional duty, due to the fact that the social state principle was not 
further substantiated.  
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Case 4: The Crediting of Vacation219 
In this case the BVerfG had to deal with the question whether § 10 I 1of the 
Federal Leave Act(Bundesurlaubsgesetz, hereinafter BUrlG) was compatible 
with the Basic Law. The parties of the main proceeding disputed whether the 
defendant was allowed to credit days of the plaintiffs’ holidays for the year of 
1997. The annual holiday  was regulated by an collective agreement.  § 10 I 
1 BUrlG which was in effect from 1996 till 1998 entitled employers in cases, 
in which employees due to availed measures of medical precaution or 
rehabilitation were prevented from work, to credit on the basis of a five-day 
week the first 2 days on the employee’s vacation. The plaintiff in the present 
case was entitled to annual leave of 30 days. Furthermore, due to a disability 
he was entitled to additional annual leave of 5 days. The plaintiff availed 
rehabilitation measures for 15 working days from the 10th June 1997 till 30 
June 1997. The defendant credited for this period 6 days on the plaintiffs 
annual vacation for the year 1997. The plaintiff lodged action for a 
declaratory judgment to the Labour Court Heilbronn whether he was entitled 
to 6 days of vacation for the year 1997. The Labour Court Heilbronn had 
doubts on the constitutionality of § 10 I 1 BUrlG. It stayed the proceedings 
and referred to the BVerfG the question whether § 10 I 1 BUrlG was in 
accordance with the Basic Law, in particular with Article 9 III GG. The Labour 
Court claimed that § 10 I 1 BUrlG provided the employer with the right of 
disposal over the collectively agreed entitlement to leave. In this way, the 
employer could unilaterally change elements of a collective agreement 
negotiated by the social partners. 
 The BVerfG concluded that § 10 I 1 BUrlG was compatible with Article 
9 III GG. The Court first affirmed that § 10 I BUrlG encroached upon the 
freedom of coalition and the autonomy of collective bargaining of the social 
partners resulting from Article 9 III GG. § 10 I 1 BUrlG provided the employer 
with the right of disposal over the collectively agreed entitlement to leave. In 
this way, the employer could indeed unilaterally change elements of a 
collective agreement negotiated by the social partners, which would have 
                                                             
219BVerfGE 103, 293, Urlaubsanrechnung,[2001]. 
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detrimental effects for trade unions. However, this encroachment was 
according to the Court justified. The BVerfG reiterated its view and stated 
that the freedom of coalition, could be limited for concerns of the common 
good which enjoyed equal constitutional status. The legislator was allowed to 
intervene in the wage agreements of the social partners. Article 9 III GG 
entitled social partners with norm setting rights, but not with a norm setting 
monopoly. The legislator remained authorized to regulate subjects belonging 
to the field of labour law. As regards this subject, the Court stated that the 
limitation of the autonomy of collective bargaining within the meaning of 
Article 9 III GG was in accordance with the Basic Law, if the legislator aimed 
to protect basic rights of third parties or other issues of constitutional status 
and the principle of proportionality was respected. The Court made clear that 
§ 10 I BUrlG served  interests of the common good. It aimed to contribute to 
higher levels of employment. The fight against mass unemployment enjoyed 
according to the Court constitutional status and the legislator could invoke 
the social state principle, Article 20 (1) GG. The reduction of mass 
unemployment allowed previously unemployed persons to realize their 
freedom of occupation, Article 12 I GG, to develop their personality, Article 2 I 
GG and to have respect for oneself and others, Article 1 I GG. Furthermore, 
§ 10 I 1 BUrlG contributed to the financial sustainability of the social security 
systems.  
 The Court considered 10 I 1 BUrlG as proportionate. § 10 I 1 BUrlG 
was in the point of view of the Court suitable to achieve the pursued objective 
of the legislator. The Court emphasized the legislators leeway of discretion, 
stating that it was within the legislators responsibility to decide which 
measures he took in the public interest on the basis of political visions 
regarding economic, labour market and socio-political issues. The appraisal 
of the legislator according to which reduced labour costs contributed to reach 
a higher level of employment and to reduce costs of the social security 
system were reasonable. By balancing the interests of the social partners on 
the one hand, and the legislator on the other, the Court gave priority to the 
latter. The BVerfG made clear that  the autonomy of collective bargaining 
was concerned in a core area of the social partners. In all branches and 
bargaining areas holiday entitlements were part of collective agreements 
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which went beyond the statutory minimum holiday. In this area, the autonomy 
of collective bargaining gained a greater degree of protection than in subject 
fields which were not part of collective agreements. Given to this, more 
stringent requirements had to be applied for justifying the encroachment on 
the free collective bargaining in the present case. Furthermore, the concrete 
implications of § 10 I 1 BUrlG on employees had to be taken into 
consideration. As regards this subject,  the Court considered  the practical 
significance of § 10 I 1 BUrlG as rather low, due to its limited scope of 
application. On the other hand, the Court stated that the fight against  
unemployment in conjunction with the guarantee of the financial stability of 
the social security systems constituted a particular important objective. 
Against the background of the difficult situation on the labour market, the 
legislator had a large leeway for the realization of its aims. 
 
 The line of reasoning of the BVerfG in this case is very similar to the 
Lohnabstandsklausel case. The Court gave the fight of unemployment as a 
concern of the common good priority over Article 9 III GG. The Court allowed 
the legislator to invoke for this objective the social state principle, human 
dignity and the freedom of self-development. Moreover, the BVerfG also in 
this case emphasized the wide leeway of the legislators discretion for socio-
economic policy making. It is also interesting to see that the  BVerfG 
interprets the freedom of occupation in the present as a positive right, 
meaning that, the legislator must ensure that fundamental rights holders can 
make use of their freedom of occupation. It is therefore the task of the 
legislator to create the necessary conditions for fundamental rights holders to 
make use of their freedom of occupation. 
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Case 5: The Temporary Agency Workers Act 220 
In this case the BVerfG had to deal with the question whether  the 
amendment of the Temporary Agency Act(Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz 
hereinafter AÜG) was in accordance with the Basic Law. In the course of the 
labour market policy reforms in 2002 the German legislator amended 
amongst others certain aspects of temporary employment and associated 
therewith the AÜG. The aim of the so called Hartz reforms was to promote 
employment. This amendment brought about important innovations for 
temporary work agencies, temporary workers and clients to the same extend. 
Among other things, the previously existing restrictions on the duration of 
assignments to a client were repealed. Furthermore, the ban on 
synchronization of the period of assignment and the workers employment 
contract were cancelled which previously authorized temporary agencies to 
contract out employees for indefinite periods of time. The client  was provided 
with the right to engage  agency workers like employees of his own, without 
becoming his actual employer. Agencies who wished to commercially 
contract employees to clients for work, were required to obtain a permit from 
the state authorities.  The act furthermore entitled agency workers to the 
same employment conditions as comparable permanent employees in the 
client´s business( equal pay and equal treatment). Moreover, the AÜG 
contained an opening clause which allowed the social partners to modify the 
mandatory requirements  of the AÜG by concluding collective agreements. In 
this way the social partners were given the opportunity to circumvent the 
principle of equal pay and equal treatment. The amendment of the AÜG was 
however not uncontested. Accordingly, eight temporary work agencies and 
two employers’ associations lodged constitutional complaints against the 
AÜG. They claimed that the AÜG violated the freedom of association of the 
employers` associations, 9 III GG and the freedom of occupation of the 
temporary agencies., Art. 12 I GG.  
  
The BVerfG dismissed the complaints as inadmissible as they lacked 
sufficient prospect of success on the merits. In regard of Article 9 III GG , the 
Court left it open whether there was a restriction of the freedom of 
                                                             
220 BVerfG, 1 BvR 2283/03, Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz[2004]; see also 
Kowanz/Kremp Key Aspects of German Labour Law, 2011, 45. 
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association, arguing that such a restriction would have been in any case 
constitutionally unobjectionable. As regards this subject, the Court stated that 
with the adoption of the AÜG the legislator aimed to protect fundamental 
rights of third parties and other issues having constitutional status. The 
contested provisions aimed to improve the situation of temporary workers 
and associated therewith to protect their freedom of occupation resulting from 
Article 12 I GG. The regulation of the working conditions provided temporary 
workers with an adequate level of protection.  
 The Court went on to state that the objective of the legislator was to 
increase the acceptance and quality of temporary agency work and 
consequently to improve agency workers position on the labour market. The 
relevant provisions of the AÜG guaranteed agency workers a suitable level of 
protection.  The Court stated that individuals had to accept restrictions of 
their freedom to engage in business activities by labour market regulations 
which aimed at protecting employees. The establishment of mandatory 
provisions of labour law in the first place provided the framework within which 
employees could realize their freedom of occupation.  
 The Court proceeded to make clear that the relevant provisions of the 
AÜG served moreover the common good.  Temporary agency work served  
as a bridge from unemployment to employment. The fight against mass 
unemployment enjoyed constitutional status as it was covered by the social 
state principle, Article 20(1)GG. The reduction of unemployment allowed the 
previously unemployed to realize their freedom of occupation.  
 The BVerfG further held that the AÜG satisfied the requirements of the 
principle of proportionality. It made clear that the relevant provisions of the 
AÜG were suitable to contribute to the creation of new employment 
opportunities. The concept of the legislature to increase the acceptance and 
quality of temporary agency work was comprehensible. In this regard the 
BVerfG stated that the legislature had a wide leeway for discretion, meaning 
that it was within the legislatures’ responsibility to decide which measures 
were to be taken in the public interest and on the basis of political visions 
regarding economic, labour market and socio-political issues. The relevant 
provisions of the AÜG were also necessary to achieve the pursued aims, 
since there was no less severe measure to achieve the same purpose. The 
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Court also confirmed the proportionality in the narrow sense of the provisions 
called into question. It stated that although the free collective bargaining was 
affected in a core area,  namely the regulation of the working conditions 
including the working remuneration, the new regulations did not place an 
excessive burden on the social partners as the opening clause did not limit 
the social partners in their field of activity. On the contrary, the opening 
clause entitled temporary work agencies to organize the working conditions 
more flexibly. 
 The Court went on and assessed the constitutionality of the AÜG  on 
the basis of Article 12 I GG. It first stated that the aim of private law 
arrangements like the AÜG which set limits to the freedom of contract was to 
balance constitutionally guaranteed interests which were in conflict with each 
other. The interest of the temporary worker in decent working conditions was 
in conflict with the interest of the employer in cost effective working 
conditions. Both interests were protected by Article 12 I GG. The Court made 
it clear, that  especially labour law norms offered protection for employees as 
they were typically in a structural weak position when an employment 
contract with the employer was concluded. The legislator was thus 
confronted with the doctrine of practical concordance. The conflicting 
fundamental  rights needed to be conceived in their interrelatedness and to 
be limited in such a way that for all those involved they became effective to 
the farthest extent possible. The Court  referred here again to the legislators 
broad decision making discretion to bring conflicting interests in balance. The 
BVerfG emphasized that the legislator infringed its duty to protect 
fundamental rights only, if a fundamental rights position was subordinated to 
the interests of the other contracting partner in a manner that in consideration 
of the meaning and range of the affected fundamental right it could not be 
spoken of an adequate balance anymore. The Court rejected such a 
subordination and stated that the legislator had fulfilled its duty by 
considering the conflicting interests appropriately. The relevant provisions did 
not infringe the freedom of occupation of the temporary work agencies. As 
regards this, the Court referred to its assessment on  the constitutionality of 
the relevant provisions of the AÜG with Article 9 III GG and concluded that 
the regulations served a legitimate purpose and were proportionate.  
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 Notwithstanding the Court did not accept the constitutional complaints, 
this case offers gainful information in terms of the optimization of competing 
fundamental rights by the principle of proportionality and the doctrine of 
practical concordance. With the equal pay and equal treatment doctrine the 
legislator has intervened in the free collective bargaining. This however 
happened in an unobjectionable way as it can be seen from the judgment of 
the Court. The encroachment upon the right to free collective bargaining 
served the interest of the common good.  
 
Case 6: The Collective Agreement Compliance Clause221 
In this case the BVerfG had to deal with the question whether  the collective 
agreement compliance clause(Tariftreueerklärung) in the public procurement 
law of the Land Berlin(Vergabegesetz Berlin, hereinafter VgGB)222. was in 
accordance with the Basic Law. The Land Berlin awarded since 1995 public 
contracts in the road-building sector on the basis of the VgGB. §1 I 2 VgGB 
provided that public contracts in the road-building sector were only to be 
awarded to companies which, when submitting a tender, declared that they 
pay their employees at least the remuneration prescribed by the collective 
agreements applicable in the Land Berlin223. The Berlin government pursued 
with the adoption of the Tariftreueerklärung to fight unemployment on the 
local labour market by giving bidding contractors which paid standard wages 
protection against disadvantages emerging from competition with contractors 
not paying such wages. The German Federal Cartel Office 
(Bundeskartellamt) took the view that §1 I 2 VgGB was not in accordance 
with the German Act Against Restraints of Competition(Gesetz gegen 
                                                             
221 BVerfGE 116, 202, Tariftreueklausel, [2006]. 
222See for this Bücker/ Warneck, 2011,92. 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2000/01/feature/de0001235f.htm  
223 § 1 of theVergabegesetz Berlin has the following wording: (1)Aufträge von Berliner 
Vergabestellen im Sinne des § 98 GWB über Bauleistungen sowie über Dienstleistungen bei 
Gebäuden und Immobilien werden an fachkundige, leistungsfähige und zuverlässige 
Unternehmen vergeben. Die Vergabe von Bauleistungen sowie von Dienstleistungen bei 
Gebäuden und Immobilien soll mit der Auflage erfolgen, daß die Unternehmen ihre 
Arbeitnehmer bei der Ausführung dieser Leistungen nach den jeweils in Berlin geltenden 
Entgelttarifen entlohnen und dies auch von ihren Nachunternehmern verlangen.  
(2) Von der Teilnahme an einem Wettbewerb um einen Bauauftrag oder 
Dienstleistungsauftrag im Sinne des Absatzes 1 sollen Bewerber bis zu einer Dauer von zwei 
Jahren ausgeschlossen werden, die ihre Arbeitnehmer entgegen einer Auflage nach Absatz 1 
Satz 2 nicht nach den jeweils in Berlin geltenden Entgelttarifen entlohnen. 
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Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, hereinafter GWB) and issued a prohibition 
decision against the Land Berlin. It argued that §1 I 2 VgGB granted the Land 
Berlin a dominant position on the relevant market which violated the anti-
discrimination provision as enshrined in § 20.1 GWB224. The Berlin Senate 
rejected this decision and filed an appeal against the prohibition decision of 
the German Federal Cartel Office before the Berlin Chamber 
Court(Kammergericht). The appeal was rejected and the case proceeded to 
the Cartel Senate (Kartellsenat) of Federal Supreme Court. The Federal 
Supreme Court found that linking the allocation of public contracts to the 
Tariftreueerklärung violated provisions of the GWB and followed in this 
regard the view of the German Cartel Office and the Berlin Chamber Court. 
In addition it found that the VgGB was unconstitutional225, as it encroached 
on the “negative freedom of association, Article 9 III 1 GG since bidding 
contractors which wanted to access a market were required to respect 
collective agreements. The Federal Supreme Court passed the case in the 
frame of a concrete review(Konkrete Normenkontrolle) of a statute to the 
BVerfG 
 The BVerfG found  §1 I 2 VgGB as compatible with the Basic Law. 
The Court rejected the claim that §1 I 2 VgGB interfered in the scope of 
protection offered by Article 9 III GG concerning the negative freedom of 
association. As regards this subject the BVerfG stated that the obligation of 
complying with the duties imposed by § 1 I 2 VgGB did not limit the right of 
companies to freely decide against joining a coalition. 
 The Court then went on and assessed the constitutionality of §1.I 2 
VgGB on the basis of Article 12 I GG. It stated that the relevant provisions 
restricted the freedom of occupation, added however, that this restriction was 
compatible with Article 12 I GG. It concluded that the collective agreement 
compliance clause encroached upon the free exercise of employment which 
was guaranteed by Article 12 I GG. This fundamental right contained 
                                                             
224 § 20(1) GWB on prohibition of discrimination has the following wording:  
Dominant undertakings, associations of competing undertakings within the meaning of §§ 
2,3 and 28(1) and undertakings which set retail prices pursuant to § 28(2) or § 30(1) 
sentence 1, shall not directly or indirectly hinder in an unfair manner another undertaking in 
business activities which are usually open to similar undertakings, nor directly or indirectly 
treat it differently from similar undertakings without any objective justification 
225 Decision of the Cartel Senate of the Federal Supreme Court 18. January 2000-KVR 23/98  
http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-
bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&nr=25566&pos=0&anz=1 
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amongst others the right to freely negotiate the conditions of the working 
contract. The Court then made clear, that with the determination of the wage 
level in the collective compliance clause by the Land legislature, the 
possibility of employers to negotiate freely with their employees on the wage 
level was restricted.  
 The BVerfG went on to state that the encroachment on the 
fundamental right of freedom of occupation by § 1 I 2 VgGB was justified It 
made clear that the contested act served to protect employers who paid 
standard wages in accordance with collective agreements against 
disadvantages in competition with employers not doing so. The Land 
legislatures pursued aim to fight unemployment enjoyed constitutional status 
since it served the public interest. In this regard the legislator could invoke 
the social state principle, Article 20 I GG. The reduction of unemployment 
allowed previously unemployed persons to realize their freedom of 
occupation, Article 12 I GG, develop their personality, Article 2 I 1 GG and to 
have respect for oneself and others, Article 1 I GG. The reduction of 
unemployment contributed also to the financial stability of the social security 
systems. The legislature was also allowed to strengthen the autonomy of 
collective bargaining by extending the negotiated wage agreements between 
trade unions and employers to non-members of employers and employees´ 
associations as this constituted a public interest concern. In this regard the 
legislator could invoke Article 9 III GG226. 
 The BVerfG further held that the procurement law satisfied the 
requirements of the principle of proportionality. It stated that § 1 I 2 VgG BL 
was suitable for implementing the legislators pursued aim. In this regard it 
highlighted the Land legislatures leeway for discretion, stating that it was 
within the legislators responsibility to decide which measures he took in the 
public interest on the basis of political visions regarding economic, labour 
market and socio-political issues. The Court then went on to state that the 
compliance clause was the least restrictive way of upholding fundamental 
rights as its consequences were limited to a single contract and to the 
specific employees engaged in that contract. The relevant provision did also 
not violate the requirement of the proportionality in the narrow sense.  
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 The BVerfG balanced the interests of the legislature on one hand and 
the scope of protection offered by the freedom of occupation on the other. It 
ascertained that the obligation to comply with collective agreements imposed 
to employers constituted an exertion of influence on the employers freedom 
of occupation. The right to freely negotiate the content of employment 
conditions with employees and subcontractors was an essential component 
of the freedom of occupation, since the economic success of firms was 
largely determined by the conditions underlying the contract. The intensity of 
this intervention however diminished due to the fact that the obligation to pay 
standard wages arose not directly on the basis of a statute but on the 
decision of the contractor to declare a commitment to pay standard wages in 
order to win the relevant public procurement contract. On the other hand it 
held that the fight against unemployment in conjunction with the guarantee of 
the financial stability of the social security systems constituted a particular 
important objective. Against the background of the difficult situation on the 
labour market, the legislator had a large leeway for realizing its aims.  
 
 In the present case, the legislator has found it necessary to adopt this 
law as in the German construction sector undertakings from other EU 
Member States employed workers with a remuneration below  standard 
wages. Against this background, the main aim of the legislator was to protect 
German small and medium sized establishments from competition from low 
wage countries and thus to revive the German labour market. It can be seen 
that the line of reasoning of the Court in the present case is not different from 
the reasoning in the previously analyzed cases. The BVerfG gave the fight of 
unemployment absolute priority. Accordingly, the legislator could also invoke 
here the social state principle, human dignity and the freedom of self 
development  to intervene in the economy.  
 
4. The Dual Health Insurance System227 
Germany’s health care system forms an integral part of the German welfare 
state and belongs to the core of the social market economy. It has been 
subject to continuous amendments caused by the legislators will to adapt the 
                                                             
227 See for this: www.bverfg.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-059en.html; Horst Küsters, 
2007,44. 
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system to socioeconomic changes. To begin with, Germany has a dual 
health insurance system consisting of statutory and private health 
insurance228. One main difference between the former and the latter is the 
way how the premiums are calculated and associated therewith how the 
bipartite insurance system is financed. Statutory health insurance is based on 
income solidarity and risk solidarity as the premiums are not related to 
individual health risks but to the income of the insured. Private health 
insurers charge risk related premiums. Individuals pay a premium according 
to individual risk. This means that people with high health risks like the old, 
sick and the chronically ill pay high premiums; and people with low health 
risks pay low premiums. The business model of private health insurance 
therefore is not based on risk solidarity nor income solidarity. Private health 
insurance companies are like every other company only profit oriented and 
associated therewith also market oriented. 
 The coming into force of the Act to Strengthen Competition in 
Statutory Health Insurance (Gesetz zur Stärkung des Wettbewerbs in der 
gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung – GKV- WSG ) of 26 March 2007  and the 
amendment of provisions of the Act for the Reform of Private Insurance Law 
(Gesetz zur Reform des Vertragsversicherungsrecht- VVG- ReformG) of 23 
November 2007 brought about important changes to Germany´s health care 
system . The aim of the legislator was to ensure that persons either 
belonging to a statutory or private health insurance have permanent and 
adequate insurance cover against the risk of illness, especially in situations 
of social need. Furthermore, the legislator intended to strengthen competition 
among health insurance providers in regard of the quality of service and 
economic efficiency and to make it easier to change the insurance company. 
The GKV- WSG maintained Germany’s bipartite health insurance system but 
it has introduced substantial reforms as of 1 January 2009. This included 
among other things, a compulsory health insurance, either private or 
statutory for all persons with a place of residence in Germany. Prior to the 
reform self-employed and high-income employees were exempt from 
compulsory insurance. Section 193 (3) of the Insurance Contract 
                                                             
228 Stefan Greß, Private Health Insurance in Germany: Consequences of a Dual System, 
2007, 29-37. 
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Act(Versicherungsvertragsgesetz)  now states that each person with a place 
of residence in Germany shall be obligated to conclude and maintain with an 
insurance company licensed to operate in Germany a cost of illness 
insurance which comprises at least a cost refund for outpatient and inpatient 
treatment. Furthermore, private insurers are obliged to enter into contract 
with persons not belonging to the statutory health insurance system. In this 
regard section 193(5) of the Insurance Contract Act states that private 
insurers are obliged to grant insurance with the introduction of a so called 
basic tariff in accordance with section 12 (1a) of the Insurance Supervision 
Act(Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz) to all persons with a place of residence in 
Germany who are  not subject to obligatory insurance in statutory health 
insurance. The conclusion of the insurance contract may not be subject to 
medical conditions of potential insurance customers and associated therewith 
a prior medical examination may not be required. The premium for the basic 
tariff may not exceed the maximum premium under the statutory health 
insurance scheme(570 Euro) . In the basic tariff, private health insurers are 
not entitled to terminate insurance contracts nor to charge risk surcharges or 
to agree to the exclusion of benefits229. Furthermore, insurance customers 
who change to another private insurer will be able to transfer their ageing 
reserves that form part of their contribution. These provisions were previously 
retained by the insurer. However, the reform was not uncontested as the 
case below reveals. 
 
Case 7: The Reform of the Health Insurance System  230 
In this case the BVerfG had to deal with the question whether the relevant 
provisions of the GKV-WSG, and in particular the provisions relating to the 
introduction of the basic tariff were compatible with the Basic Law. Five 
health insurance companies and three complainants with private health 
insurance lodged constitutional complaints to the BVerfG against provisions 
of the (GKV- WSG). The companies claimed that several provisions of the 
reform lead to an unacceptable burden on private health insurance 
companies and their policyholders, resulting in a violation of their freedom of 
occupation. In particular, they claimed that the provisions related to the 
                                                             
229 (§ 203 Abs. 1 Satz 2 VVG). 
230 BVerfGE 123, 186, Gesundheitsreform[2009]. 
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introduction of the basic tariff, namely the obligation to contract, the 
prohibition to terminate the contract and to charge risk surcharges as well as 
the exclusion of benefits were in breach of Article 12 I GG.  
  The Court rejected the constitutional complaint. As regards the 
provisions concerning the introduction of the basic tariff the Court confirmed 
that these new regulations restricted the private insurers’ freedom of 
occupation resulting from Article 12 I GG; however it found the restrictions 
justified. The BVerfG pointed out that the aim of the GKV WSG was to 
ensure that all inhabitants of Germany had affordable health protection in the 
statutory or private health insurance system. Accordingly, the health reform 
served the interest of the common good and the legislator could invoke the 
social state principle, Article 20 I GG, since the protection of the population 
against the risk of sickness was a core task of the state. The legislative 
intention to create health insurance protection for all inhabitants was based 
upon the aim to offer protection against general risks of life. For this purpose, 
the legislator was authorized to cover the expenditures originating from it on 
the basis of a compulsory insurance.  
 The Court then went on and assessed the proportionality of the 
relevant provisions. In regard of the proportionality of the introduction of the 
basic tariff the Court stated that the combination of compulsory insurance (§ 
193 Abs. 3 VVG) and obligation to enter into contract(§ 193 Abs. 5 VVG) in 
the basic category was suitable to achieve the legislators’ goal of ensuring 
adequate and affordable health insurance cover for the category of persons 
allocated to private health insurance. People were provided with the right to 
sign an insurance contract and associated therewith obtained health 
insurance equivalent to the compulsory provision under statutory health 
insurance. This health insurance was affordable since the premium for the 
basic tariff must not exceed the maximum premium under the statutory health 
insurance scheme. The Court also confirmed the necessity of the basic tariff . 
It argued that the obligation to contract was the least restrictive way to ensure 
health insurance for people concerned. If there was no obligation to enter into 
contract, persons with serious pre-existing conditions would have no 
possibility of being accepted by a private health insurance company due to 
the increased risk. The obligation to contract was also reasonable since the 
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goal of the legislature to ensure adequate and affordable health insurance 
enjoyed high priority.  
 The Court further stated that in regard of the introduction of a fixed 
maximum premium in the basic tariff and associated therewith the prohibition 
of taking into consideration pre- existing conditions of persons concerned for 
calculating the premium the legislature pursued an legitimate aim, namely to 
ensure affordable insurance protection for all people concerned in private 
health insurance. The Court emphasized that there might be cases in which 
private health insurance companies were obliged to insure people at a non -
risk equivalent premium. However, this insufficiency of cover that may arise 
was not borne by the insurer, but by persons insured in private health 
insurance, in the form of a contribution. In drafting the act, it was reasonable 
for the legislature to assume that in the foreseeable future the basic category 
will have no significant effect on the business of the private insurance 
companies. The possibility of many insured would move to the basic category 
was out of question, at all events at present.  
 The basic tariff entailed a high premium of approximately 570 euros 
per month. At the same time, the main benefits of the basic category were 
narrower in scope than the customary benefits of the normal categories. 
Contrary to the fears of the companies, the legislature was allowed to 
assume that there would be no disproportionate increases of premium in the 
normal categories of private health insurance as a result of the need to 
finance the basic category, whose premiums might not be sufficient to cover 
costs, and that this would not in future lead to a substantial  move to the 
basic category, which in the long term would destroy the complete business 
model of private health insurance. The Court stated that if it transpired in 
future that prognosis of the legislator was mistaken, the legislature would 
have the duty to correct it. 
 In regard of the absolute prohibition of termination of comprehensive 
health insurance policies introduced by the GKV-WSG the Court stated that 
this was a justified encroachment in order to ensure that the privately insured 
were covered with a permanent health insurance just as in state health 
insurance. The same applied to the duty of private health insurers to provide 
their insured with emergency treatment even in case of default of payment. 
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This case shows that the rules of the market find only conditional 
application in the German dual health insurance system, which is traditionally 
a domain of the state. This has implications for the business model of private 
insurers, and in particular for their freedom of action. As was shown, the 
business model of private insurers is neither based on income solidarity nor 
on risk solidarity. Notwithstanding, private health insurers are now legally 
obliged to offer a non- risk based basic tariff in health insurance.  Health 
protection is a concern of the common good which enjoys, to the extent 
illustrated above, priority over the freedom of occupation of private insurance 
companies. It is again the social state principle which allows the legislature to 
intervene in the economy and  to limit  the freedom of occupation of private 
health insurance companies. 
 
5. Interim Conclusion 
This case study illustrated important judgments of  the Federal Constitutional 
Court on the  economic constitution of the German Basic Law. It was shown 
that not all features of the  original concept of the social market economy are 
reflected in legislative acts and associated therewith in the reasoning of the 
BVerfG. The criterion of market conformity is neither taken into consideration 
by the legislator when adopting a law nor by the BVerfG in the course of 
constitutional review. This speaks in favour of distinguishing  between the 
ideal and the real type of the social market economy. The former refers to the 
original concept of the social market economy and the latter to the social 
market economy as practised by the legislator in compliance with  the 
economic constitution of the Basic Law.  The social market economy 
facilitated by the Basic Law therefore  has a strong social connotation.  The 
state can intervene in the economy in the interest of the common good. In its 
subsequent case law the BVerfG emphasizes the importance of the concept 
of man of the Basic Law for the determination of the common good. The 
concept of man of the Basic Law does not correspond to the self interested  
"homo oeconomicus" .  Accordingly, in the legal reasoning of the BVerfG 
there is no attachment to market liberalism. The concept of man of the Basic 
Law has more to do with "the free development of human personality within 
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the social community". This has implications on the protection of fundamental 
rights. Fundamental rights holders  must accept limitations on their  freedom 
of action which the legislator draws for the care and advancement of 
communal life. The BVerfG sees  the choice and practice of an occupation  
less as a means of earning a living than as a foundation for the development 
of the human personality". The BVerfG therefore allows the legislator to 
intervene in the economy in the name of the common good  by invoking 
human dignity, freedom of self-development very often in conjunction with the 
social state principle. These constitutional values play an pivotal role in giving 
social concerns constitutional weight. They constitute  to the same time limits 
of the legislators wide discretion in regulating the social market economy. 
The BVerfG only ensures that the legislator does not exceed the limits of his 
discretion. 
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E. The Social Market Economy and the European Economic 
Constitution  
 
With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1st 2009, the 
social market economy has been constitutionalized in the European Union in 
Article 3 III 2 TEU. This gives on the one hand rise to the question of what 
legal content the social market economy has and on the other of its legal 
implications on the Lisbon version of the economic constitution of the 
European Union. These questions gain in particular significance when 
considering the judgments of the CJEU in the Viking quartet231 which were 
handed down prior to Lisbon. With these rulings the CJEU initiated a debate 
on the relationship between the economic and social dimension of the EU, 
thus between the freedom on the market and social state interventions. 
These rulings are mainly attributable to the substantial content of  the 
European economic constitution in the pre-Lisbon era232 and associated 
therewith on the legal reasoning of the  CJEU to resolve the conflicting 
interests. Against this background it will have to be analyzed in how far the 
constitutionalization of the social market economy offers room for a fairer 
reconciliation of the economic and the social dimension of the European 
Union.  
 
1. Defining the European Economic Constitution  
The analysis of the European economic constitution necessitates first to draw 
attention on the status of the European Treaties as a constitution and thus to 
deal with the term constitution in general terms. A constitution can be 
generally defined as a "juridical regime that entrenches certain rights in the 
fundamental laws of the polity, forbids derogation from those rights and 
enables right holders to sue to protect themselves against state action or 
inaction that infringes those rights233. In addition, there is a distinction 
between a constitution in the formal and material sense. A constitution in the 
                                                             
231 Case C-438/05 ITF v Viking Line ABP[2007] ECR I- 10779; Case C – 341/05 Laval v 
Svenska  Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR I – 11767; Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v 
Land Niedersachsen [ 2008] ECR I- 1989; Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg [2007] 
ECR I- 4323. 
232 Filip Dorssemont, A judicial pathway to overcome Laval and Viking, OSE paper series, No 
5, September 2011, 2. 
233Arthurs 2010, 405. 
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formal sense can be defined as " a set of legal norms contained in a 
document that is referred as the constitution in social practice234. The 
material concept of the constitution seeks to classify certain rules as 
constitutional according to their typically constitutional content235  It is 
generally acknowledged that the EU has no constitution in the formal sense, 
but a constitution in the material sense. The constitutionalisation of EU law is 
attributable to the case law of the CJEU.236 This is particularly remarkable 
against the background that the word constitution is neither mentioned in the 
founding Treaties nor in the subsequent amended version of the Treaties. 
The CJEU made it to a very early point of its jurisdiction clear that the then 
EEC Treaty was distinct from other international organizations. In 1962, in 
the VAN GEND AN LOOS case the CJEU stated that237:  
“By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has 
created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the 
Treaty, became an integral part of the legal systems of the Member 
States and which their courts are bound to apply. By creating a 
Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own 
personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of  representation on 
the international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming 
from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States 
to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign 
rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law 
which binds both their nationals and themselves”. 
In Costa vs. Enel the Court drew more far reaching conclusions from the 
principles formulated in the Van Gend case. The Court took the opportunity 
                                                             
234 See Agustín José Menéndez,  Three conceptions of the European Constitution, 2003, p. 5., 
see also Grimm, Dieter, ' Does Europe need a constitution? in P. Gowan and P. 
Anderson(eds.) The question of Europe. London: Verso, pp. 239-258; Habermas, Jürgen, 
Why Europe needs a constitution, in E.O Eriksen, J.E Fossum and A.J Menendez(eds), 
Developing a Constitution for Europe. London:Routledge, 19-34.; Weiler, Joseph H.H, 
(2002) ' A constitution for Europe? Some hard choices' , Journal of Common Market Studies, 
Vol. 40, No. 4, 563-80. ; Bellamy, Richard, ' The European Constitution is dead, long live 
European constitutionalism' Constellations, Vol 13 No. 2, 2006.   
235 Maria Luisa Fernandez Esteban, The Rule of Law in the European Constitution 1999, 10.  
236 On the constitutionalization of European Union law see inter alia; J.H.H. Weiler, The 
Constitution of Europe:"Do New Clothes Have an Emperor?" And Other Essays on European 
Integration, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1999; And other Leonard F.M. 
Besselink, The Notion and Nature of the European Constitution after the Reform Treaty, 
2008. 
237 CJEU, Case 6-64 Costa v. Enel[1964] ECR 585. 
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to lay down general rules which were to govern the relations between 
Community law and national law: 
"[The Treaty]... has created its own legal order... having real powers resulting 
from a limitation of competence or from a transfer of powers from the States 
to the Community...[it] would be impossible to assert any internal text 
whatsoever against the law created by the Treaty without robbing it of its 
Community nature and without jeopardizing the legal foundation of the 
Community itself238. 
But it was only in 1986 that the Court explicitly referred to the 'constitution'  of 
the then Community, the EC(EU) Treaty. In  Les Verts the Court it stated 
that: 
 It must be first emphasized in this regard that the European Economic 
 Community is a community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as 
 neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of  the 
 question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity 
 with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty239. 
 In regard of the particular features of the European constitution the CJEU 
issued an opinion in 1991 stating that: 
 "The EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of international 
agreement, none the less constitutes the constitutional charter of a 
Community based on the rule of law. The Community treaties 
established a new legal order for the benefit of which the States have 
limited their sovereign rights and the subjects of which comprise not 
only Member States but also their national. The essential 
characteristic of the Community legal order which has thus been 
established are in particular its primacy over the law of the Member 
States and the direct effect of a whole series of provisions"240. 
                                                             
238 CJEU, Case C- 6/64 Costa/ENEL ECR [1964], 1141,1269. 
239 CJEU Case C- 294/83 Les Verts v. Parliament[1986] ECR 1339, para. 23. 
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Over the course of time the CJEU then made recourse to the constitutional 
character of the EC(EU) Treaty in subsequent judgments241, lastly in 2008 in 
the Case Kadi & Al Barakaat where the Court stated that:   
 "The obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have 
the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which 
include the principle that all Community acts must respect fundamental 
rights".242 
From this statements the legal framework created by the Court which led to 
the constitutionalization of the Treaties becomes visible, as for instance 
principles like supremacy, direct effect, enforcement mechanism, the rule of 
law, hierarchical legal order243. These principles have without doubt 
constitutional character. 
 As regards the European economic constitution it was already 
mentioned that the interpretation of the notion economic constitution can be 
done on the basis of different approaches. The economic constitution in the 
ideal typical sense corresponds to the ordoliberal understanding of the 
economic constitution as was shown in the first chapter. The economic 
constitution understood in a constitutional law sense refers to “the sum of 
legal constitutional structural elements of the system of economy244. At the 
heart of this reading of the economic constitution is “the use of law to 
establish controls and limitations of power, a power which can be exerted by 
the state as well as private protagonists”245 The economic constitution in the 
constitutional law sense is based on constitutional provisions with relevance 
to economic life. In opposition to the economic constitution in the ideal typical 
sense, the economic constitution in the constitutional law sense, is not a 
closed system in itself, which necessitates therefore, to consider the whole 
                                                             
241 See inter alia CJEU Case C- 2/88 Imm. Zwartveld[1990] ECR I 3365, para. 16; Case C-
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constitution when applying and interpreting its provisions. The economic 
constitution in the constitutional law sense does not necessitate to separate 
the constitution into an economic and political part like in the ordoliberal 
economic constitution.  
 The formula of the economic constitution in the constitutional law 
sense must be extended when analyzing the European economic 
constitution. It is necessary to consider the shared competencies between 
the Union and the Member States in the realm of economic policy which 
offers room for intervention in the economic process. The European 
Economic Constitution can therefore be characterized as a mixed constitution 
which follows from both, market economic guarantees and the economic 
policy powers of the EU and the Member States.246. “ In the following,  the 
European economic constitution will be further analyzed.  
 
2. Evolution of the European economic constitution 
The system of the European economic constitution was established by the 
Treaty of Rome and further developed by the several Treaty amendments.  In 
evolutionary terms, the initial conception of the Rome Treaty allowed for a 
ordoliberal reading of the EEC Treaty. With the advancement of the 
European integration process, and several Treaty amendments an 
ordoliberal reading of the European economic constitution is not possible 
anymore which as a matter of fact necessitates to read the European 
economic constitution in a constitutional law sense. Departing from the 
Treaty of Rome the development of the European economic constitution will 
be illustrated in the next section.  
 
2.1. From Rome to the Single European Act 
The tensions between the freedom on the market and social state 
interventions are no recent phenomena . On the contrary, in the negotiations 
to the EEC Treaty in 1957, the position of Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg 
and the Netherlands on the one hand, and France and Italy on the other, 
differed with regard to the question what form the European integration 
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project should take. Germany advocated a functional method of integration, 
meaning that a common market had to be developed by the integration of 
European markets. France, on the other hand, preferred the institutional 
method of integration which was mainly based on the establishment of a 
customs union by way of a political integration. These two positions still 
dominate the regulative controversies in the European Union247. At the end it 
Germany prevailed. The German delegates to the EEC Treaty were amongst 
others comprised of Walter Hallstein, the first president of the European 
Commission, Hans von der Groeben, involved in the drafting of the Spaak 
Report and Alfred Müller-Armack, the founding father of the “Social Market 
Economy”. These persons were closely related to ordoliberalism.  It comes 
therefore as no surprise that  traces of the social market economy can be 
already found at an early stage of the European integration process. There is 
historical evidence that the ideas of the Freiburg School played a significant 
role in drafting the EEC Treaty248.The Treaty of Rome as the constitutive 
Treaty of the European Economic Community was therefore mainly 
economic in nature, which is also the reason why it is considered as the 
“original” European economic constitution". Article 2 of the EEC Treaty had 
the following wording:  
 "It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a 
Common Market and progressively approximating the economic 
policies of Member States, to promote  throughout the Community a 
harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and 
balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising of 
the standard of living and closer relations between its Member States”. 
To realize the above mentioned objectives the establishment of a common 
market was foreseen, consisting of the following instruments: the Customs 
Union and the fundamental freedoms providing that the Community has the 
task to eliminate customs duties, non-customs tariffs and obstacles to the 
free movements of goods, persons, service sand capital; free competition 
aiming at establishing a system ensuring that competition in the internal 
market is not distorted; and the introduction of a common trade and 
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transportation policy. From this it can be inferred that the fundamental market 
freedoms and the competition rules formed the basic features of the EEC 
Treaty. The fundamental market freedoms primary aim was to reduce market 
barriers in transnational trade by the opening up of national markets for 
supply and demand of goods, persons, and service from all Member 
States249. The openness of markets ensured the right of individuals to 
conclude contracts across borders. The aim of the establishment of a system 
ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted was to secure 
the openness of the markets in the then EEC against market limitations and 
distortions, from privates enterprises or the state250. From this it becomes 
clear that the fundamental market freedoms and the competition law of the 
EU are interlinked.  
 To continue with, reference to social policy in the EEC Treaty in its 
broadest sense was rather vague. As regards this subject it is important to 
note that the foundation of the then EEC was already laid in 1956 when the 
Ohlin Report251 and Spaak Report252 were produced253. Both reports dealt 
amongst others with the question, to what extent social competencies should 
be given to the common market with its emphasis on the free movement of 
products, i.e. goods and services and production factors i.e. labour and 
capital254. The Ohlin Report which was drafted by a group of experts of the 
International Labour Organization(ILO) and led by Bertil Ohlin in 1956, 
advocated a transnational harmonization of social policy only in few areas, 
such as equal pay255 , but rejected a general harmonization of social policy.  
By utilizing David Ricardo's economic theory of comparative advantage256 the 
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drafters of the Ohlin Report argued that differences in nominal wage costs 
between countries did not pose  obstacles to economic integration because 
what mattered was unit labour costs. In the report it is stated that, "so long as 
we confine our attention to international differences in the general level of 
costs per unit of labour time, we do not consider it necessary or practicable 
that special measures to harmonise social policies or social conditions should 
precede or accompany measures to promote greater freedom of international 
trade" as such differences reflect variations in productivity. This explains why 
it was not deemed necessary to harmonize social issues. The Spaak 
Report257 - drafted by the so called Spaak Committee in 1956 followed 
broadly the Ohlin Report.  
In accordance with the above mentioned Spaak and Ohlin Report but also 
ordoliberalism, reference to social policy in its broadest sense was rather 
vague. From the 248 Articles contained in Title III of the Treaty of Rome, 
"Social Policy", only 12 covered social policy issues.258 At the centre of the 
social policy provisions was Article 117 EEC Treaty(Article 151 TFEU) which 
provided:  
 "Member States agree upon the need to promote improved working 
 conditions and an improved standard of living for workers, so as to 
 make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is being 
 maintained".  
This provision clearly reflected the Member States’ decision that employment 
and labour relations were to be determined by the rules of the market and not 
by  European policy formation259". Thus, social policy was from the very 
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beginning of the European project subordinated to the economic constitution. 
Fritz Scharpf characterized the Rome version of the European economic 
constitution as a project which has decoupled economic and social policy260. 
In the view of Wolfgang Streeck the Treaty of Rome charged the Community 
with "developing a new kind of social policy, one concerned with market 
making rather than market correcting, aimed at creating an integrated 
European labour market and enabling it to function efficiently, rather than 
with correcting its outcomes in line with political standards of social 
justice261". 
  It can be clearly seen that the most important rules of the EEC Treaty 
reflected the constitutive and regulative principles of the ordoliberal economic 
order and thus supported the ordoliberal reading of the EEC Treaty. To be 
more precise,  the system ensuring that competition in the internal market is 
not distorted reflects Eucken´s constitutive principle of a workable price 
system with perfect competition. As regards this subject it is important to note 
that ordoliberalism had its most powerful influence in the area of the 
competition rules of the EEC Treaty. This is largely attributable to the primary 
role of German nationals in establishing and developing the competition law 
system262. The fundamental market freedoms aiming at the opening up of 
national economies are related to Eucken´s constitutive principle of free 
access to markets. The control of competition policy was entrusted to the 
European Commission, as an expert institution independent from democratic 
politics which reflects the regulative principle of the reduction and control of 
monopoly power. David Gerber draws attention to the fact that the 
establishment of the European Commission as a non-political expert 
institution "contributed to the emphasis on protecting the neutrality and 
objectivity of decision makers, the establishment of quasi-judicial procedures 
and standards for decision making, and the general demand that decisions 
be justified by reference to legal principles rather than merely to political 
interests"263. The effective enforcement of the fundamental market freedoms 
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and competition rules deriving from the European economic constitution on 
national level was ensured by the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) when it established the principles of direct effect and 
the primacy of Community law. Furthermore, the fact that social policy goals 
had to be achieved through the effectiveness of competition and thus beyond 
the reach of process policy was also in accordance with the ordoliberal 
economic constitution. Accordingly, social policy belonged to the sphere of 
political legislation and had to remain national. The lack of parliamentarism, 
democracy and pluralism in the EEC Treaty accorded also to the ordoliberal 
economic constitution. 
However, it should not be overlooked that the EEC/EC/EU Treaties ever 
allowed non market conform interventions in the economy. The Common 
Agricultural Policy264, for instance, which forms part in the EU Treaties since 
the Treaty of Rome, is not based on market principles but it has rather more 
in common with principles belonging to planned economy. This shows that 
although the Rome version of the European Economic Constitution generally 
allowed an ordoliberal reading, exceptions from market principles have been 
part of the Treaties since the beginning of the European integration process. 
  
 The Single European Act from 1987 constituted the first major 
amendment of the Treaty of Rome and represented the beginning of a 
profound development, a breakthrough and turning point in the European 
integration process265. The Single European Act was largely based on the 
Commission´s White Paper named “Completing the Internal Market”266. The 
main objective of the Single European Act was to revitalize European 
integration by creating the internal market consisting of the free circulation of 
goods, persons, services and capital to be achieved by 1992. The most 
important amendment to the EEC Treaty concerned the decision making 
procedure in the then EEC. Accordingly, the Single European Act made the 
application of the qualified majority rule for the adoption of legislation acts in 
several policy fields possible and replaced instead the requirement of 
unanimousity. This development paved the way for the concept of positive 
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integration. As opposed to negative integration which seeks to reduce 
existing market barriers via the fundamental freedoms, positive integration 
seeks to introduce new regulatory state policies to correct market failures267. 
There is no doubt, the Single European Act aimed at facilitating positive 
integration by removing the requirement of unanimity in essential policy 
areas. However, the White Papers aim was not primarily to encompass 
market correction measures via positive integration. On the contrary, it was 
based on eliminating existing transnational trade barriers which could not be 
removed by negative integration.  
The Single European Act constitutes also  the beginning of the social 
dimension of the internal market. The European Commission described the 
social dimension in the following way:“The social dimension of the internal 
market is a fundamental component of this project, for it is not only a matter 
of strengthening economic growth and stepping up the external 
competitiveness of European undertakings, but also of using more efficiently 
all the resources available and of achieving a fair share out of the 
advantages deriving from the single market"268.Jacque Delors, the then 
president of the Commission stated that "the creation of a vast economic 
area, based on the market and business cooperation, is inconceivable - I 
would say unattainable- without some harmonization of social legislation. Our 
ultimate aim must be the creation of a European social area269. 
Unsurprisingly, the Single European Act found support by trade the union 
movement as with Article 118A270 qualified majority voting concerning social 
protection and the health and safety of workers was introduced. Furthermore, 
the introduction of Article 118 B marks the beginning of the social dialogue at 
EEC level.  
                                                             
267 The distinction between negative integration and positive integration goes back to Jan 
Tinbergen, See Tinbergen1965, 76. 
268 Social Dimension of the Internal Market. Commission Working Paper. SEC (88) 1148 
final, 14.9.1988. 
269 EC Bull 2/1986, 12. 
270 Article 118 A had the following wording:  
1. Member States shall pay particular attention to encouraging improvements, especially in 
the working environment , as regards the health and safety of workers, and shall set as their 
objective the harmonization of conditions in this area, while maintaining the improvements 
made: 
2. In order to achieve the objective laid down in the first paragraph, the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, in cooperation with the European 
Parliament and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt, by means 
of directives, minimum requirements for gradual implementation, having regard to the 
conditions and technical rules obtaining in each of the Member States. 
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2.2. From Maastricht to Lisbon  
The Maastricht Treaty changed the structure of the Union and associated 
therewith the European economic constitution fundamentally. This structure 
can be characterized amongst others as follows: on the one hand a turning 
away from the pure ordoliberal European economic constitution took place 
and on the other new ordoliberal elements were added with the creation of 
the Economic and Monetary Union(EMU).  To begin with, for the first time 
ever a systematic decision in favour of a certain economic system was 
incorporated in the EC Treaty. With ex. Articles 4(1) and 98 the EC Treaty 
obliged the Member States and the Community to adapt their economic 
policies to the model of an open market economy with free competition. This 
commitment however did not mean that non market conform measures of 
Member States were generally not allowed271 as it can be concluded from a 
judgment of the CJEU dating back to 2000. In Echirolles Distribution SA v. 
Association du Dauphine and Others272 the Court stated that: 
“As regards Articles 3a, 102a and 103 of the Treaty, which refer 
to economic policy, the implementation of which must comply with the 
principle of an open market economy with free competition (Articles 3a 
and 102a), those provisions do not impose on the Member States 
clear and unconditional obligations which may be relied on by 
individuals before the national courts. What is involved is a general 
principle whose application calls for complex economic assessments 
which are a matter for the legislature or the national administration”273.  
The Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak in In Caja de Ahorros y 
Monte de Piedad de Madrid274 is far more illuminating as far as the 
justiciability of the open market economy with free competition is concerned. 
By making reference to the judgment of the CJEU in Echirrolles she stated 
that:  
 "As the Court made clear in that judgment[Echirolles], Articles 
4 EC,  98 EC and 99 EC, in so far as they refer to economic policy, 
                                                             
271 Calliess EUV Kommentar, Article 119, para.9.  
272CJEU Case C-9/99, Échirolles Distribution SA/Association du Dauphiné  and others, 
[2000]. 
273 CJEU Case C -9/99, para 25. 
274 Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak, Case C- 484/08, Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad 
de Madrid[2009]. 
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which must conform with the principle of an open market economy 
with free competition, define only general objectives, with the result 
that they must be read in conjunction with the provisions of the Treaty 
designed to implement those objectives. It follows that they are 
basically in the nature of an economic governance programme. In the 
view of the Court, they are not therefore provisions that impose on the 
Member States clear and unconditional obligations which may be 
relied on by individuals before the national courts. What is involved is, 
rather, a general principle the application of which calls for complex 
economic assessments, which are a matter for the legislature or the 
national administration. The last-mentioned is based not least on the 
fact that, as there is no common economic policy following the model 
of the common trade policy or agricultural policy in the framework of 
the economic and monetary union, the Member States continue to be 
competent and responsible for their general economic policy, although 
they must adjust this by way of coordination in such a way as to 
contribute to the attainment of the objectives of the Community within 
the meaning of Article 2 EC. In view of the legal uncertainty of those 
programmes and the continued competence of the Member States in 
the area of economic policy, it is in principle impossible to assess 
national implementation measures by use of the yardstick of the 
abovementioned provisions of primary law as to whether they are 
compatible with Community law. On the other hand, in accordance 
with the case-law referred to above, theoretically a legal assessment 
by reference to the Treaty provisions designed to implement 
Articles 2 EC, 3(1)(g) EC and 4(1) EC would be possible275". 
This decision of the Court but also the Opinion of the Advocate General are 
of utmost importance. It becomes clear that neither a market economic 
system nor  free competition can be directly enforced. The principle of an 
open market with free competition only constitutes a general objective which 
as a result must be read in conjunction with the provision of the Treaty 
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designed to implement those objectives276. The market economic system 
therefore is a enforceable by the fundamental market freedoms. Undistorted 
competition is to be enforced by the competition rules in ex. Article 85, 86 EC 
(now Article 101,102 TFEU).  
 Notwithstanding that the open market economy with free competition 
was not justiciable and associated therewith could not be enforced by 
individuals, it was not meaningless. From a material point of view277 the 
systematic decision in favour of an open market economy was significant 
with regard to the functional conditions of a competition controlled market 
economy. This comprises economic freedom, the co-ordination of supply and 
demand in competition and free access and exit from the market. From a 
structural point of view 278 the establishment of a competition driven market 
economy prohibits a change of the economic system based on market 
economic principles . Thus, an introduction of a planned economy by the 
Community and the Member States was prohibited unless the elimination or 
limitation of market principles is expressly allowed, as it is the case in 
agricultural policy. Furthermore, the principle of an open market economy 
supported a precept of rule and exception in which "each intervention into 
economic freedom of action was subject to compulsory justification according 
to the standards of proportionality279." Moreover, the principle of an open 
market economy with free competition served as an guideline for 
interpretation of economically relevant guarantees and authorisations of the 
Community´s primary law as well as for the measures of secondary law280.  
 With the Treaty of Maastricht the moderate canon of goals of the 
Treaty of Rome were expanded281. Accordingly, Article 2 EC contained 11 
primary goals, namely a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development 
of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, 
equality between men and women, sustainable and non inflationary growth, a 
high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, 
                                                             
276 "What gives an economic constitution legal strength and which limits it sets to sovereign 
and private parties is not derived from a specific economic model but rather from the 
concrete applied standards of norms".  Hatje  2010, 591. 
277Hatje 2010, 597. 
278Hatje  2010, 597. 
279Hatje  2010, 597; Nowak, EuR-Bei, 2011,(21),39; Frenz, GewArch 2010, 330; Louis Azoulai 
2008, 1343; Lukas Oberndorfer, 2009, 45. 
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281 See for this Barnard , EU Employment Law 2012, 14. 
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a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, 
the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and 
social cohesion and solidarity among  the Member States.  These goals were 
according to Article 3 EC to be achieved mainly by the establishment of the 
common market and the economic and monetary union(EMU).   
In addition, with the Maastricht Treaty a social chapter was introduced . It 
was originally proposed that Articles 117-122 EEC be amended to expand 
the EU´s social competence but this idea met with resistance from the UK. In 
order to secure the UK´s agreement to the Treaty on the European Union as 
a whole, it was agreed to remove these changes from the main body of the 
Treaty and place them in a separate Protocol and Agreement(the Social 
Policy Agreement(SPA) and the Social Policy Protocol(SPP), together 
referred to as the Social Chapter), which would not apply to the UK. The 
incorporation of labour law provisions blurred the formerly drawn clear cut 
line between the European economic constitution and the political 
responsibility of the Member States in regard of their social policies. 
 From the standpoint of ordoliberalism the introduction of several non- 
market elements in the  Maastricht Treaty like industrial policy, employment, 
social and economic cohesion was not in accordance with the ordoliberal 
economic constitution282. This move opened the door for the creation of 
discretionary policies and new forms and mechanisms for public intervention 
not compatible with the principle of undistorted competition283. Competition 
policy was downgraded to one among several commitments. As a matter of 
fact it was not possible anymore to assign the system of undistorted 
competition a constitutive function and normative dominance284. These 
developments have unambiguously narrowed the scope of derivable rights 
from the European economic constitution. According to Joerges the 
Maastricht Treaty was the end of the ordoliberal “economic constitution”285. 
While on the one hand the Maastricht Treaty limited the  Rome version 
of the European economic constitution by allowing non market conform 
interventions in the market process it widened it on the other hand  by the 
establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union(EMU),. “With its 
                                                             
282 see for this Craig, 2010, 292. 
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284Joerges: What is left of the European Econ0mic Constitution? 2004. 
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provisions on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Treaty of Maastricht 
added a new layer to the European economic constitution, while leaving 
intact the constitutional foundation of fundamental market freedoms and 
competition law. While the first layer of the European economic constitution 
focuses on the basic principles of microeconomics, the second layer 
addresses issues of macroeconomics”286. And here again, ordoliberalism 
played a significant role in shaping the rules of the European economic and 
monetary policy.  
 With Amsterdam a social policy287 and employment288 chapter was 
integrated in  the EC Treaty. The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice moreover 
provided for a qualified majority voting in the European Council in areas 
related to the improvement of the workplace, the protection of health and 
safety of workers, working conditions, information and consultation of 
workers, equal treatment of men and women on the labour market and in the 
workplace, and the integration of people  excluded from the labour market 
289. 
 
3. The Lisbon version of the European Economic Constitution  
On December 1, 2009 the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. This Treaty 
amended the existing legislative framework and precluded a new Treaty on 
the European Union(TEU) and a Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union(TFEU). Although the main concept of the European Economic 
Constitution remained unaltered, this new Treaty has provided a new basis to 
the European integration process. In the following, the components of the 
Lisbon version of the European economic constitution concerning the 
microeconomic layer shall be elaborated. 
 
3.1. The Fundamental Market Freedoms  
The analysis of the Lisbon version of the European economic constitution 
has to start with the internal market.  Article 3 III 1 TEU states that the Union 
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shall establish an internal market. The term internal market is legally defined 
in Article 26 TFEU290. Article 26(1) TFEU states that the Union shall adopt 
measures with the aim of establishing or ensuring the functioning of the 
internal market, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties. 
Article 26(2) TFEU then explicitly describes the internal market as an area 
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the 
Treaties. The implementation of the objectives of the internal market is in the 
first place done by the economic freedoms291, which traditionally form 
fundamental pillars of EU Law. The four fundamental market freedoms 
remained unchanged. Accordingly, the provisions on the free movement of 
goods are contained in Article 28-37 TFEU, the free movement of persons in 
Article 45-48 TFEU, the rules on freedom of establishment in Article 49-55 
TFEU, the freedom of services is dealt with in Article 57-62 TFEU.  
3.2. European Competition Rules 
Furthermore, the functioning of the  internal market is not only ensured by the 
fundamental market freedoms but also of a system in which competition is 
not distorted292. When taking a look at the Lisbon Treaty, however, one will 
search in vain a reference to a system ensuring that competition is distorted 
in the common provisions. Article 3 III 1 TEU contains only the commitment 
to create an internal market but the system of ensuring undistorted 
competition is not explicitly mentioned. In comparison, the failed 
Constitutional Treaty for Europe gave free and undistorted competition the 
status of an objective of the Union293. The removal of a system of undistorted 
competition from the body of objectives can be traced back to the position of 
                                                             
290 Ex. Article 14 EC. 
291 The ECtHR uses the expression fundamental freedoms as well, however only in regard to 
rights guaranteed in a catalogue of fundamental rights, whereas in EU Law fundamental 
freedoms refer to cross-border economic freedoms to establish the internal market, see inter 
alia, Christian Walter , History and Development of European Fundamental Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms § 1(42), in :European Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, ed. Dirk 
Ehlers 2007. 
292 CJEU Case C-300/89 Commission/Council , ECR. 1991, I- 2867 (14.); CJEU Case  C-
350/92, Spain/Council, ECR 1995, I-1985 ( 32). 
293 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe[2004] OJ C303/1; Article I-3 reads as 
follows: `The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without 
internal frontiers, and an internal market where competition is free and undistorted`.  
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the French delegation in the course of negotiations to the Lisbon Treaty294. It 
is important to note that the rules on competition have ever since had a very 
strong standing in Community law. As was shown before, competition law as 
a constitutional foundation played a significant role in the European 
integration process and associated therewith in the rulings of the CJEU. 
Accordingly,  it is worth to mention that the CJEU granted the principle of free 
competition the status of a general principle of Community law already in 
1980295, thus before it found its place in several provisions of the European 
constitution with the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty296. Ex. Art. 
3(1) g EC foresaw a system ensuring that competition in the internal market 
is not distorted. This system constituted an important instrument to achieve 
the objectives enlisted in ex. Article 2 ECT. The significance of this system 
can also be seen in the rulings of the CJEU when it stated that free 
competition within the common market constituted a fundamental objective of 
the Community under ex. Article 3(1)(g) EC Against this background it is very 
remarkable that there is no commitment to the system that competition is not 
distorted in the catalogue of objectives of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 3 TEU. 
This removal however has not the consequence that undistorted competition 
is completely superseded from the body of objectives. First, according to 
Article 3(b) TFEU the EU still has the  exclusive competence for the 
establishment  of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market.  Furthermore reference to a system of undistorted 
competition is made in Protocol (No 27) on the internal market and 
                                                             
294 President Sarkozy stated that:“We have obtained a major reorientation of the objectives of 
the Union. Competition is no longer an objective of the Union, or an end in itself, but a 
means to serve the internal market” In French: “Nous avons obtenu une reorientation 
majeure des objectifs de L’Union. La concurrence n’est plus un objectif de l’Union ou un fin 
en soi, mais un moyen au service du marché intérieur.” See for this Rompuy, 2011, 4. 
295 Case 139/79 Maizena v. Council[1980] ECR 3393; Case 240/83 Procureur  de la 
Republique v Association de defense des bruleurs d´huiles usagees(ADBHU) [1985] ECR 
531. 
296 See Article 3(g)EC (...) " a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not 
distorted;  Article 4(1) EC (...) : " For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the 
Member States and the Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in 
accordance with the timetable set out therein, the adoption of an economic policy which is 
based on the close coordination of Member States´ economic policies, on the internal market 
and on the definition of  common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the principle 
of an open market economy with free competition. 
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competition297. This protocol enjoys according to Article 51 TEU Treaty status 
and has the following wording: 
 (...) ' Considering that the internal market as set out in Article 3 of the 
Treaty on the European Union includes a system  ensuring that competition 
is not distorted, have agreed that: To this end, the Union shall, if necessary, 
take action under the provisions of the Treaties, including under Article 353 of 
the Treaty on the  Functioning of the European Union. This protocol shall 
be annexed to the Treaty on the European Union and to the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.' 
In the juridical literature it was not quite clear which implications this move 
would have298. In Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB299, the CJEU 
made for the first time reference to Protocol No 27 on the internal market and 
competition and created clarity on the status of undistorted competition in the 
frame of the internal market . Here, the CJEU declared the following: “Article 
3(3) TEU states that the European Union is to establish an internal market, 
which, in accordance with Protocol No 27 on the internal market and 
competition, annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, is to include a system ensuring 
that competition is not distorted". From this it can be concluded that Protocol 
No 27 is an inseparable part of Article 3(3) TEU. This also means that the 
excise of the principle of undistorted competition from the front of the Treaties 
has no direct implications on the enforceability of the European competition 
rules. But it must be admitted that the shifting of the objective of undistorted 
competition in a protocol  sends a clear political message as the idea of 
competition has forfeited its legal basis in regard of its function as a Leitbild 
for policy making in the EU. 
 
 
 
                                                             
297 Protocol (No 27) on the internal market and competition OJ 115 09/05/2008 P.0309-
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298 See for this: Carsten Nowak,  EuR-Bei, 2011, (21), 30; Ben van Rompuy, The Impact of the 
Lisbon Treaty on EU Competition 2011, 4.  
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3.3. Defining the Social Market Economy in Article 3 III 2 TEU  
As already pointed out, the objective of the open market economy with free 
competition was to be implemented by the fundamental market freedoms and 
the European competition rules, the backbones of the Nice version of the 
European Economic Constitution. One of the most eye catching innovation 
brought about Lisbon is the shift from an open market economy  towards a 
"social market economy" as an objective of the Union. This begs the 
question, what the social market economy explicitly stands for. Prima facie, it 
doesn’t seem unreasonable to make recourse to the original concept of the 
social market economy to define the social market economy in Article 3 III 2 
TEU, since the social market economy originated in Germany. On closer 
examination, however,  it becomes cear, that the original concept of the 
social market economy is not reflected in Article 3 III 2 TEU.  As was already 
pointed out,  the notion social market economy can refer to different things. 
There is a difference between the ideal and the real concept of the social 
market economy. Even within the ideal concept there are different types of 
positions, particularly on the scope of the social element within the social 
market economy. Against the background of the evolution of the European 
Economic Constitution it seems rather improbable that the social market 
economy in Article 3 III 2 TEU  can be equated with ordoliberalism. It is on 
the one hand undeniable that the constitutional framework of the Union still 
has very strong ordoliberal elements. This, however, does not detract from 
the fact that the Lisbon version of the European economic constitution is with 
several ordoliberal principles at odds. As was shown, already with the coming 
into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 non-market elements were 
introduced which,  as a matter of fact,  makes it  not possible anymore to give 
the ordoliberal element of undistorted competition a constitutive function. This 
development is at odds with another basic characteristic of ordoliberalism, 
namely the requirement of market conformity.  
 Moreover, it seems also improbable that the social market economy in 
Article 3 III 2 TEU could be equated with Alfred Müller- Armack´s concept of 
the social market economy. As was already pointed out, the concept of social 
market economy combines the freedom on the market with social justice. 
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Accordingly, it contains distributive and redistributive elements. The principle 
of freedom on the market provides for a fair distribution of prosperity, and the 
social policy has the task of redistributing prosperity in cases where the 
market is not able to guarantee a fair distribution. The necessary means for 
redistribution policies are funded by public revenue. This is the manner in 
which the state enforces solidarity by the strong with the weak300. However, 
the European Union lacks competences for creating governmental 
redistributive policies. The constitutionalization of the social market economy 
in the Lisbon Treaty did not go hand in hand with a widening of EU 
competences in the field of social policy allowing for the creation of 
redistributive policies, as will be shown below. On the contrary, the European 
Union ever lacked competences to allow the establishment of a European 
social state. From this it can be concluded that redistribution is still a matter 
which belongs to the sphere of the Member States. It is particularly this 
element which makes the social market economy different from an open 
market economy. Against this background  also the predominant view in the 
German legal literature is that the reference to the social market economy in 
Article 3 III 2 TEU cannot be equated with it original concept 301. Exemplary, 
Joerges states that “central characteristics of the social market economy like 
redistributive policies through taxation and subsidies, minimum wages, 
welfare aid, tenant subsidies, investment in higher education, the objective of 
a high rate of employment are not existing at the EU level. He concludes 
from this, that the reference to social market economy cannot be equated 
with its historical model”302. For Joerges therefore the reference to a highly 
competitive social market economy means that a kind of social balancing 
must take place. According to Azoulai303 the social market economy refers to 
the intention to create a social counterbalance to market considerations in 
the sense that neither the European integration process should be advanced 
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to the detriment of the integrity of the national social systems. For him the 
social market economy reflects the desire to find a new equilibrium. 
Catherine Barnard sees things similarly. According to her the highly 
competitive social market economy refers to the need of reconciling the 
economic and the social dimension of the internal market.304 In her point of 
view the social market economy is equivalent to the German social state 
principle, Articles 20(1), 28 GG. In the view of DG Employment Comissioner 
Laszlo Andor the social market economy, that the Treaties support, consists 
of:“a market economy that harnesses competition to keep prices down and 
generate growth and innovation, with rules to eliminate distortion; with a 
social dimension involving the application of rules on working conditions, 
individual and workers’ rights, and the objective of full employment; and 
displaying a concern for sustainability, illustrated by the idea of balanced 
growth and the quality of the environment”305. 
 All these considerations are in line with the genesis of Article 3 TEU 
and particular with the objective of the social market economy. As regards 
this subject,  it should be recalled that the constitutionalization of the highly 
competitive social market economy is not a brand new innovation of the 
Lisbon Treaty but goes back to an initiative of the former Foreign Ministers of 
Germany and France Joschka Fischer and Domenique de Villepin 
respectively in the course of elaborations of the European Convention in 
2001306. The social market economy in the European Convention was part of 
deliberations in the  working groups on Social Europe and Economic 
Governance. In the final report of the Working Group XI on Social Europe it is 
stated that: “several members aimed with the incorporation of the social 
market economy as an objective to emphasize the link between economic 
and social development and the efforts made to ensure greater coherence 
between economic and social policies”307.  From this it can be clearly seen 
that the social market economy is targeted at linking the economic and social 
dimension of the internal market. A reference to the original concept of the 
social market economy did not take place. This also means that the 
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realization of the social market economy  must take place beyond the reach 
of an economic model with undistorted competition and  market conformity at 
its core. Against this background, the highly competitive social market 
economy has to be defined as the requirement to balance and reconcile  the 
economic and the social dimension of the internal market of the European 
Union.  
3.4.Legal Implications of the Social Market Economy 
After having carved out a definition for the social market economy it must be 
dealt with the question which legal implications the constitutionalization of the 
social market economy has for the European economic constitution. This 
necessitates first to analyse the social market economy in its function as an 
objective of the European Union. The central provision referring to objectives 
of the European Union is Article 3 TEU. The rationale behind Article 3 TEU is 
to set out the general objectives of the European Union as an international 
organisation from which above all the justification of the very existence of the 
Union can be derived.308 This is clearly reflected in Article 1 TEU in which it is 
stated that the establishment of the European Union is based on the 
conferral of competences by the Member States to attain “common 
objectives”309. The ruling of the CJEU in Echirolles on the enforceability of an 
open market economy with free competition is mutatis mutandis applicable to 
the highly competitive social market economy in Article 3 III 2 TEU. This also 
means that the social market economy is not justiciable and associated 
therewith can not be enforced by individuals before courts. Moreover, an 
invocation of Article 352 TFEU is not possible, as this provision necessitates 
a reference to a policy area, however the sole realization of an objective does 
not create new competences. The realization of the objective social market 
economy is, therefore, dependent on single provisions in the Treaties. 
 Furthermore, Article 3 TEU and associated therewith the objective of 
the social market economy has no competence establishing nature. This can 
be clearly concluded from Article 3VI TEU  which provides that the Union 
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shall pursue its objectives by appropriate means commensurate with the 
competences which are conferred upon the Treaties. Accordingly, this makes 
it necessary to search for provisions in the Treaties which give the “social” 
element of the  social market economy concrete shape. 
  Like all objectives of the EU the objective of creating a  social market 
economy is addressed to the institutions of the EU which are enlisted in 
Article 13 TEU. These institutions are obligated to pursue the objective of 
creating a highly competitive social market economy legally and factually. 
Accordingly, Article 3 TEU is a standard setting provision for legislative acts 
at the European level as well as for the application of respective norms by 
the EU institutions. Furthermore, the objective of the social market economy 
is binding on the Member States, which results in positive and negative 
obligations.310 In regard of the former Article 4 III 2 TEU states that the 
Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to 
ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting 
from the acts of the institutions of the Union. In regard of the latter Article 4 III 
3 TEU states that the Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the 
Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardize the 
attainment of the Union's objectives. From this it can be concluded, that the 
reference to the social market economy in Article 3 III 2 TEU contains a 
mandate for action for both the EU institutions and the Member States.  
 The social market economy places a duty on the EU and the Member 
States to provide for a balance between the social and economic dimension 
of the internal market. As regards this the legislatures are endowed with a 
broad margin of discretion. However, the social market economy does not 
say anything as to how this task is to be accomplished in detail. The internal 
market shall be a social one, but the Lisbon Treaty does not indicate what the 
attribute "social " explicitly stands for. The obligation of the social market 
economy can be interpreted very differently and therefore the approach to 
address the "social question " can differ, depending on the political force the 
legislator belongs to. From this it can be inferred that the objective of the 
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social market economy constitutes a political declaration rather than a 
juridical mechanism.  
 Moreover, objectives are traditionally used for the interpretation of EU 
law. The strong position of the fundamental market freedoms and the 
competition rules are generally attributable to the market economic 
orientation of the EU. Due to the replacement of the social market economy 
by the social market economy  the CJEU is now required to apply the social 
market economy in the interpretation of legal provisions in the frame of its 
case law311. Against the background that the strong position of the 
fundamental market freedoms and the competition rules are amongst others  
attributable to ex. Art 4 (1) EC which referred to the open market economy, 
the social market economy can only mean to allow more derogations from 
the economic constitution as this was before. This possible development 
gains even more significance, if taking into consideration that the CJEU 
mainly uses the  systematic-teleological approach to interpret EU law, as will 
be shown below. 
4. Interim conclusion  
 The social market economy according to Article 3 III 2 TEU can neither 
be equated with ordoliberalism nor with the original concept of the social 
market economy. The social market economy according to Article 3 III 2 TEU 
stands for the balancing and reconciliation of the economic and social 
dimension of the internal market of European Union. In comparison to the 
open market economy, the social market economy can be distinguished by 
the fact, that it entails a positive obligation to balance the social and the 
economic dimension of the internal market. Due to the fact that EU objectives 
are not enforceable and do not have the effect of establishing a new 
competence, the social market economy must be read in conjunction with 
provisions of the Treaty designed to implement it as an objective. The 
realization of the social market economy depends therefore of competences 
and enabling provisions in the Treaties. It will be dealt with this in the next 
section.  
                                                             
311 Ingolf Pernice, Potenziale Europäischer Politik nach Lissabon, EuZW 2010, 407, 411; 
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F. Ways to Realize the Objective of the Social Market Economy   
 The derivable rights from the European economic constitution are not 
absolute. The CJEU has made it several times clear that both, the internal 
market and the European competition rules do not form goals in themselves, 
but rather means to realize higher goals of integration, “which are placed 
above the economy312”. Accordingly the derivable rights from the European 
economic constitution might be limited by social competences and 
associated with that rights of the EU but also the Member States. This fact is 
now in particular expressed by the move away from an open market 
economy with free competition towards a highly competitive “social” market 
economy which clearly reflects the fact that the EU not only has an economic 
but a social face. It is worth to stress again, that the social dimension of the 
internal market is not a brand new development but as such started to evolve 
with the above mentioned Single European Act.  More recently, namely in its 
Single Market Review Package the Commission stated that the single market 
has to go hand in hand with social and environment policies to contribute to 
sustainable development goals and needs to “encompass a strong social and 
environmental dimension. A major challenge was thus to “find the right mix to 
allow trade to flourish while respecting labour law, health, safety and 
environmental standards313. Likewise, the European Economic Social 
Committee is of the opinion that  in a social market economy the internal 
market cannot function properly without a strong social dimension314.  Also 
the CJEU acknowledged the social orientation of the EU  in its judgment in 
the Laval case when it stated that: 
It must be added that, according to Article 3(1)(c) and (j) EC, the 
activities of the Community are to include not only an 'internal market' 
characterized by the abolition, as between Member States, of 
obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, service and capital' 
but also  'a policy in the social sphere'. Article 2 EC states that the 
                                                             
312 Opinion 1/91 EEA I [1991] ECR I-6079, para 50; see Armin Hatje 2010, 593. 
313 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of the Regions,   A Single 
Market for 21st Century Europe  Com(2007) 725, 20.11.2007.   
314OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee  on  “The Social Dimension of 
the Internal Market”,  SOC/360 The Social Dimension of the Internal Market  Brussels, 14 
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Community is to have as its task, inter alia, the promotion of 'a 
harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic 
activities' and 'a high level of employment and of social protection'.  
Since the Community has thus not only an economic but also a social 
purpose, the rights under the provisions of the Treaty on the free 
movement of goods, persons, services, and capital must be balanced 
against the objectives pursued by social policy, which include, as is 
clear from the  first paragraph of Article 136 EC, inter alia, improved 
living and working conditions, so as to make possible their 
harmonisation while improvement is being maintained, proper social 
protection and dialogue between management and labour".315 
The question now arises, in how far the constitutionalization of the social 
market economy will contribute to enhance the social dimension of the 
internal market in comparison to the pre-Lisbon period. As has been pointed 
out, the social market economy entails a positive obligation to balance the 
economic and social dimension of the internal market. The realization of the 
social market economy in the sense of Article 3 III2 TEU might therefore be 
achieved in two different ways. First, by enhancing social policy formation on 
EU level in the sense of positive integration and secondly by limiting the 
detrimental effects of negative integration for the social models of the  
Member States. In the following these two options will be examined in detail.  
 
 
I. The Realisation of the Social Market Economy via the Concept of 
Positive Integration 
The objective of the social market economy in the sense of Article 3 III 2 TEU 
might be achieved by the concept of positive integration and thus by 
enhancing active policy formulation. Pursuant to the separation of power and 
despite the lack of democratic structure of the EU it is in the first place the 
task of the European legislator to realize objectives of the European Union316. 
The CJEU respects in this regard  the political autonomy of evaluation and 
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formation of the European legislator317. In the view of the CJEU, judicial 
review absolutely precludes the evaluation of the situation resulting from 
economic facts or circumstances318. Accordingly, it is up to the European 
legislator to adopt new secondary legislation which reflects the idea of the 
social market economy. The potential significance of the social market 
economy is that constitutional objectives like the social market economy are 
intended to guide the policies performed on the basis of given competencies 
which means that the social market economy is to be taken into 
consideration when new polices are created. In order to answer the question 
whether the European legislator is given room to adopt new secondary law in 
the sense of the social market economy it necessitates first to analyze  the 
new framework and in particular the social competencies of the EU according 
to the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
1. Social Competences of the European Union   
When taking a look at Article 3 TEU what immediately catches the eye are 
the numerous references to the attribute “social”. Accordingly, the “social” 
market economy aims to achieve “social” progress, Article 3 III 3 TEU refers 
to the objective of combating “social” exclusion and the promotion of “social” 
justice. Article 3 III 4 TEU speaks about the promotion of economic “social” 
and territorial  cohesion. Due to the quantitative predominance of social 
elements in the body of EU objectives one can quite agree that a textual shift 
of weight towards enhancing the social dimension of the EU took place. 
However, the Lisbon Treaty has not extended the social competences of the 
EU. The many social objectives of Article 3 TEU are not reflected in the 
competences of the EU.  According to Article 4 (2b) TFEU social policy for 
the aspects defined in Article 3 TFEU belongs to an area  where the EU 
shares its competencies with the Member States. These competences are 
concretized in the provisions on the social and employment policies, Article 
151 -165 TFEU. However, the competences of the EU in the field of social 
policy have largely remained unaltered. Thus, the social competences of the 
Union are still very limited. The Lisbon Treaty moreover did not change the 
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decision making process in the social policy area and accordingly the 
unanimity requirement remained unaltered. The European Council has still to 
act by unanimity as laid down in Articles 153 and 294 TFEU for matters 
relating to social security and the social protection of workers, termination of 
employment contracts, collective representation and defense of workers´ and 
employers´ interests, conditions of employment for their country national with 
legal residency in the territory of the Union, and financial contributions for 
employment promotion and job creation. The European Council moreover 
has still no competence in matters of pay, the right of association, the right to 
strike or the right to impose lock-outs. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty does 
not contain provisions for qualified majority voting to become normal 
procedure for matters of social policy. As a consequence, the unanimity rule 
remains in place for all decisions relating to social protection319. It can be 
inferred from this, that the probability of adopting new legislative acts in the 
sense of the social market economy according to Article 3 III 2 TEU appears 
to be rather low.  
 
2. Social Novelties of the Lisbon Treaty 
Notwithstanding and against the background of  structural changes to the 
European Constitution brought about by the Lisbon Treaty there are novelties 
which are of significance for the social dimension of the internal market of the 
EU. Accordingly there are three  developments which needs further 
clarification. First, the introduction of values of the European Union in Article 
2 TEU and in the preamble of the CFREU, secondly the legally binding 
fundamental rights in the frame of  the CFREU, and lastly the so called 
horizontal social clause in Article 9 TFEU320. Against the background of the 
unchanged competences of the EU in economic and social issues, the 
question which now must be addressed is whether these novelties have the 
potential to result in a fairer reconciliation of the economic and social 
dimension of the internal market of the EU. It will be dealt with these issues in 
detail in the next section.  
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2.1. The Values of the European Union  
At the forefront of the catalogue of objectives in Article 3 I  TEU it is stated 
that the Union´s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its 
people. The European values are enlisted in Article 2 TEU and in the 
Preamble to the CFREU. Article 2 TEU which is identical with Article 2 of the 
failed Constitutional Treaty has the following wording: 
 "The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
 freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and the respect for 
 human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. 
 These values are common for Member  States in a society in which 
 pluralism, non- discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality 
 between women and men prevail" 
The preamble of  CFREU  makes reference to European values as follows:  
  " (...) the Union is founded on the indivisible , universal values of 
 human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the 
 principles of democracy and the  rule of law". 
 Generally speaking, values321 are defined as  concepts or standards 
that people have about what is good and bad, i.e. abstract standards of 
goodness, moral principles or ideals322 and as such they are considered 
worthwhile or desirable323. From a legal perspective, values describe the 
"assets recognized by a legal system as given or compulsory”324 . “Legal and 
social values are often associated with goals and purposes- they establish a 
direction for policymaking and may place demands and limitations on state 
                                                             
321 The Oxford English Dictionary describes values as follows: „[p]rinciples or moral 
standards of a person or social group; the generally accepted or personally held judgment of 
what is valuable and important in life; The quality of a thing considered in respect of its 
ability to serve a specified  purpose or cause an effect.“; Oxford English Dictionary  3500 (5th 
ed. 2003) 
322 Chris Longman, The Debate on European Values, 187, in: Constitutional Politics in the 
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action. Broadly phrased values rarely require specific actions, but they serve 
as guidelines or goals to be met either by individuals or the state”325. 
 The European Treaties ever since contained objectives, given the fact 
that international organizations like the European Union necessitate 
objectives to justify their existence. The same however, holds not to be true 
for values, which gained legally binding status only after Lisbon. However, 
looking back at the history of the European integration process and leaving 
for the moment aside the normative implications of values, it can be seen that 
values have always played a role in the EEC/EC/EU and accordingly have 
always been debated. The Treaty of Rome, although not explicitly referring to 
values, committed the then EEC amongst others to social progress, solidarity 
and the preservation of peace and liberty. In 1973 at the Copenhagen 
European Summit the then nine Member States of the EEC produced a 
'Declaration on European identity' in which they expressed their 'wish to 
ensure that the cherished values of their legal, political and moral order are 
respected' and that the 'attachment to common values give the European 
identity its originality and own dynamism326. Two decades later then the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 made in ex. Article 6 TEU  reference to principles. 
These principles included amongst others liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights, fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, social rights, solidarity, 
social progress, sustainable development, peace and security327. The 
foundations for the debate on values in the drafting process of the 
Constitutional Treaty were laid in 2000 at the Charter Convention which 
resulted in the adoption of the CFREU. The Constitutional Treaty referred to 
values which were already mentioned in the Preamble of the former TEU. 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty innovate by 
adding other values. These are respect for human dignity, equality and 
respect for the rule of law. On closer examination and against the 
background of its paramount importance, the incorporation of values raises 
questions which will be addressed in the following.  
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2.1.1. Values in Article 2 TEU  
Article 2 TEU is the main provision referring to the values of the EU. On 
closer inspection it becomes clear that there is a difference between Article 
2(1) and Article 2(2) TEU. While Article 2(1) TEU contains values on which 
the European Union is explicitly founded, Article 2(2) TEU as a so called 
homogenity principle refers to characteristics which are used to describe the 
qualities of a civilised society common to the Member States328. Moreover, 
Article 2(1)  TEU has in comparison to Article 2(2) TEU legal implications as 
can be concluded from the explanatory notes as regards Article 2 TEU in the 
European Convent. In CONV 528/03 it is stated that: 
(...) This Article concentrates on the essentials – a short list of fundamental 
European values. Further justification for this is that a manifest risk of serious 
breach of one of those values by a Member State would be sufficient to 
initiate the procedure for alerting and sanctioning the Member State (see 
Article 45 of the preliminary draft Treaty which would incorporate the 
mechanism set out in Article 7 TEU), even if the breach took place in the field 
of the Member State's autonomous action (not affected by Union law). This 
Article can thus only contain a hard core of values meeting two criteria at 
once: on the one hand, they must be so fundamental that they lie at the very 
heart of a peaceful society practicing tolerance, justice and solidarity; on the 
other hand, they must have a clear non-controversial legal basis so that the 
Member States can discern the obligations resulting there from which are 
subject to sanction. That does not, of course, prevent the Constitution from 
mentioning additional, more detailed elements which are part of the Union's 
"ethic" in other places, such as, for instance, in the Preamble, in Article 3 on 
the general objectives of the Union, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 
Title VI on "The democratic life of the Union" and in the provisions enshrining 
the specific objectives of the various policies329. 
From this it can be concluded that there are three reasons for enshrining 
values in the European Constitution, namely to make the people of Europe 
feel part of  the same Union, to provide criteria to assess whether applicant 
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states are worthy of accession; and to provide criteria for suspension or 
sanctioning of Member States in breach of these values. As regards the 
second reason,  Article 49 TEU330 states that only European states which 
respect the values referred to in Article 2 TEU and commit themselves to 
promote them may apply to become Member of the EU331.  In regard of the 
third reason, Article 7 TEU332 contains an alerting and sanctioning system 
which finds application in cases where there are risks of serious breaches of 
EU values by Member States, This includes even breaches in the field of the 
Member State´s autonomous action333. In both provisions, Article 7 and 49 
TEU the term value is only related to the “hard core values” of Article 2 I TEU 
but not to the 'characteristics' enlisted in Article 2 II TEU. According to Article 
2 TEU solidarity would not count as a value, but only as a feature. The non-
classification of solidarity as a value, however, would not reflect the 
European Constitution properly. The explanatory note correctly provides that 
European values may be mentioned in other places than Article 2 I  TEU. It 
makes explicitly reference to the CFREU, where solidarity is enlisted as a 
value in the Preamble of the CFREU as was shown before. As a matter of 
fact, solidarity belongs without doubt to the European values334. 
The incorporation of values in the TEU has further legal 
consequences335. This follows from the fact that the EU is obliged to promote 
these values as they belong to the normative framework of the EU. As 
                                                             
330 Article 49(1) TEU reads as follows: Any European State which respects the values referred 
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333 CONV 528/03. 
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Mangiamelli rightly states the “inclusion of values into a legislative or 
constitutional act produces the effect to make them legal. So, once inserted 
in a legal text, these values become “principles” that can be interpreted and 
help create a system”336. According to Article 19 I 2 TEU the CJEU shall 
ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is 
observed. This task also includes the interpretation and application of Article 
2 TEU. Furthermore, Article 13(1) TEU states amongst others that the Union 
shall have an institutional framework which shall aim to promote its values. 
This means that also the other institutions of the EU are obliged to promote 
the core values of Article 2 TEU.  
2.1.2.The Relationship of Values and Objectives  
From the wording of Article 3 I 1 TEU it becomes furthermore clear that 
Articles 2 and 3 TEU are interlinked. The fundamental difference between 
these two Articles is that the former enshrines the basic values which make 
the peoples of Europe feel part of the same "Union", whereas the latter sets 
out the main aims justifying the creation of the Union for the exercise of 
certain powers in common at European level337. “The strategic role of values 
is to guide the Union´s legal and economic planning with regard to its 
objectives”338.The values of the EU are linked with the issue of citizenship, 
whereas the objectives are related to the Union339. It becomes obvious that 
the objectives of the European Union must be realized in the light of the 
values of the European Union. Objectives are therefore means to the end for 
promoting the values of the EU. Accordingly values enjoy priority over 
objectives which results in the fact that the former constitutes a limit on the 
EU objectives and the exercise of its powers340.  
Although the CFREU has indeed upgraded some fundamental economic 
freedoms to the status of fundamental rights a distinction could be made 
between human rights within the meaning of Article 2 TEU and fundamental 
rights within the meaning of the CFREU. In sum, in interpreting EU Directives 
in the area of social policy the Court should take account of the constitutional 
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values underlying these instruments, instead of interpreting them in the light 
of the conflicting economic objectives of the European Union.  It is right to 
say that Article 3 TEU is inseparably linked to Article 2 TEU. This implies that 
every time the Union is taking action it must take into consideration both, the 
values and the objectives of the European Union. With the coming into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty values have gained significance from a normative point 
of view. The Lisbon Treaty gave the European Union a new telos which has 
particularly implications for the interpretation of EU law. The explicit 
incorporation of values in the Treaties illustrates very clearly the further 
development of the European Union from an economic community 
(Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft) towards a value based community 
(Wertegemeinschaft). It is the people of the Union who have moved at the 
center of the European integration process, not as market participants but as 
citizens of the European Union. This development is further reflected by the 
incorporation of values in several other provisions of the Treaties.  Article 3 V  
TEU states that in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold 
and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its 
citizens.  In Article 8(1) TEU it is stated that the Union shall develop a special 
relationship with neighboring countries, aiming to establish an area of 
prosperity and good neighborliness, founded on the values of the Union and 
characterized by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation. Article 
13(1) TEU provides that the Union shall have an institutional framework 
which aims to promote its values and advance its objectives. Article 21(2) a 
TEU states that the Union shall define and pursue common policies and 
actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of 
international relations, in order to safeguard its values.  Article 32 TEU 
provides that Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their 
action, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the 
international scene.  
2.1.3.Values in the CFREU  
An analysis of the values of the European Union necessitates to take  into 
consideration of the CFREU. It is the CFREU in which for the first time in the 
history of the EU values explicitly found mentioning. Due to this it comes as 
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no surprise that the values in Article 2 TEU and the CFREU are largely 
identical. As stated above, solidarity in the frame of the CFREU is a value 
and not only a feature. Furthermore, Article 2 TEU stresses the value of 
respect for human rights, whereas the CFREU contains a catalogue of 
fundamental rights.  The values of Article 2 TEU are linked to the values in 
the CFREU. The CFREU as such entails with the fundamental rights 
concretizations of the Union´s values. Thus, for interpretation purposes of the 
values it can re resorted to the specific provisions of the CFREU.  The 
difference between the values in the TEU and the CFREU is the scope of 
application. Values of the CFREU are only applicable for Member States if 
they implement EU Law. The values of the TEU on the other hand must 
always be respected. Furthermore, the sanctioning procedure resulting from  
Article 7 TEU is not applicable to the CFREU. 
 The incorporation of values in the Lisbon Treaty has far reaching legal 
implications. This means for the social market economy in Article 3 III 2 TEU  
that the “free market principle finds its limit in the principles of solidarity and 
respect for human dignity and human rights”341.  These social values are in 
particular concretized and reflected in the CFREU but also in human rights 
instruments belonging to the domain of the Council of Europe. This 
necessitates to further analyze the protection of fundamental social rights in 
the European multilevel governance system.  
 
2.2. Fundamental Social Rights in the European Multilevel Governance 
System  
In the European multi-level governance system the protection of fundamental 
social rights consists of mutually dependent and interacting orders that 
together form one encompassing constitutional order. With the coming into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty this order is constituted by three layers, namely the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union(CFREU), the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) – once the EU has acceded to it – and fundamental rights 
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as general principles of law342. The CFREU has finally become legally 
binding343 and has according to Article 6 I TEU the same legal value as the 
Treaties. Thus ,other than before, the CFREU stands on an equal footing 
with the provisions belonging to the TEU and TFEU, in particular with the 
fundamental market freedoms. This is probably the Lisbon Treaty´s most 
significant innovation in regard of the EU ´s social dimension.  
2.1.1. Fundamental Social Rights in the CFREU 
 The protection of fundamental rights in the CFREU in itself takes place 
on the basis of CFREU provisions, international conventions such as the 
ECHR, the European Social Charter (ESC)344 and the Revised European 
Social Charter (RESC)345, fundamental rights as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to Member States and international legal 
instruments to which the Member States and the EU are signatories. 
According to Article 51(1) CFREU the provisions of the CFREU are 
addressed to EU institutions and to Member States only when they 
implement EU law or act within the scope of EU law. Conversely, this means 
that internal situations are not included within the scope of the CFREU. This 
gap is then filled by national constitutional norms. It is not exactly clear what 
the terms “implementing Union law means”. First of all, there is no doubt  that 
the CFREU finds application in the so called “agent situation” in which 
Member States adopt measures in order to comply with the obligations 
imposed by a normative scheme set out by EU law. However it is not quite 
clear whether the CFREU is also applicable in the so called derogation 
situation in which the validity of national measures derogating from EU 
requirements are examined346. Koen Lenaerts affirms the applicability. He 
refers to the application of fundamental rights as general principles of EU 
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law347 in such situations and particular to the judgment of the CJEU in 
ERT348. Here Court stated that national rules which constitute a restriction on 
the freedom to provide services may be justified on the grounds laid down in 
Article 52(1) TFEU, in so far as those rules are “interpreted in light of[…] 
fundamental rights”. In order for those rules to fall within the scope of Article 
52(1) TFEU, they must be compatible with the fundamental rights the 
observance of which the CJEU ensures. It follows from that, when a Member 
State derogates from the substantive law of the EU, it is also implementing 
EU law, given that such derogations must always meet the conditions 
imposed by EU law. Not only must the national measure conflicting with the 
fundamental freedoms pursue a legitimate interest recognized by EU law, be 
free from any discrimination, and respect the principle of proportionality, but it 
must also comply with fundamental rights. ERT suggests that whether the 
derogations put forward by a Member State comply with fundamental rights is 
a determination that does not fall outside the scope of application of the 
treaties. Far from that, all derogations put forward by a member state must 
always pass muster under the EU law, of which the Charter is now part and 
parcel. The CJEU has so far not addressed this question and thus, has not 
provided clarification on the way how “implementing Union law” must be 
interpreted.  
 To continue, the CFREU has also no potential effect on the application 
of EU fundamental social rights with regard to legal proceedings between 
private parties. This is due to the fact that the CFREU was drafted primarily 
to govern vertical relationships rather than horizontal ones. The vertical effect 
of fundamental rights refers to the applicability of fundamental rights in 
protecting individuals against the EU or Member States. Horizontal effect 
refers to the ability of fundamental rights to affect legal relations between 
                                                             
347 General principles of EU law fulfil a threefold function. First, they authorize the CJEU to 
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scope of EU law must be interpreted in  line with general principles. Last but not least, they 
may be relied upon as grounds for judicial review .EU legislation in non- compliance with  
general principles  must be considered as void. National law falling under the scope of EU 
law that violates a general principle must not be applied, The constitutional allocation of 
powers and general principles of EU law , Koen Lenaerts, Jose Guiterrez Fons, Common 
Market Law Review 47: 1629-1669( 1629). 
348 CJEU, Case C- 260/89 ERT. 
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private parties. The horizontal effect of fundamental social rights at EU level 
has to be seen in relation to the right to non-discrimination349 and equal 
treatment. In Mangold350 and Kücükdeveci351 the CJEU gave only the right to 
non-discrimination and equal treatment horizontal effect by construing it as a 
general principle of primary EU law.  General principles of law belonging to 
the EU’s ‘old method’ of protecting fundamental rights have to be 
distinguished from the classification of provisions made in the preamble in 
the  CFREU on rights and freedoms, on one hand, and principles, on the 
other. It follows from Article 51(1) CFREU that subjective rights must be 
respected, whereas principles must be observed. The difference between 
rights and freedoms on the one hand and principles on the other is “evidence 
of a graduated intensity of protection according to the legal right 
concerned”352. Principles may be implemented by the legislator and they 
become significant for courts only when the implemented acts needed to be 
interpreted or reviewed. They do not give rise to direct claims for positive 
action. This distinction is of the utmost importance for the fundamental social 
rights in the CFREU. Chapter IV (Articles 27-38) of the Charter is entitled 
Solidarity. Articles 27 to 34353 refer directly on industrial relations and 
employment. The great majority of fundamental social rights under the 
heading solidarity are rather principles than justiciable rights. This has the 
consequence that fundamental social rights are deprived of their legal 
significance354 as they constitute rather programmatic obligations than 
enforceable subjective rights. In some cases, however, it is fairly difficult to 
make a distinction between rights and principles, since some provisions of 
the CFREU may contain elements of both a right and a principle, for 
example, Articles 23, 33 and 34 CFREU. The task of identifying whether a 
provision is a principle rather than a right is left to the interpretation of the 
CJEU, which has not yet addressed the issue. However, there is no doubt 
                                                             
349 Article 21(1) CFREU states that "any discrimination based on... age...shall be prohibited". 
350 CJEU C-144/04 (Mangold v. Helm). 
351 CJEU C-555/07( Seda Kücükdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG). 
352 Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak, Case C- 282/10 Maribel Dominguez, 2011, para. 71. 
353 Workers rights to information and consultation(Article 27), Right to collective bargaining 
and collective action(Article 28), Right of access to placement services(Article 29), Protection 
in the event of unjustified dismissal(Article 30), Fair and just working conditions(Article 31), 
Prohibition of child labour and protection of young people at work(Article 32), Family and 
professional life(Article 33) Social security and social assistance(Article 34).  
354 Karlo Tuuori, The Economic Constitution among European Constitutions, 2011, 37. 
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that the  right of collective bargaining and action, Article 28 CFREU, the right 
of access to placement services, Article 29 and the right to just and fair 
working conditions Article  31 CFREU grant subjective rights355.  
The CFREU also does not widen the competencies of the EU356. This 
becomes clear from Article 6(1) TEU which states that the provisions of the 
Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined 
in the Treaties. According to Article 51(2) CFREU does the Charter not 
extend the field of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union 
or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks 
as defined in the Treaties. 
There is no doubt, the CFREU has an added value for the 
fundamental social rights protection in the EU. However, the significance of 
the Charter for the protection of fundamental social rights  is weakened by 
the fact that the Charter only has a narrow scope of application. As regards 
this subject, the fundamental rights as general principles of EU law offer  a 
higher level of protection. From Article 6 I and III TEU it can be concluded 
that the CFREU and the general principles of law have a separate existence. 
Both, the rights under the Charter and the rights under general principles 
have equal status. In addition,  the fact that the majority of the social rights 
are considered as mere principles weakens the protection of fundamental 
social rights in the  CFREU. Another  shortcoming of the CFREU is that the 
EU cannot guarantee the precondition for exercising social rights. This is so 
because  the competency to regulate social policy matters still remains with 
the Member States357. 
2.2.2.  Fundamental Social Rights in the Council of Europe 
There are other human rights instruments referred to in the CFREU 
itself that are of relevance for the protection of fundamental social rights. Two 
of these instruments can be found within the domain of the Council of 
                                                             
355 See Opinion Advocate General Trstenjak, Case C- 282/10 Maribel Dominguez, 2011, para. 
78-79. 
356 See further Barnard, European Labour Law 2012, p. 31. 
357See for this  Monika Schlachter, Reconciliation between fundamental social rigths and 
economic freedoms, 2011, 5.  
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Europe, namely the  ESC358 and the (R)ESC359, on one hand, and the ECHR, 
on the other. Both instruments are linked to the CFREU. The European 
Social Charters from the Council of Europe play a significant role in the frame 
of the CFREU. By establishing a regional European system for the protection 
of social and economic human rights, the Social Charters complement the 
ECHR, which guarantees civil and political human rights. The ESC and 
RESC have legally binding character at Member State level. These 
instruments are important for developing fundamental social rights in the EU, 
not least because the CFREU explicitly refers to the ESC and RESC in its 
preamble, making them integral instruments for interpreting relevant 
provisions of the CFREU. It should also be recalled that that there is a 
reference to the ESC in the fifth recital of the TEU as well in Article 151(1) 
TFEU. Moreover, numerous fundamental social rights particularly in the 
solidarity chapter of the CFREU are materially based on rights of the 
European Social Charters360.“ In its case law, the CJEU has acknowledged 
the European Social Charter as one of the sources of the common European 
tradition which defines fundamental rights general legal principles, but the 
CJEU has been reluctant to refer on a provision of this Charter in its rulings 
(or the solidarity provisions in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”361. 
The ECHR forms another layer for the protection of social fundamental 
rights in the EU. Although the ECHR is not set up specifically to promote 
social justice, there is wide scope for protecting economic and social rights 
under the ECHR system, above all in respect of private and family life, 
freedom of association, including the right to strike, and the prohibition of 
discrimination362. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) treats the 
ECHR as a ‘living instrument’ and accordingly has developed a new 
                                                             
358 The European Social Charter was adopted in 1961. The Member States declared, that they 
are resolved to "make every effort to improve the standard of living and to promote the social 
well-well being of both their urban and ruralpopulations". ETS No 035; see for this also 
Christian Walter , 2007, 10. 
359 The European Social Charter has been complemented by Additional Protocols. In 1996, 
these additions were combined in a revised European Social Charter, which came into force 
on 1 July 1999.  
360 See Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
OJE 2007/C 303/02. 
361 Kaarlo Tuori , The Economic Constitution among European Constitutions, 2011, 37. 
362 Angelika Nußberger, 2012, 12. 
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methodology to interpret rights contained in the ECHR363. In the cases Demir 
and Baykara364 and Enerji Yapi Yol Sen v Turkey365 the ECtHR defined the 
substance and content of Article 11 ECHR concerning freedom of association 
also on the basis of elements of international law other than that of the 
Convention, namely the ESC, the RESC and the ILO Conventions. The 
ECtHR stated that although Member States are free to develop their own 
systems, all such systems must be consistent with international labour 
standards, irrespective of whether or not the Member States have ratified the 
relevant Convention. This dynamic approach is of the utmost importance for 
the development of fundamental social rights protection in the EU since the 
ECHR forms an important layer of fundamental rights protection. In case of 
accession, the CJEU will be requested to interpret legal standards in 
accordance with the interpretation of the ECtHR. This in turn would result in 
the fact that not only the ECHR, but also the ESC, the RESC and the ILO 
Conventions might influence the interpretation of EU secondary law.  
2.3. The Horizontal Social Clause366 
A further innovation of the Lisbon Treaty is the so called horizontal social 
clause, enshrined in Article 9 TFEU. This article has the following wording:  
In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall 
take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high level 
of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight 
against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and 
protection of human health. 
The horizontal social clause is a new provision of the Lisbon Treaty and as 
such taken over verbatim from Article 117 of the failed Constitutional Treaty. 
It belongs in the frame of the TFEU to " Provisions having General 
Application". The aim of these provisions is to ensure  consistency between 
                                                             
363 See for this ECtHR Tyrer(1979-1980) 2 EHRR 1, para 31. 
364 ECtHR, Demir and Baykara, no. 34503/97. 
365 ECtHR, Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v. Turkey, no. 68959/01. 
366 See inter alia, Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Strengthening 
EU cohesion and EU social policy coordination through the new horizontal social clause in 
Article 9 TFEU, 
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the policies and objectives of the EU under consideration of the principle of 
conferral of powers. Accordingly, the specific aim of the horizontal social 
clause is to ensure that all of the EU's activities take full account of the social 
dimension by following the five sub-objectives in Article 9 TFEU, in order to 
achieve the fundamental values and objectives of the EU within the scope of 
its responsibilities 367.  Article 9 TFEU  forms  the missing link between, on 
the one hand, the general social objectives  mentioned in the TEU, in 
particular Article 3 TEU and, on the other, the competences of the EU as 
stated in the TFEU368. It is important to note that all sub-objectives of Article 9 
TFEU except human health are expressly enlisted in Article 3 III TEU. 
Moreover,  all sub objectives form part of  other  provisions in the Lisbon 
Treaty, namely the provisions on employment 369(Article 145-150 TFEU, 
social  policy370(Article 151-161 TFEU)  education and vocational training, 
Article 165 TFEU 371and health protection372(166-168 TFEU).  These 
provisions give the sub-objectives of the horizontal social clause a concrete 
form and contain legal bases for the EU to take action. The co-existence of 
Article 9 TFEU on the one hand and the above mentioned special provisions 
on the other can be interpreted to mean only that the EU institutions shall be 
obliged by Article 9 TFEU to make indeed use of their relevant competences. 
It is also clear, therefore, that Article 9 TFEU does not widen the 
competences of the EU. On the contrary, the applicability of Article 9 TFEU is 
preconditioned by existing competences. Article 9 TFEU as such is 
addressed to all European institutions, including the European Parliament, 
Council, CJEU, Commission. Moreover, also the Member States as indirect 
addressees are obliged to take full account of the horizontal social clause 
when implementing secondary legislation and in the frame of the open 
method of coordination. The addressees are obliged  to make sure that the 
horizontal social clause is implemented within the relevant sphere of their 
                                                             
367 Schorkopf/Grabbitz/Hilf/Nettesheim Article 9, para 6. 
368 Pascal Vielle , The Horizontal Social Clause, in: The Lisbon Treaty and Social Europe 
2012,  
369 The term high level of employment is mentioned in Article 147 TFEU. 
370 The terms guarantee of a high level of social protection is mentioned in Article 151 I 
TFEU, the terms fight against social exclusion is mentioned in Articles 153 I j TFEU, 151 I 
TFEU.  
371 The terms high level of education and training are mentioned in the heading to Article 165 
TFEU. 
372 The terms protection of human health are mentioned in several provisions of the Treaties, 
see Articles 30, 45 III, 52 I, 114 III  TFEU, and above all Article 168 TFEU.  
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responsibilities. The horizontal social clause is closely related with the idea of 
the social market economy in Article 3 III 2 TEU. It reflects very well the 
requirement to balance the economic and the social dimension of the 
European Union. In terms of its practical relevance the horizontal social 
clause gains especially significance for the ex- ante and ex-post  assessment 
of legislatives acts. As regards the former it is amongst others of relevance 
for political decision makers like the European Commission before proposing 
a new legislative initiative. By a so called social impact assessment the 
European Commission assesses the potential economic, social and 
environmental consequences of  legislative acts in the pipeline.373 It is 
important to note that the horizontal social clause does not only find 
application in regard of legislative initiatives in the social field, but in the 
whole field of EU policies. The horizontal social clause is also relevant for the 
CJEU in the frame of an ex-post assessment of a legislative act.  
 The horizontal social clause constitutes an important tool to realize the 
objective of the social market economy according to Article 3 III 2 TEU. It´s 
significance must be seen in the fact that it offers policy makers a tool to 
address the social question not only in the field of social policy, but also in 
other policy fields as well. In this way, it is ensured that social issues are not 
neglected when new legislative acts are created. However, the horizontal 
social clause gives its addressees a wide leeway of discretion. It requests 
from the  EU institutions and  Member States  only to make use of their social 
competences, but it does not give further indications in how far social issues  
have to be reflected in legislative acts. The horizontal social clause is 
therefore only subject to limited scrutiny by the CJEU. Like the reference to 
the social market economy in Article 3 III 2 TEU it has rather a  political 
connotation.  
 
3. Interim Conclusion 
It must be concluded that the prospect of enhancing the social dimension 
through the concept of positive integration in comparison to the pre-Lisbon 
period is rather low. There is no doubt that the constitutionalization of the 
European values, the horizontal social clause and in particular the legally 
                                                             
373 http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/index_en.htm . 
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binding social rights of the CFREU have all contributed to a valorization of 
the social dimension of the internal market. However this development has 
not gone  hand in hand with a widening of the social competences of the 
European Union. The competences on social issues are still divided between 
the Member States and the European Union. In addition to this, Article 153 V 
TFEU expressly excludes competences from the scope of EU law. A 
juxtaposition of the social competences with the economic competences of 
the EU proves that no fundamental improvements have been achieved; the 
two spheres are still not on an equal footing“374. „The possibility to create new 
legislation in the social field is very low.  A further impediment constitutes the 
unanimity requirement. Substantial social protection continues to take place 
on the level of the Member States. Thus the impact of the social market 
economy on the substantive content of the European economic constitution 
is rather low. 
 
E. II. The Realization of the Social Market Economy by Limiting the 
Effects of Negative Integration  
The  social market economy in the sense of Article 3 III 2 TEU might 
furthermore  be realized by limiting the effects brought about by the concept 
of negativeintegration. In this situation the success of the social market 
economy depends, on the one hand ,on the will of the national legislator to 
create policy in the sense of Article 3 III 2 TEU, and on the other, on the 
CJEU to allow Member States to derogate from the material content of the 
European economic constitution on the basis of social policy considerations. 
In this constellation, as it was already mentioned before, the CJEU applies 
the precept of rule and exception after which the CJEU determines the limits 
of derogation via the principle of proportionality.  
With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty the EU has not acquired new 
competences in the social field. This also means that the Member States 
continue to be the main actors in their national social models. Thus, the 
reverse side of the weakness of the EU in the social field is a far reaching 
autonomy of the Member States in shaping their national social models. This 
combination of weak competences of the EU on the one hand and broad 
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competences of the Member States in the social field on the other is also 
related to the European Social Model375 which was launched in the European 
Commissions´ White Paper on European Social Policy - A way forward for 
the Union376 dating back to 1994.  The European Social Model as a 
normative concept is  rather a vague concept.  Generally speaking , the 
European Social Model stands for a unity of values and objectives with 
diverse national social systems377". Among these values are democracy, 
individual rights, free collective bargaining, market economy, equality of 
opportunity for all, social welfare and solidarity.378 " These values are held 
together by the conviction that economic and social progress must go hand in 
hand, competitiveness and solidarity have both to be taken into account in 
building a successful Europe for the future".379  
In a Communication Paper entitled “European values in a globalized world” 
the European Commission made on the European Social Model the following 
statement380:  
“National economic and social policies are built on shared values such as 
solidarity and cohesion, equal opportunities and the fight against all forms of 
discrimination, adequate health and safety in the workplace, universal access 
to  education and healthcare, quality of life and quality in work, sustainable 
development and the involvement of civil society. These values represent a 
European choice in favour of a social market economy. They are reflected in 
the EU treaties, its action and legislation, as well as in the European 
Convention of Human Rights and our Charter of fundamental rights”.  
 In the Presidency Conclusions of the Nice European Council meeting 
in 2000 the European Social Model is defined as follows: " The European 
Social Model, characterized in particular by systems that offer a  high level 
social protection, by the importance of the social dialogue and by services of 
general interest covering activities vital for social cohesion, is today based, 
                                                             
375 See further Barnard, European Labour Law 2012, 34. 
376 COM 94, 333 final 1994.  
377 Rogowski/ Kajtár The European Social Model and Coordination of Social Policy- An 
overview of policies, competences and new challenges at the EU level, 2004 .  
378 COM 94, 333 final 1994, 4;  see also  Jens Alber, What - if anything - is undermining the 
European Social Model? , Lecture 1 at Charles University, Prague, March 2010. 
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beyond the diversity of the Member States social systems, on a common 
core of values"381. The European Trade Union Confederation(ETUC) defines 
the European Social Model as follows:" The European social model is 
characterized by the indissoluble link between economic performance and 
social progress, in which a highly competitive social market economy is not 
an end in itself, but should be used to serve the welfare of all, in accordance 
with the traditions of social progress rooted in the history of Europe and 
confirmed in the Treaties"382.  
 As is well known, however, there is not only one European social 
model but all 28 EU Member States have unique social models383. These 
social models are broadly divided in the Continental- European, the 
Scandinavian the Anglo-Saxon and the South-European models. Here , it is 
less important to highlight the differences between these models but to focus 
on the commonalities constituting the European social model384. In this 
regard it can be stated that  the autonomy of the Member States to shape 
their national social model refers amongst other to the following areas which 
considered  in their entirety form the basis of the relevant national social 
model: social security of employees in the event of illness, invalidity, 
unemployment, retirement; minimum wages; employment protection, social 
dialogue. It was already shown, that the European Union is not able to 
harmonize these areas as it only has a shared competence in the field of 
social policy. The different national social models find also protection in the 
constitutions of the Member States. Like in Germany, almost all Member 
States  have clauses like that of the social state principle in their 
constitutions385 which enable legislators to intervene in the market process to 
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382Protocol on the Relation between Economic Freedoms and Fundamental Social Rights in 
the Light of Social Progress, Article 1 ETUC. 
383 see Ferrera, M., The ‘Southern Model’ of Welfare in Social Europe, Journal of European 
Social Policy, 6(1), 1996, pp. 17-37, Esping-Andersen, G., Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK,1990 
384 See Eva Maria Tscherner, Arbeitsbeziehungen und Europäische Grundfreiheiten 2012, 
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bring about social justice386. Thus , social policy on national level has a 
market correcting function387.  
 For a long time this European social model has coexisted with the 
European economic constitution and the former was rather not exposed to 
the influence of  the latter. This however has changed over the course of 
time, As Jens Albers has rightly stated, the European social model has been 
faced  with supranational challenges388 which do neither emanate from the 
lack of willingness by the relevant national legislator nor the European Union  
legislator to take legislative action in the social field. Here, it is above all the 
CJEU which has contributed to shape the European social model by way of 
negative integration. With its case law on the internal market it has 
jeopardized the social models of the Member States. To recall the 
fundamental market freedoms and the European competition rules as 
derivable rights from the European economic constitution enjoy according to 
the case law of the Court priority over the law of the Member States and are 
directly applicable in transnational situations. Thus in the course of time, the 
case law of the CJEU on the internal market lead to a gradual subordination 
of the European social model to the European economic constitution. It 
happened first that part of the social security systems of the Member States 
had to comply with the fundamental market freedoms. The CJEU handed 
down landmark decisions like Kohll389 , Decker390, Watts391 where it ruled that 
national security systems fall under the scope of  Community law, in 
particular the fundamental freedoms . By doing so the national social security 
systems were subordinated to the fundamental market freedoms and the 
Court paved the way for cross-border access to national public health care 
services. This all happened against the background that the EU has no 
regulating competence for the social security systems of the Member States.  
And the CJEU has followed this line of reasoning.  In Petersen392 the Court 
exemplary stated that:  
                                                             
386 Katrougalos 2004, 2;  see also : Fundamental Social Rights in Europe, Working Paper 
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 "It must be pointed out, however, that Regulation No 1408/71 
does not set up a common scheme of social security, but allows 
different national social security schemes to exist and its sole objective 
is to ensure the coordination of those schemes. Whilst in the absence 
of harmonization at Community level, Member States retain the power 
to organize their social security schemes, they must none the less, 
when exercising that power, comply with Community law and, in 
particular, the provisions of the EC Treaty on freedom of movement for 
workers".  
 
In Hartlauer393 the Court ruled in the same way:  
 " First, it should be recalled that it is clear, both from the case-
law of the Court and from Article 152(5) EC, that Community law does 
not detract from the power of the Member States to organize their 
social security systems and to adopt, in particular, provisions intended 
to govern the organization and delivery of health services and medical 
care. In exercising that power, however, the Member States must 
comply with Community law, in particular the provisions of the Treaty 
on the freedoms of movement, including freedom of establishment. 
Those provisions prohibit the Member States from introducing or 
maintaining unjustified restrictions on the exercise of those freedoms 
in the healthcare sector". 
The CJEU extended exactly this line of reasoning to the area of the industrial 
relation systems of the Member States. The rulings in the Viking quartet must 
be mentioned here in which the Court, as is well known, showed a clear lack 
of respect for the particularities of national industrial relation systems. This is 
especially worrying in the light of the fact that also in this field the EU has no 
regulating competence as Article 153 V  TFEU  reveals. It can be inferred 
from this that there is an uneasy relationship between the fundamental 
market freedoms belonging to the European economic constitution and the 
national social models as part of the European Social Model. Catherine 
Barnard draws attention to this relationship by referring  to it as a "lopsided 
triangle with the (dominant) EU economic freedoms at one point, national 
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social rights at a second point and a rather rudimentary EU social policy at 
the third394. It is therefore right to say that the initial sovereignty of the 
Member States to shape their national social models is at odds with the 
European economic constitution.   
It is generally acknowledged that the rulings in the Viking quartet are mainly 
attributable to the reasoning of the CJEU395. The Court promoted lopsided 
negative integration to the detriment of political and social rights and imposed 
on the relevant Member States a neoliberal economic model. This constitutes 
a danger for socio-political achievements. It is important to note that these 
rulings were handed down to a time when the open market economy with 
free competition formed the basis of the European Economic Constitution. As 
was note before, one important implication following from the market 
economic orientation of the European economic constitution has been the 
fact that social state interventions in the market have been seen as 
exceptions requiring justification. This begs the question, in how far the move 
from the open market economy with free competition towards a highly 
competitive social market economy might change the application of precept 
of rule and exception and put the Member States in a stronger position to 
combat the detrimental effects caused by the concept of negative integration. 
The answer to this question depends to a very big extent on the reasoning of 
the CJEU. 
 Accordingly, the main focus of the following will be on the analysis of 
the legal reasoning of the CJEU. In this regard, first the methods of 
interpretation of EU law and justification of restrictions in internal market law 
will have to be analyzed. Subsequently a case study will take place in which 
the CJEU had to deal with cases referring to restrictions of fundamental 
market freedoms on ground of social state interventions. The analysis will be 
split in two parts. The cases to be illustrated in the first part were handed 
down prior to Lisbon. In this regard the focus will be on the Viking quartet 
cases.  In the second part then, cases belonging to the post -Lisbon era will 
be illustrated. The aim of the case study will be to investigate whether with 
the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty the reasoning of the CJEU has 
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changed, and if yes, whether this is attributable to the move from the open 
market economy with free competition towards the social market economy. 
Associated with that it will be investigated in how far the social novelties of 
the Lisbon Treaty have found application in the reasoning of the CJEU.  
 
1. Methods of Interpretation and Legal Reasoning at the CJEU 
According to Article 19 TEU the CJEU shall ensure that in the interpretation 
and application of the Treaties the law is observed. From this it can be 
deduced that the CJEU has a particularly important role to play in the 
European integration process, not least due to the fact that the provisions of 
the EU Treaties are vaguely defined and thus require interpretation.   
Generally speaking, the CJEU employs the methods of interpretation used by 
national constitutional courts. Accordingly, the methodology used by the 
CJEU to interpret primary and secondary EU law is comparable to the 
methodology undertaken by the BVerfG to interpret the  Basic Law. 
Therefore reference can be made to the aforementioned analysis on the 
teleological, systematical, grammatical and historical methods of 
interpretation undertaken by the BVerfG. In addition to this, there is on EU 
level the comparative method of interpretation, which takes into account the 
different legal traditions of the Member States. The comparative method of 
interpretation plays in particular a significant role in interpreting fundamental 
rights in EU law as the CJEU employs the ECHR but also the common 
traditions of the Member States as the main sources for interpretation396. 
Other than in Germany, however, the grammatical interpretation plays a 
minor role. This is due to the fact that  in a European Union with 23 official 
languages it is difficult to translate provisions in the same grammatical 
wording.  The overriding method of interpretation used by the CJEU is the 
teleological-systematic approach. This was already acknowledged by the 
CJEU as  early as in 1963 in Van Gend en Loos when it referred to the 
methods of legal interpretation. Here the Court stated that:" the EEC Treaty 
must be interpreted by taking into consideration the spirit, general scheme 
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and the wording of the provisions"397. What stands out immediately is the 
order in which the methods of interpretation are mentioned. By naming the 
teleological method of interpretation first followed by the systematic and the 
grammatical method of interpretation, the CJEU, although not creating  an 
order of precedence, provided gainful  information on the relevance of the 
methods to be employed in EU law"398.  
In EU law, the teleological and systematic methods of interpretation are 
interrelated and often employed together by the CJEU. The former Advocate 
General  at the CJEU Maduro attributes this to the fact that:  
 'Teleological interpretation in EU law does not refer exclusively 
to a purpose driven interpretation of the relevant legal rules. It refers to 
a particular systemic understanding of the EU legal order that 
permeates the interpretation of all its rules. In other words, the Court 
was not simply been concerned with ascertaining the aim of a 
particular legal provision. It also interpreted that rule in the light of the 
broader context provided by the EC(now EU) legal order and ts 
"constitutional telos". There is a clear association between the 
systemic(context) and teleological  elements of interpretation in the 
Court´s reasoning. It is not simply the telos of the of the rule to be 
interpreted that matters but also the telos of the legal context in which 
those rules exist. We can talk therefore of both a teleological and a 
metateleological reasoning in the Court'399. 
 This view is consistent with the view of the CJEU as can be concluded from 
CILFIT. Here,  the Court stated that: 
  "Every provision of Community law must be placed in its context and 
 interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole, 
 regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution 
 at the date on which the provision in question is to be applied"400.  
As a matter of fact, the interpretation of the Court hinge upon the purpose of 
the relevant provision as well as the whole system the provision belongs to. 
From this it can also be derived why the fundamental market freedoms and 
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the European competition rules are interpreted restrictively by the CJEU. 
Both, the competition rules and the fundamental market freedoms concretize 
the objective of the establishment of the internal market. The reason for the 
prominent position of the teleological interpretation method has to be seen in 
the fact that the institutions of the EU as well as the Member States are on 
the one hand bound by the objectives of the EU and on the other they have 
to realize these objectives by effet utile401. The Court takes generally into 
consideration the reason for the very existence of the European Union. 
 Attention must also be drawn to a specific feature when analysing the 
legal reasoning of the CJEU, namely the distinction between interpreting EU 
law and practising judicial activism. This has to do with the fact that the CJEU 
not only employs the methods of interpretation to interpret  European law 
according to its original function, but also practises judicial activism on the 
basis of the above mentioned methods of interpretation, in particular the 
systematic- teleological interpretation402. Judicial activism as opposed to 
judicial restraint refers to the 'willingness of the courts to create public policy 
when the political institutions of government either cannot or will not'403. To 
put it differently, judicial activism refers to the transfer of legislative rights to 
the courts.  Just to name a few examples, the direct effect of EU law, its 
precedence over national law, the classification of fundamental market 
freedoms as prohibition of restrictions rather than prohibitions of 
discrimination and the horizontal effect (Drittwirkung) of fundamental market 
freedoms  are not results brought about by the European Union legislator but 
can be solely traced back to judicial activism as practiced by the CJEU.  With 
the establishment of these means of negative integration the CJEU but also 
the European Commission have gradually enhanced the range of negative 
integration without taking into consideration the Council of Ministers404. But 
the CJEU is strongly criticized for its exercise of judicial activism and thus for 
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deviating from its original role towards a political actor405. The critique refers 
mainly to the fact that the court is practicing  European integration policy 
without having the necessary legitimacy to do so but also for having taken 
over a role which was not covered by Article 19 TEU. Höpner considers the 
CJEU as an "engine of integration " due to its pro-European case law 406. 
According to him, the Court  has gradually  taken on the role of a legislator 
and altered the legal order of the EU but also the Member States which 
would have detrimental effects for the Member States and their social 
models, not taking into consideration the exceptions foreseen in Article 153 V 
TFEU.  It is furthermore argued that the Member States did not legitimized 
the CJEU for practicing negative harmonization, as harmonization of the laws 
was a  task which belonged to the realm of the European Union legislator.  
 
2. The Method of Justification in EU Internal Market Law  
For the  appraisal of restrictions of fundamental market freedoms by the 
CJEU employs a precept of rule and exception "whereby the openness of the 
market and undistorted competition constitute the rule, and interferences with 
these guarantees of the European economic constitution the exception 
requiring justification"407. This approach  goes back to the market economic 
orientation of the EU and is directly linked with the principle of 
proportionality408. In the following the precept of rule and exception and  the 
principle of proportionality  will be further illustrated. 
 
2.1. The Precept of  Rule and Exception 
In a judicial process in the field of internal market law the CJEU first 
examines whether the national measure falls within the scope of EU law. 
Only if the CJEU affirms this question, it continues its assessment. In a 
further step, the CJEU examines whether an interference in a fundamental 
market freedom or the competition rules is given. In order to assess this, the 
Court utilizes in general two approaches, namely the prohibition of 
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discrimination and the prohibition of restriction approach. These approaches 
are mutually not exclusive. Until the mid 1970s the fundamental market 
freedoms were solely seen as principles of equal treatment. This can be 
traced back to the fact that fundamental market freedoms were initially 
established to prohibit discrimination on grounds of nationality on domestic 
markets409. This reflects very well the main idea behind the establishment of 
the non discriminatory common market on the basis of fundamental market 
freedoms, namely to fight national protectionism within the then EEC. In the 
course of time the CJEU extended  the interpretation of fundamental market 
freedoms from mere prohibitions of discrimination on the basis of nationality 
to comprehensive prohibitions of restrictions410 which shows clear elements 
of economic fundamental rights411. This is attributable to the fact that the 
Court recognized that also non discriminatory measures could prevent or 
render the achievement of the Community´s objective of freedom of 
movement for persons and goods. Against this background it found it 
therefore necessary to extend the interpretation of fundamental market 
freedoms from prohibitions of discrimination into prohibition of limitations412. 
The starting point of this line of reasoning was Dasonville413 which concerned 
the free movement of goods. In this case the Court  stated that "measures 
equivalent to quantitative limitations within the meaning of Article 28 of the 
TEC refer to any national regulation which is capable of hindering, directly or 
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade414. The Court widened 
this line of reasoning to the other market freedoms as well.  In the course of 
time the Court started to interpret all fundamental freedoms in a similar way 
as prohibiting both discriminations based on nationality and limitations. In 
regard of the freedom to provide service it is generally recognized that it was 
in Säger/Dennmeyer415 when the Court first applied the limitation approach. 
Here, the Court stated that: 
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Fundamental Freedoms 2007, p.18. in: Dirk Ehlers,  European Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms, 2007. 
412 Streinz, Europarecht 2012, 805.  
413 Christian Walter 2007, 19.  
414 Christian Walter 2007, 21. 
415 EUGH Rs C- 76/90, Säger/Dennemeyer, Slg 1991, I-4221. 
147 
 
 "Not only the elimination of all discrimination against a person 
providing services on the ground of his nationality but also the 
abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without distinction to 
national providers of services and to those of other Member States, 
when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise  impede the activities of a 
provider of services established in another Member  State where he 
lawfully provides similar services"416. 
The prohibition of restriction approach constitutes an effective tool "to cut 
through swathes of national rules"417 and thus to promote the market making 
process. This however has detrimental effects for the regulatory autonomy of 
Member States as the focus of this approach is solely on the effect of the rule 
on the out-of state provider"418. The prohibition of restriction approach 
extends the scope of application of the precept of rule and rule-exception. 
Even if a national regulation is non discriminatory, it can restrict the market 
access and thus it will fall under the scope of the precept of  rule and 
exception. The prohibition of restriction approach can be traced back as 
stated before to the teleological interpretation of the CJEU. 
 To continue, any state interference in the fundamental market 
freedoms and  European competition rules must be justified by legitimate 
purposes. Conversely, neither the fundamental market freedoms nor the 
European competition rules are absolute and thus can be restricted. In 
evolutionary terms it was first the issue of the public interest which provided 
valid grounds for justifying derogations from the free movement provisions on 
goods, persons, services and capital. There are generally two types of such 
public interest justifications: on the one hand there are express derogations, 
which are explicitly and exhaustively prescribed by primary or secondary EU 
law419; and on the other hand, unwritten rule of reasons based on CJEU 
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rulings pursuant to the Cassis de Dijon420 judgment. As opposed to express 
derogations the rule of reasons are not exhaustive and have been developed 
by the case law of the CJEU in the course of time. It is worth to mention, that 
according to the consistent case law of the CJEU the protection of 
workers421, the prevention of social dumping422, unfair competition423, the 
avoidance of disturbances on the labour market424are among the overriding 
reasons of public interest justifying restrictions on the exercise of the 
fundamental market freedoms. In the course of time there have been 
important developments in the case law of the CJEU which concerned further 
derogations from internal market rules. According to that, the CJEU allowed 
amongst others derogations from internal market rules based on 
requirements of fundamental rights in Schmidberger425 and a fundamental 
value in Omega426, laid down in the constitutions of the Member States. In 
regard of the latter, however, the CJEU classified human dignity not as a 
fundamental value or fundamental right, but only as a public policy concern. 
As a matter of fact and in regard of the mandatory requirements, the 
fundamental market freedoms can not only be limited on grounds of public 
interest concerns, but also fundamental rights and fundamental values. 
 
2.2.The Principle of Proportionality 
Of fundamental importance is furthermore the fact, that the express 
derogations and mandatory requirements will only be effective, when the 
restrictions comply with the principle of proportionality. The principle of 
proportionality plays therefore a pivotal role for the appraisal of the legality of 
limitations to the  fundamental market freedoms. As was stated before, the 
precept of rule and exception is directly linked to the principle of 
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proportionality as  the CJEU assesses on the basis of the principle of 
proportionality whether restrictions of  fundamental freedoms are reasonable. 
 The principle of proportionality finds application in several areas of 
Community law and thus it can be seen as one of the most important 
horizontal provisions of EU law. To begin with, the principle of proportionality 
as an explicit component of EU law has three different legal bases, however 
with differing scopes of application. First, the principle of proportionality is 
legally defined in Article 5(4) TEU427. This Article is solely addressed to the 
institutions of the Union and aims to impose limits upon the exercise of 
competences of the EU 428. Second, the principle of proportionality finds 
mentioning in Article 52(1) CFREU. This Article has the following wording:  
"(..) Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by 
this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those 
rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle proportionality, limitations may 
be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general 
interest recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others".  
 From the wording of Article 52(1) CFREU it can be inferred that a 
limitation of a fundamental right may take place when a legitimate objective 
of the EU and the principle of proportionality is respected. In regard of the 
former it is important to note that fundamental freedoms are mainly utilized to 
create the internal market, which is, according to Article 3 TEU, an objective 
of the EU. Thus, since the realization of a fundamental market freedom 
constitutes a legitimate limitation of a fundamental right, it is the principle of 
proportionality which is used to assess whether a limitation of a fundamental 
right by directly invoking a fundamental freedom is proportionate and thus in 
accordance with EU law. Lastly, the principle of proportionality is also 
considered as a general principle429 of Community law. As this it was first 
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recognized by the CJEU in 1956 in Federation Charbonniere de Belgique v 
High Authority430. In the form of a general principle of Community the CJEU 
applies the principle of proportionality for assessing the legality of limitations 
by Member States  to the fundamental freedoms. Given to the fact  that 
fundamental freedoms are in the first place addressed to the Member States, 
it is the task of national policy makers to take this principle into consideration 
when legislating. This also means that prior to the adoption of a national 
measure, it is the  task of the relevant Member State to assess the foreseen 
measure on its compatibility with the fundamental freedoms. This includes 
employing a proportionality test, too. From this it can be concluded that the 
principle of proportionality has a broad scope of application.  
 Concerning the components of the principle of proportionality it is 
generally acknowledged that the principle of proportionality in EU law is 
attributable to German law431. Accordingly, like in Germany, the state 
interference must be suitable, necessary and proportionate in the narrow 
sense. Nevertheless, the application of the principle of proportionality as 
employed by the CJEU differs from the BVerfG. The CJEU employs two 
different approaches to the principle of proportionality, depending on whether 
EU regulation or national  regulation is assessed432. Thus, when the CJEU 
has to assess regulatory measures belonging to the sphere of the Union, it 
applies a rather modest proportionality test consisting of the above 
mentioned three subtests433. Exemplary, in Agrana Zucker the Court stated 
that:  
"In that regard, it should be recalled that the principle of 
proportionality, which is one of the general principles of European 
Union law, requires that acts adopted by institutions of the European 
Union do not exceed the limits of what is appropriate and  necessary 
in order to attain the legitimate objectives pursued by the legislation in 
question; where there is a choice between several appropriate 
measures, recourse must  be had to the least onerous, and the 
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disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate  to the aims 
pursued"434.  
On the other hand, when assessing regulatory measures of the Member 
States  the CJEU does not apply the proportionality test in the narrow sense 
but narrows down the proportionality test to a suitability and appropriateness 
test.  This approach is much stricter and the CJEU will declare national 
legislation as non conform with EU law  if it comes to the conclusion  that the 
national legislator has not chosen the least restrictive alternative. The 
difference in the intensity of review is attributable to the fact that  in internal 
market law the principle of proportionality is used as a tool to promote 
European integration, in particular to "further market integration"435. The 
principle of proportionality therefore  can´t be regarded as value- neutral436. 
Moreover, in the frame of the proportionality test, the burden of proof for the 
justification of derogations from  fundamental freedoms is imposed on the 
Member States437. According to the case law of the CJEU, a derogation from 
the fundamental freedoms is only justified when the Member States can proof 
that measures restricting fundamental freedoms are in compliance with the 
principle of proportionality.  
 
3. Case Law of the CJEU in the Pre-Lisbon Era 
What wages and employment conditions are applicable to posted workers 
carrying out temporarily work in the territory of another Member State? 
Should their employment relationship be governed by the laws of the host 
country or the country of origin? How should the balancing of fundamental 
market freedoms with the right to take collective action within the internal 
market take place?  These questions  were, in 2007 and 2008,  raised in the 
cases of Viking, Laval, Rüffert and Commssion vs, Luxemburg. These four 
cases, which have come to be known as the Laval quartet have triggered a 
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controversial political and judicial discussion438. The cases Laval, Rüffert and 
Luxemburg concerned issues around Directive 96/71 on posted 
workers(hereinafter  PWD). The PWD´s general aim is to find a balance 
between three different policy goals. First, to promote  the free movement of 
services, secondly to protect workers in the host state from competition from 
workers from home states where labour standards in terms of remuneration 
and protection are lower, and thirdly to protect posted workers by improving 
their working conditions. At the center of the Viking case and to a certain 
extend in Laval were collisions between fundamental market freedoms and 
the right to take collective action. It is important to note that this was not the 
first time that the Court  had to deal with the delicate relationship between 
fundamental market freedoms and fundamental rights. Viking and Laval were 
amongst others preceded by the landmark cases Schmidberger439 and 
Omega440. In the latter two cases national fundamental rights and values 
respectively triumphed over fundamental market freedoms. Accordingly, 
these cases were generally considered as the end of the hegemony of 
ordoliberalism in the reasoning of the CJEU. But as is well known, this 
assumption proofed to be wrong. In the reasoning of the Court in Viking and 
Laval but also Rüffert and Commission vs. Luxemburg there are still strong 
traces of ordoliberalism.  In the following theses cases will be first illustrated 
and subsequently analyzed.  
 
3.1. Schmidberger441 
The Austrian government had allowed a political demonstration on the 
Brenner motorway by a  environmental group against the pollution of the 
Alps, caused by the heavy traffic on the Brenner motorway, the main traffic 
link between northern Europe and Italy. Due to the demonstration , the 
Brenner motorway  was completely closed  to traffic for approximately 30 
hours. Schmidberger, a German transport company, argued that  the closure 
of the Brenner motorway infringed the free movement of goods, Article 28 EC 
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and sued Austria for damages. The Court was confronted with a conflict 
between Schmidbergers invocation of a fundamental economic freedom  
protected under Article 34 TFEU( ex. Article 28 EC) and Austria´s invocation 
of the fundamental right of its citizens, guaranteed not only under the 
domestic Austrian constitution but also under Article 10 and Article 11 of the 
ECHR, to freedom of expression and assembly. 
 The CJEU first affirmed that the closure of the Brenner motorway 
restricted the free movement of goods. The Court then dealt with the 
question whether this restriction was justified . As regards this subject it is 
important to note that the referring Austrian Court had  explicitly asked 
whether the free movement of goods enjoyed priority over the  fundamental 
rights at issue. 
The CJEU took the view that the restriction in the present case was justified  
by the protection of fundamental rights, which formed an integral part of the 
general principles of EU law. As regards this subject, the Court added the 
following: 
" First ,whilst the free movement of goods constitutes one of the 
fundamental  principles in the scheme of the Treaty, it may, in certain 
circumstances be subject to restrictions for the reasons laid down  in 
Article 36 of that Treaty or  for overriding requirements relating to the 
public interest442." 
Second, whilst the fundamental rights at issue in the main proceedings 
are expressly recognised by the ECHR and constitute the fundamental 
pillars of a democratic society, it nevertheless follows from the express 
wording of paragraph 2 of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention that 
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly are also subject to 
certain limitations justified by objectives in the public interest, in so far 
as those derogations are in accordance with the law, motivated by one 
or more of the legitimate aims under those provisions and necessary 
in a democratic society, that is to say justified by a pressing social 
need and, in particular proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued"443. 
Thus, unlike other fundamental rights enshrined  in that Convention, 
such as the right to life or the prohibition of torture and inhuman 
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degrading treatment or punishment, which  admit of no restriction, 
neither  the freedom of expression nor the freedom of assembly 
guaranteed by the ECHR appears to be absolute but must be viewed 
in relation to its social purpose. Consequently, the exercise of those 
rights may be restricted, provided that the restrictions in fact 
correspond  to objectives of general interest and do not, taking 
account of the aim of the restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of 
general interest and do not, taking account of the aim of the 
restrictions, constitute disproportionate and unacceptable interference, 
impairing the very substance of the rights guaranteed"444. In those 
circumstances, the interests involved must be weighed having regard 
to all the circumstances of the case in order to determine whether a 
fair balance  was struck between those interests445. 
In order to resolve the conflict in the present case the Court assessed 
whether the restriction of the free movement of goods  through the exercise 
of fundamental rights was proportionate to the protection of those rights446.  
Conversely, however,  the Court examined, in how far the enforcement of the 
free movement of goods would have resulted in an excessive interference in 
the exercise of the fundamental rights.447 From this approach it can be 
inferred,  that in the present case the CJEU considered the conflicting 
fundamental freedom and fundamental right as having equal rank. 
 The Court then drew attention to a number of factors to affirm the 
proportionality of the restriction of the free movement of goods. Accordingly, 
the Court first stated that the demonstration at issue in the main proceedings 
took place following a request  for authorization presented on the basis of 
national law. The Court proceeded to state that the demonstration obstructed 
the traffic on the Brenner motorway only on a single route, on a single 
occasion and during a period of almost 30 hours. The Court took furthermore 
the view that the purpose of the  demonstration was not to restrict trade in 
goods of a particular type or from a  particular source. In addition the Court 
expressed the view that supportive administrative measures were taken to 
limit the implications of the demonstration. The demonstration gave also no 
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rise to a general climate of insecurity, which had a negative effect on trade. 
Lastly, an outright ban of the demonstration would lead to an unjustifiable 
interference with the fundamental rights of the demonstrators. As a result, the 
restriction on the free movement of goods arising through the exercise of the 
fundamental rights at issue was regarded as justified.  
 This judgment is of utmost importance as the CJEU gave a  political 
fundamental right priority over a fundamental market freedom.  Furthermore, 
the approach of the CJEU to balance the conflicting interests at stake is 
worthy of remark. In the present case, the Court did not apply the precept of 
rule and exception to the detriment of fundamental rights but considered the 
conflicting positions as having equal rank.  
 
3.2. Omega
448
 
Omega was a German company that operated a laserdrome, where amongst 
others games simulating acts of homicide were hold. For running the 
laserdrome, Omega used equipment that was supplied by the firm Pulsar 
International Limited in Great Britain. The police authority of the city of Bonn 
issued a ban prohibiting Omega  to further operate the laserdrome as  this 
business idea constituted an interference with the public order, which 
included also human dignity as guaranteed in Article 1 (1) of the German 
Basic Law. Omega argued that the public order notice was not in compliance 
with Community la, in particular with the freedom to provide services, Article 
49 TFEU(ex. Article 43 EC). The Bundesverwaltungsgericht (German 
Federal Administrative Court) submitted to the CJEU the question whether 
the prohibition was compatible with the freedom to provide services as the 
equipment to be used in the laserdrome was supplied by the Bristish firm 
Pulsar.  
 The CJEU first affirmed that the ban restricted Omega´s  freedom to 
provide services. It added, however, that this was justified. The Court made 
clear that the freedom to provide services allowed for restrictions justified by 
public policy, public security or public health.  In the present case,  the CJEU 
affirmed a threat to public policy by reason of the fact that, in accordance with 
the conception prevailing in the German public opinion the commercial 
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exploitation of games involving the simulated killing of human beings 
infringed a fundamental value enshrined in the national constitution, namely 
human dignity449. As regards this subject, the Court, by making reference to 
its reasoning in Schmidberger, acknowledged that fundamental rights formed 
an integral part of the general principles of law.450  It went on and stated that:  
"The Community legal order undeniably strives to ensure respect for 
human dignity as a general principle of law. There can therefore be no 
doubt that the objective of protecting human dignity is compatible with 
Community law, it being immaterial in that respect that, in Germany, 
the principle of respect for human dignity has a particular status as an 
independent fundamental right"451. Since both, the Community and its 
Member States are required to respect fundamental rights, the 
protection of those rights is a legitimate interest which, in principle, 
justifies  a restriction of the obligations imposed by Community law, 
even under a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty such as 
the freedom to provide services."452 
The Court then made clear that the restriction of the freedom to provide 
services was only justified if the prohibition was  necessary for the protection 
of the interests which it  intended to guarantee and only in so far as this 
objectives could not be attained by less restrictive measures.453 As regards 
the proportionality of the prohibition, the Court first stated that the need for 
and adoption of provisions such as the German prohibition on laser games 
was not only  excluded merely because one Member State has chosen a 
system of protection different from that adopted by another State.454 
According to the Court the prohibition on the shooting game corresponded to 
the level of protection of human dignity which the national constitution seeks 
to guarantee in Germany. By prohibiting only the variant of the laser game 
the object of which is to fire on human targets and thus play at killing people, 
the contested order did not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain the 
objective pursued by the competent national authorities455. 
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 Like in Schmidberger, also in this case the CJEU gave a national 
concern priority over a fundamental market freedom. This case shows also 
very well that the guarantee of human dignity does not provide the same 
protection in all Member States456. This becomes even more clear if taking 
into consideration that in the United Kingdom the shooting game is legal and 
the business idea is exported by franchise contracts and patent technology. 
Accordingly, the value and the fundamental right of human dignity cannot be 
interpreted autonomously by the CJEU. 
 
3.3. Viking 
The Viking shipping line ran ferry services, including the vessel Rosella  
between Tallinn and Helsinki  under a Finnish flag. Viking decided to reflag 
its ferries under the Estonian flag and associated with that to employ an 
Estonian crew. By doing so, Viking intended to make use of the 
comparatively  low wage costs in Estonia. As a response to this, the Finish 
union of seamen(FSU) issued a warning to Viking that they might hold a 
strike  to stop the reflagging of the Rosella. Furth to this, the International 
Transport Workers Federation(ITF) which had been running a Flag of 
Convenience(FoC) campaign aimed to hinder the  ship owners from taking 
just such action, called on its affiliates to boycott Rosella and to carry out 
sympathy actions against both, Rosella and other Viking vessels. Viking 
brought an action before the English courts requesting it to declare that the 
action taken by the International and Finnish union was contrary to Article 49 
TFEU (ex. 43EC). The Court of Appeal, before which FSU and ITF lodged an 
appeal, referred to the CJEU in the frame of a preliminary ruling a number of 
questions related to the following issues: the right to take collective action as 
a fundamental right; the scope of freedom of establishment and the question 
whether employment law is included in this scope; the horizontal direct effect; 
and the proportionality test with regard to collective action 457.  
 The Court first dealt with the question, in how far the right to take 
collective action, including the right to strike felt under the scope of EU law. 
This question came up against the background of (ex Article 137(5)EC) after 
which the Community has no competence to regulate the right to strike and 
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the right to impose lock-outs. The Court acknowledged that Member States 
were free to lay down conditions to govern the existence and the exercise of 
the rights in question but added, while doing that the Member States  were 
obliged to comply with Community law. The Court was also of the opinion 
that  the right to take collective action, including the right to strike felt within 
the scope of the freedom of establishment. The CJEU first stated  that the 
right to take collective action, including  the right to strike , must be 
recognized as a fundamental right, as it  formed an integral part of the 
general principles of Community law. In this regard the Court made amongst 
others  reference to the European Social Charter,  ILO Convention 87 and 
Article 28 CFREU. However, by making reference to the landmark cases 
Schmidberger458 and Omega459, the CJEU made clear that the exercise of 
the right to strike was not absolute, but might be subject to certain 
restrictions. Thus, the exercise of the fundamental rights at issue had to be 
reconciled  with the requirements related to rights protected under the Treaty, 
and to be in accordance with the principle of proportionality460. The CJEU 
proceeded and clarified  that the free movement provisions could be invoked 
against trade unions as private legal entities. The CJEU thus affirmed the 
horizontal direct effect of the free movement provisions by asserting that 
contrarily the objectives of the single market and the exercise of the 
fundamental market freedoms would be at risk , since trade unions as legal 
entities could  impose restrictions.  
 The CJEU then continued and stated that  the collective action at 
issue restricted the Viking´s freedom of establishment. The court based its 
reasoning on the ground that the collective action such as that envisaged by 
FSU had the effect of making Viking´s exercise of freedom of establishment 
less attractive, as the strike prevented Viking from moving to another EU 
country with lower wages and to enjoy the same treatment in the host 
Member State as other economic operators461. Also ITF´s Flags of 
Convenience policy had to be considered at least liable to restrict Vikings 
exercise of its right of freedom of establishment462. 
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 On the question of the justification of the restriction, the Court stated 
that the right to collective action was a legitimate interest, which in principle 
justified a restriction of fundamental market freedoms. Furthermore, the Court 
made clear  that the protection of workers was one of the overriding reasons 
of the public interest recognized by the Court463. The Court added, however, 
that "such a view would no longer be tenable if it were established that the 
jobs or conditions of employment at issue were not jeopardized or under 
serious threat"464. It can be inferred from this that according to the point of 
view of the Court collective action was subject to the condition that it must 
aim to protect jobs and conditions of employment. Only if this is the case, the 
principle of proportionality must find application by the national court. The 
CJEU, although leaving the exercise of the proportionality test to the national 
court, provided indirectly the frame in which the proportionality test had to be 
exercised. The Court affirmed the suitability of the collective action. In the 
view of the Court it was generally recognized that industrial action constituted 
one of the key tasks of trade unions to  protect the interest of their members.  
In regard of the necessity , the CJEU stated that it was the task of the 
national court to examine on the basis of national rules in how far FSU did 
have other means available which were less restrictive to the freedom of 
Establishment and, furthermore, whether FSU had exploited its means at 
disposal before initiating collective action465. From this it can be concluded 
that according to the CJEU the strike action must constitute the last resort466.  
 
 
 
3.4. Laval 
The Latvian company Laval un Partneri Ltd.  won a tender for construction 
work at a school in Sweden. To perform its obligations following from the 
signed contract, Laval  posted its own workers from Latvia to Sweden. In 
accordance with the standard practice in the Swedish industrial relation 
system, Swedish trade unions commenced negotiations with Laval to 
conclude a collective agreement on wages and other working conditions, 
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which is generally done on a case by case basis. Given to the fact that Laval 
was interested to make use of Lativa´s lower standard of wages, it concluded 
a collective agreement not in Sweden but in Latvia where workers earned 40 
per Cent less than comparable Swedish workers. As a result of the failed 
negotiations, Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, a Swedish construction trade 
union, took collective action by blockading Laval´s  construction sites in 
Sweden. Other Swedish trade unions, like the electricians trade union 
supported by solidarity the collective action.  As a  consequence of the 
collective actions  it was for  Laval  no longer possible to  carry out 
construction work  in Sweden467. Thereupon, Laval lodged a complaint before 
the Swedish labour court, arguing that the collective action and the blockade 
of the construction side but also the sympathy strike were not in compliance 
with Article 56 TFEU(ex. Article 49 EC).The Swedish labour court submitted 
to the CJEU the question in how far  the collective  action in question was 
compatible with the freedom to provide services and with the provisions of 
the PWD. 
 In its reasoning the Court first assessed the compatibility of the 
collective action in the present case with Community law. Like in Viking and 
with the same reasoning  it stated that the collective action in the present 
case  did neither fall outside EU law nor Article 56 TFEU ( ex Article 49 EC)  
and Directive 96/71. With regard to the right to strike as a fundamental right 
and the scope of the fundamental market  freedoms, Court referred  again to 
its judgment in Viking. The Court then went on and made clear that the 
collective action in the present case constituted a restriction fn the freedom to 
provide services within the meaning of Article 56 TFEU (ex Article 49 EC). 
Just like in Viking the Court took the view that the collective action in the 
present case was liable to make it more difficult for undertakings established 
in other Member States to carry out construction work in Sweden since they 
could be forced to sign the collective agreement for the building sector468. In 
regard of justification of the restriction the Court stated that" the right to take 
collective action for the protection of the workers of the host State against 
possible social dumping may constitute an overriding reason of public 
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interest within the meaning of the case-law of the Court which, in principle, 
justified a restriction of  fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty"469.   
 The Court went on and stated that the collective action in the present 
case violated the principle of proportionality. The Court first clarified that 
Community law did not prohibit Member States from requiring undertakings 
to comply with their rules on minimum pay by appropriate means470. But the 
Court took the view that the Swedish minimum wage system was not 
compatible with the PWD. In the point of view of the Court the Swedish rules 
on the minimum wages were not sufficiently precise and accessible which as 
a result made it impossible or excessively difficult in practice for undertakings 
established in another Member State to determine the obligations with which 
it is required to comply as regards minimum pay471. The Court considered 
against this background the collective action as unsuitable to protect workers 
against social dumping. 
 
3.5. Rüffert 472 
The German building company Objekt und Bauregie GmbH & Co won a 
tender with the Land Niedersachsen (the German state of Lower Saxony) for 
the conduct of  construction work at a prison. Article 3(1) of the Public 
Procurement Act(Landesvergabegesetz) of Lower Saxony  foresaw  that 
contracts for building services were to be awarded only to undertakings 
which, when lodging a tender, undertook in writing to pay their employees, 
when performing those services, at least the remuneration prescribed by the 
collective agreement in the place where those services were performed. 
Article 4 (1) of that Act further provided that in so far as services were  
assigned to subcontractors, the contractor had to  impose on the 
subcontractors the obligations applicable to him and to monitor compliance 
with these obligations by the subcontractors. Article 8 (1) of the 
Landesvergabegesetz provided a contractual penalty of up to 10% of the 
contract value in case of non- compliance with the above mentioned 
obligations. In the contract with Lower Saxony the building company 
committed itself to comply with  the collective agreements in force on the 
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construction site, in particular with the statutory minimum wage. The building 
company then subcontracted the work to a Polish firm. Later on  it  turned out 
that 53 Polish workers belonging to the subcontractor had been paid only 
46.57% of the statutory minimum wage. The Land  Niedersachsen canceled 
the contract and imposed financial penalties on the company. The company 
challenged this decision and took legal action.  The competent German court 
submitted to the CJEU the question whether the freedom to provide service 
would be compromised in a case of public tendering under the condition that 
at least the remuneration prescribed by the local collective agreement needs 
to be paid , when performing the tendered services with employees.  
The CJEU came to the conclusion that the Public Procurement Act  of 
Niedersachsen was  not in compliance with the PWD interpreted in the light 
of Article 56 TFEU(ex Article 49 EC)  Accordingly, the Court was of the 
opinion that the Niedersachsen´s Public Procurement Act restricted the 
freedom to provide service. The CJEU took the view  that the commitment of 
undertakings performing  public works contracts but also their subcontractors 
to apply the minimum wage laid down by the relevant collective agreement, 
was capable of constituting a limitation within the meaning of Article 56 
TFEU(ex. Article 49 EC).  
 The Court considered the restriction as not justified473. It rejected the 
justification on ground of protecting workers interests due to the fact that the 
Landesvergabegesetz was only applicable to public but not private contracts. 
The Court stated that there was  "[n]o evidence to support the conclusion that 
the protection resulting from such a rate of pay–which, moreover, as the 
national court also notes, exceeds the minimum rate of pay applicable 
pursuant to the AEntG- is necessary for a construction sector worker only 
when he is employed in the context of a public works contract but not when 
he is employed in the context of a private contract".474 For the same reason, 
the Court rejected a justification on the basis of the autonomy of the 
"independence of working life  by trade unions"475 and the financial 
sustainability of the social security systems.  
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3.6. Commission vs. Luxemburg476  
Commission vs. Luxembourg concerned the interpretation of  Article 3 (10) of 
the PWD. This provision allows for exceptions to the restrictions set out in 
Article 3(1) PWD, provided that those exceptions are "so crucial for the 
protection of the political, social, or economic order in the Member State 
concerned as to require compliance by all persons present on the national 
territory of that Member State and all legal relationships by the state. 
Accordingly, the CJEU had to deal with the question whether national labour 
law provisions by the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg could count as "public 
order legislation" or public policy exceptions within the meaning of Article 
3(10). In legislation transposing  the PWD, the Grand Duchy invoked this 
exemption to justify the requirement that all workers posted to its territory 
linked by a written contract of employment  to their home country employer, 
and that all rates of remuneration, not only minimum wages of any form, be 
indexed to the cost of living, among others. The Grand Duchy contended that 
the imposition of those obligations were imperative to the national public 
interest, inasmuch as they were deemed to be indispensible to the 
maintenance of good labour relations in Luxembourg. Luxemburg's labour 
legislation offered workers better conditions  than those decided in the PWD.  
The European Commission was of the opinion  that  Luxembourg´s labour 
legislation transposing the PWD was not in line with the PWD and started  an 
action against Luxembourg before the CJEU under the infringement 
procedure.  
 The Court agreed with the Commission and the Advocate General and 
ruled that the way in which Luxembourg had implemented the PWD was at 
odds with the freedom to provide service. By making reference to Omega477, 
the Court held that " while the Member States are still, in principle, free to 
determine the requirements of public policy in the light of their national 
needs, the notion of public policy in the Community context, particularly when 
it is cited as justification for a derogation from the fundamental principle of the 
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freedom to provide services, must be interpreted strictly, so that its scope 
cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member State without any control 
by the European Community institutions. It follows that public policy may be 
relied on only if there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a 
fundamental interest of society"478.  
 From this it can be concluded that the CJEU grants Member States a 
margin of discretion in the field of public policy, which however must 
withstand limits imposed by the Treaty and associated with that is subject to 
judicial review by the Court. It also follows from the judgment that  it belongs 
to task of the Member State to prove the facts which gives ground to justify a 
derogation from the freedom to provide service. But in the view of the CJEU 
Luxembourg could not satisfy that burden of proof as it failed to provide 
appropriate evidence which allowed to make a necessity and proportionality 
test of the relevant measures in question. The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg  
only had cited in a general manner the objectives of protecting the 
purchasing power of workers and good labor relations without indicating 
evidence  to allow a necessity and proportionality test of the measures 
adopted479. 
3.7. Analysis of the Cases 
It was shown, that the CJEU applied the precept of rule and exception and 
associated therewith the principle of proportionality in a very restrictive way. 
This has far reaching consequences for the social models of the  Member 
States.  In regard of the scope of application of EU law, it is interesting to see 
that the Court rejected in Viking and Laval  the argument of the relevant 
Member States where after labor law felt outside the scope of EU law. The 
Court has not considered  the intention of the Member States to exclude 
certain areas of their national social models form the scope of application of 
EU law which is reflected in Article  153 V TFEU. Joerges puts it in a nutshell 
:"The limitation of European competences in the area of social policy and 
labor law cannot be interpreted as an empowerment of European institutions 
to subject these fields to the discipline of Community principles and to 
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overrule conflicting national legal traditions. The uniqueness of labour law, 
the social and economic constitution is an indispensable dimension of 
democratic orders. Interventions in constitutional accomplishments of such 
dimensions cannot be based upon supremacy which European law grants to 
economic freedoms"480. 
 To continue, the Court has interpreted in all four cases the 
fundamental market freedoms not on the basis of the prohibition of 
discrimination but prohibition of restriction approach. It is due to this that the 
precept of rule and exception found application which resulted in the fact, that 
the social was put automatically on the back- foot 481. If the Court applied the 
non discrimination approach, it must have rejected a breach of Community 
law in all four cases482. The Court was also very restrictive in allowing 
derogations from the fundamental freedoms. In any of these cases the 
relevant Member State succeeded to assert against the fundamental market 
freedoms. . In Rüffert and Luxemburg, for example,  the Court has not even 
accepted a justification of a restriction. This has mainly to do with the fact that 
the minimum social  protection provided by the PWD has been interpreted by 
the Court as a maximum.  In Viking but also in Laval, the Court did not accept 
the right to strike as an self standing rule of reason but subsumed it under the 
protection of workers. This does not sufficiently  reflect the nature of a 
fundamental right.   
 In regard of the application of the principle of proportionality it can be 
concluded that due to its restrictive reasoning the Court in Rüffert and 
Luxemburg did not carry out a proportionality test. Germany and Luxemburg 
respectively, could not discharge the burden of proof for justifying the 
derogation from the relevant fundamental market freedoms. This also shows 
that it is a rather challenging enterprise to meet the burden of proof as 
required form the CJEU.  Moreover, also the application of the principle of 
proportionality in Viking and Laval itself is disappointing. As Barnard states 
correctly, the Court conducted balancing only in name but not in 
substance483. The opposing interests have not been balanced at all, as the 
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Court did not proceed to the third step of the proportionality test where 
normally the balancing procedure takes place. The Court applied only a 
"least restrictive" proportionality test to the actions of the unions in Viking and 
Laval. This committed the courts to examine whether the unions had other 
means at their disposal which would have been less restrictive  of the 
employer´s free movement rights."484.The formula of the CJEU as developed 
in Schmidberger, which removed an hierarchical scale regarding fundamental 
rights and fundamental freedoms was not applied in Viking and Laval. This  
suggests that the balancing outcome  depends on the nature of the right and 
on the impact to the internal market485. It can be implied from this, that, 
according to the CJEU, a political fundamental right is likely to have less 
detrimental effects on the functioning of the European market  than social 
fundamental rights. 
 The Laval quartet must also be seen in relation with the EU 
enlargement to the east  and  associated therewith, with an extension of the 
internal market. Joerges speaks in so far from a new socio-economic 
diversity in the Union  consisting of the old Member States with high wage 
levels and the new Member States with low wage levels, seeking access in 
the labour market of the old Member States486. In making it  for the new 
Member States  possible to  enter the European labour market,  the Court 
has enforced a market liberal vision through the concept of negative 
integration. As regards this subject, the Laval quartet  can be seen as  a 
revival of the concept of ordoliberalism487.  The yardstick of the CJEU to 
allow derogations from  fundamental market freedoms is similar to the one of 
the Freiburg School, namely the criterion of market-conformity. In the Laval 
quartet the CJEU has eliminated  market access  barriers as these were 
regarded as not market conform.  Also Catherine Barnard sees things similar. 
For her, the Laval quartet is attributable to the market access approach of the 
CJEU.  She states that "according to the Court, employment rules of the host 
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state can interfere with an entrepreneur´s access to the market in that state, 
those rules constitute a restriction on free movement and are unlawful unless 
justified and proportionate"488. Simon Deakin on the other hand sees in 
Viking and Laval a shift from ordoliberalism towards neoliberalism489. He 
states that: "The logic of Viking and Laval runs contrary to ordoliberal origins. 
It is consistent on the other hand, with what may be called a neoclassical 
interpretation of the EU´s economic constitution. Neoclassical models of the 
law-economy relationship see markets as essentially self-equilibrating. They 
share with ordoliberalism a distrust of direct state intervention in the 
economy, but they go further in denying that legal regulation is necessary to 
create the conditions for effective competition. While opposing extensive 
antitrust law interventions as unnecessary, neoclassical approaches 
nevertheless view labour law rules and collective bargaining practices as 
inherently inefficient. Thus, in the neoclassical approach, a principle role of 
the courts is to remove, through deregulation, legislative interventions, which 
may have arisen in the past on the basis of what are seen as misguided 
notions of social justice, and to deploy the power of the legal system to break 
up collusive arrangements through which private actors seek to capture the 
surplus(rents) generated by the productive process. According to this logic, 
few protective rules are required for labour law markets to operate: rules 
against forced labour by ruling out the institution of slavery and requiring 
"free" contracting- provide one example"490. 
 
To conclude, the CJEU gave with its rulings in the Laval quartet priority   to 
further deregulate the labour market and to dismantle the European social 
model. With this line of reasoning,  the Court  encourages social dumping 
and system competition between the Member States. Accordingly, there is 
pressure for the high-wage Member States to take measures to address the 
risk of a downward spiral of social standards, as there is no harmonized level 
of worker protection on EU level. As regards this subject, the Member States 
were able to take adequate measures to respond to the situation brought 
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about by the rulings of the CJEU in the Laval quartet491. This shows, that the 
Member States "still"  have considerable autonomy in the formulation and 
application of social policy to combat negative integration.  
 
4. Case Law of the CJEU in the Post-Lisbon Era  
The Lisbon Treaty brings up the question in how far the reasoning of the 
CJEU in comparison to the pre- Lisbon era has changed. As regards this 
subject,  the Court  has so far only handed down two  judgments with 
relevance to the social market economy and its impact on the European 
economic constitution. The first case, Santos Palotha, concerned the issues 
discussed in the posting of workers cases Laval, Rüffert and Luxemburg.  In 
Commission vs. Germany the Court had to deal with a conflict between  
public procurement law and  a German collective agreement. Both cases are 
characterized by the fact, that the opinions of Advocate Generals differ from 
the judgments of the Court to the extent that the former have given the social 
innovations brought about by Lisbon more attention than the latter.  
 
4.1. Case C-515/08  Santos Palhota and Others492 
4.1.1. Factual and Legal Background493   
The Portugese company Termiso Limitada  posted workers from its 
workforce in Portugal to Belgium to execute subcontracts at the shipyard 
belonging to Antwerp Ship Repair in Antwerp.  Belgium  introduced for the 
implementation of the PWD  a so called simplified regime concerning the 
keeping of social documents by undertakings posting workers to Belgium. 
This simplified regime  provided that employers in the first six months of 
posting were relieved from the requirement of drawing up and keeping social 
documents if employers sent the Belgian authorities a declaration of posting 
(‘the prior declaration of posting’), before the relevant employees started to 
work. The Belgian authorities had to certify receipt and approval of the 
declaration within five working days of the date on which it was received and 
to send  a registration number to the employer who could begin to employ the 
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workers only after the date on which the registration number was notified. In 
the case of non-compliance with this procedure the employer was not entitled 
to the dispensation from drawing up and keeping social documents provided 
for under the simplified regime.  Furthermore, employers had to provide the 
Belgian authorities with copies of  documents equivalent to the individual 
account or to the pay slip. The copies of the relevant documents had to be 
kept available to the designated inspection services for the period of six 
months. Furthermore, the copies had to be kept either at the workplace to 
which the worker was assigned in Belgium or at the Belgian address of a 
natural person who retained them as an agent or servant of the employer. In 
case of non-compliance with that obligation, employers had to draw up and 
complete the individual account and pay slip on the basis of Belgian law. 
  During an inspection carried out by the Belgian authorities it turned 
out that the mandatory prior declaration of the posting of workers to the 
Belgian authorities on behalf of Termiso Limitada did not take place. In 
addition, 53 posted workers belonging to Termiso Limitada were not in 
possession of the required social documents. Moreover, Termiso´s foreman 
could  not provide the Employment Inspectorate with evidence in the form of 
pay slips of the posted workers. As a result of that charged Belgium  Termiso 
Limitada for having failed to comply with the conditions laid down in Belgian 
legislation. Termiso Limitada challenged the validity of the relevant Belgian 
law on the basis of the freedom to provide service. The Court of First 
Instance of the judicial district of Antwerp, ‘the Rechtbank’ with which the 
appeal was lodged, asked the CJEU to clarify whether the Belgian law in 
question may be interpreted as compatible with Article 5 of Directive 
96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers and with Articles 56 and 57 
TFEU.  
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4.1.2. Opinion of the Advocate General 
 To begin with, the AG drew attention to the ongoing controversy 
brought about by the Viking quartet by stating that "this case brings to light 
once again the inherent tension between the construction of the internal 
market and the protection of social values"494. He proceeded to state that the 
rules laid down in the PWD were complemented with a national set of rules to 
give the PWD effect495. He added, that these national rules in the present 
case were not covered by Article 5 of the PWD which accordingly resulted in 
the fact that the relevant national rules were to be assessed on the basis of 
Article 56 TFEU. AG Villalon stated that this approach reflected the current 
line of reasoning  of the CJEU and referred to the posted workers case law of 
the Court  in Laval, Rüffert and Luxemburg496.  
 The Advocate General then delivered an innovative approach 
concerning the relation between the economic and social dimension of the 
Union´s internal market.  He acknowledged the valorization of the social 
dimension of the internal market by stating that with the coming into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty  
 "[i]t has been necessary to take into account a number of 
provisions of primary social law which affect the framework of the 
fundamental freedoms. Specifically, the posting of workers, in so far as 
it may alter the amplitude of the freedom to provide services, must be 
interpreted in the light of the social provisions introduced by that 
Treaty. Article 9 TFEU lays down a ‘cross-cutting’ social protection 
clause obliging the institutions ‘to take into account requirements 
linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of 
adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a 
high level of education, training and protection of human health.’ That 
requirement is laid down following the declaration in Article 3(3) TEU 
that the construction of the internal market is to be realised by means 
of policies based on ‘a highly competitive social market economy, 
                                                             
494 Opinion AG Villalon para 38. 
495Opinion AG Villalon,  Palotha, para 42. 
496Opinion AG Villalon, Palotha,  para 44.  
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aiming at full employment and social progress497’.That social obligation 
is reflected even more clearly in Article 31 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, a text that is now part of primary European Union 
law, which  provides that ‘[e]very worker has the right to working 
conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity.’ Among 
those conditions, provision is made for a guarantee relating to working 
hours, rest periods and paid leave, which is illustrative albeit not 
exhaustively, of a minimum framework for the protection of 
 workers498. 
The Advocate General thus explicitly refers to the horizontal social clause,  
the objective of the social market economy and to Article 31 CFREU as 
innovations to the substantive content of EU law. Yet, he did not stop at this 
statement, but intimated how this development had to  be reflected in the 
case law of the CJEU:  
"As a result of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, when 
working conditions constitute an overriding reason relating to the 
public interest justifying a derogation from the freedom to provide 
services, they must no longer be interpreted strictly. In so far as the 
protection of workers is a matter which warrants protection under the 
Treaties themselves, it is not a simple derogation from a freedom, still 
less an unwritten exception inferred from case-law. To the extent that 
the new primary law framework provides for a mandatory high level of 
social protection, it authorises the Member States, for the purpose of 
safeguarding a certain level of social protection, to restrict a freedom, 
and to do so without European Union law’s regarding it as something 
exceptional and, therefore, as warranting a strict interpretation. That 
view, which is founded on the new provisions of the Treaties cited 
above, is expressed in practical terms by applying the principle of 
proportionality499". Thus, in order for the employment measures in 
issue in the host Member State to be justified in the terms set out 
above, they must be suitable for ensuring the attainment of the 
objective they pursue and must not go beyond what is necessary to 
                                                             
497Opinion AG Villalon, Palotha,  para 51. 
498Opinion AG Villalon, Palotha,  para 52. 
499 Opinion AG Villalon, Palotha,  para 53. 
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achieve that objective. This criterion of proportionality, which the Court 
has consistently applied in its case-law on the fundamental freedoms, 
is usually described as the appropriateness test and the necessity test, 
respectively. It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether the 
disputed measures constitute a restriction of freedom to  provide 
services and, then, if the reply is affirmative, to assess whether those 
measures are justified by reviewing their proportionality. This analysis 
must be performed in an individualised manner, examining every 
measure concerned separately and in the light of a standard of review 
which, in accordance with the Treaty, is to be particularly sensitive to 
the social protection of workers.  
As regards the proportionality of the Belgian rules the Advocate General  
found the declaration prior to the posting suitable but not necessary. 
According to him, the time limit of five days within which the Belgian 
authorities must acknowledge receipt and issue a registration number was 
not necessary since less restrictive means were available. He proposed as 
an alternative method a so called system of positive silence whereby a 
registration number would be presumed to have been issued if the authorities 
failed to reply within the time-limit500.As regards the requirement of keeping  
the documents the AG came to the conclusion that this was suitable but only 
partially necessary501. The documents were suitable for the purposes of 
determining the financial rights of workers as they made it possible to monitor 
whether the legally prescribed wages were paid. But he found the extension 
of the obligation to keep the documents for up to five years after the expiry of 
the period of six months since the worker was first posted not necessary as  
there were less restrictive measures available.  
 
4.1.3. Judgment of the CJEU 
The CJEU followed the proposal of Advocate General Villalon. The Court 
assessed the compatibility of the relevant Belgian law on the basis of Articles 
56 and 57 TFEU and not on Article 5 of Directive 96/71. 
  As regards the registration and notification procedure the CJEU 
stated that this constituted not merely a declaratory procedure, but an 
                                                             
500 Opinion AG Villalon, Palotha, para. 76. 
501Opinion  AG Villalon, Palotha,  para. 90-92. 
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administrative authorisation procedure which was likely to constitute a 
restriction on the freedom to provide service within the meaning of Article 56 
TFEU. With reference to the requirement to keep certain social labour 
documents the Court was of the opinion that "it could not be ruled out at the 
outset that those obligations give rise to additional expenses and 
administrative and economic burdens for undertakings established in another 
Member State, with the result that such undertakings may not be on an equal 
footing, from the standpoint of competition, with undertakings employing 
persons normally working in Belgium".  
 The Court then proceeded and examined whether the restrictions to 
the freedom to provide service were justified. The Court emphasized that 
according to settled case law a national legislation which restricted the 
freedom to provide service was justified, if it constituted an overriding 
requirement relating to the public interest and was appropriate for securing 
the attainment of the objective which it pursued and did not go beyond what 
was necessary in order to attain it502. The Court made clear that the 
simplified regime in the present case served the purpose to monitor 
compliance by employers posting workers to Belgium with the terms and 
conditions of employment set out in Article 3(1) of the PWD. Thus in the point 
of view of the Court the simplified regime pursued  the public interest 
objective of the social protection of workers. This constituted an overriding 
reason relating to the public interest capable of justifying a restriction on the 
freedom to provide service503. According to the Court, it was therefore 
necessary to assess whether the relevant measures belonging to the 
simplified regime were appropriate for attaining the objective of protecting 
workers and did not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that 
objective. The Court considered the prior declaration as a suitable means to 
achieve the attained goal of the social protection of workers. However, it 
found that the administrative authorisation procedure  went beyond what was 
necessary in order to ensure that posted workers were protected. The CJEU 
was of the opinion that there was a less restrictive way for the employer at 
hand, namely  to report beforehand to the local authorities on the presence of 
                                                             
502CJEU, Palotha para. 44. 
503CJEU, Palotha, para 46-47. 
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one or more deployed workers, the anticipated duration of their presence and 
the provision or provisions of services justifying the deployment. 
 As regards the requirement to keep certain social documents the 
Court considered this measure as appropriate to allow the authorities to 
supervise compliance with the terms and conditions of employment of posted 
workers as set out in Article 3(1) of Directive 96/71but also to ensure that the 
workers are protected.504 As regards the necessity of the relevant Belgian 
regulation the Court stated that "keeping the originals or copies of those 
documents available on site or in an accessible and clearly identified place in 
the territory of the host Member State constitutes a less restrictive means of 
ensuring the social protection of workers than drawing up documents 
complying with the rules of that Member State.   
 
4.1.4. Analysis of the Case  
This case is particularly striking because of the innovative approach taken by 
the Advocate General as regards the reconciliation of the economic and the 
social dimension of the internal market of the European Union. Vilallon 
addressed the valorization of the social dimension in the EU by making 
reference to the horizontal social clause, the social market economy and 
Article 31 CFREU. He is of the opinion that due to the valorization of the 
social dimension the protection of workers did not constitute an exception 
anymore. The message of the Advocate General  is clear: he calls for a 
strengthening of the autonomy of the Member States in their social policies. 
Unfortunately the AG left it in addressing the horizontal social clause and the 
social market economy but did not go in further detail to specify these 
novelties of the Lisbon Treaty. By contrast, the CJEU was very reluctant to 
take account of the new legal situation brought about by the Lisbon Treaty. 
The Court did not mention any of the social novelties in its reasoning. As 
regards the application of the principle of proportionality everything has 
remained the way it was. The Advocate General but also the CJEU applied a 
least restrictive approach to the principle of proportionality and thus did not 
apply the proportionality test in the narrow sense. The Advocate General also 
based the principle of proportionality on the precept of  rule and exception. 
                                                             
504CJEU, Santos  Palotha,  para 57. 
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This rule-exception relationship reflects the strong standing of fundamental 
market freedoms as subjective negative rights. Both, the Court and the 
Advocate General have based their reasoning on the precept of rule and 
exception in which  the freedom to provide service constitutes the rule and 
the relevant Belgian social  law an exception requiring justification. In regard 
of the justification of restriction, the AG refers to working conditions as an 
overriding reason relating to the public interest. It is disappointing that the AG 
only mentioned Article 31 CFREU  but  did not apply it as a self standing 
justification ground. The CJEU, unlike the Advocate General did  not even  
refer to Article 31of the CFREU for justifying the derogation from the freedom 
to provide service, but the Belgian law in question pursued in the view of the 
Court "only" the social protection of workers. 
 
 
4.2. Commission vs. Germany505 
4.2.1. Factual and Legal Background506  
Local authorities and local authority undertakings in Germany  had awarded 
service contracts in respect of occupational old-age pensions to bodies and 
insurance companies referred to in Paragraph 6 of the Collective agreement 
on the conversion for local authority employees of earnings into pension 
savings (Tarifvertrag zur Entgeltungwandlung für Arbeitnehmer im 
kommunalen öffentlichen Dienst; ‘hereinafter TV-EUmw/VKA’),) without 
issuing a call for tender at the EU level. The  Commission launched an 
infringement proceeding against Germany arguing that Germany had failed 
to fulfill its duties resulting from Article 8 in conjunction with Titles III to VI of 
Council Directive 92/50 EEC507, and  since 1 February 2006 Article 20 in 
conjunction with Articles 23-55 of Directive 2004/18 EC508. Germany 
submitted four grounds to justify the preliminary selection of pension scheme 
providers, namely more transparency in the selection of pension scheme 
                                                             
505 CJEU, Case C- 271/08Commission vs. Germany 2010, ECR I-000. 
506 For a summary of the case see Bücker, Hauer, Walter, Workers´rights and economic 
freedoms: symphony or cacophony? A critical analysis from a German perspective,2011. 
507 Council Directive 92/50 EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures 
for the award of public service contracts , OJ 1992 L 209, p.1. 
508 Directive 2004/18 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
on the coordination of procedures for the award of public work contracts, public supply 
contracts and public service contracts, OJ 2004 L 134, p. 114. 
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providers, greater acceptance amongst workers as a result of the 
participation of worker representatives in the preliminary selection in favour of 
certain pension scheme providers, the greater expertise of the parties 
involved in negotiating the collective agreement and particular characteristics 
of the chosen pension scheme providers509. The CJEU, therefore, had to 
deal with the question whether service contracts conducted between public 
authorities and insurance companies serving the aim of converting earnings 
into pension savings had to be classified as public contracts falling under the 
scope of public procurement law.  
  
4.2.2. Opinion of the Advocate General 
Advocate General Trstenjak first dealt with the claim of Germany whereupon 
collective agreements were excluded from the scope of application of 
European competition law. Germany had referred to the judgments of the 
CJEU in the cases Albany and Van der Woude and argued that the exception 
in the field of competition law could also be applied in relation to fundamental 
freedoms and, as a result, collectively agreed framework agreements were 
excluded from the scope of fundamental freedoms. The AG did not accept 
the argument of Germany but made it clear that both, the competition rules 
and the fundamental market freedoms have the objective of completing the 
internal market. The fact that an agreement or activity was excluded from the 
scope of the competition rules did not necessarily mean that it was also 
excluded from the scope of the rules on freedom of movement.  The AG 
made clear that the CJEU in Viking510 hold that "an agreement or an activity 
may be included within the scope of the provisions on free movement, at the 
same time it may fall outside the scope of the provisions on competition and 
vice versa" 511. She concluded from this  that there was no "mandatory 
concordance between the scope of the competition rules under primary law 
and that of the fundamental freedoms"512.  
 The Advocate General then continued to state that in the present case 
there was a asymmetrical collision between the fundamental right of freedom 
of coalition and collective bargaining, on the one hand ,and the Directives 
                                                             
509 AG Trsteniak, Commission vs. Germany, para. 220. 
510CJEU Viking  para 53. 
511AG Trsteniak, Commission vs. Germany, para. 66. 
512AG Trsteniak, Commission vs. Germany, para. 67. 
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92/50 and 2004/18 on the other, which gave effect to the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide service.  The resolution of this 
conflict required first to transpose this conflict into a symmetrical collision at a 
primary law level  and treating the conflict as one between the freedom of 
coalition and collective bargaining on the one hand and the freedom of 
establishment and freedom to provide service on the other. Subsequently, 
that resolution achieved at a primary law level must be implemented at the 
level of secondary law through an interpretation of the procurement directives 
in accordance with primary law513.  
 The Advocate General then went on and dealt in detail with the 
resolution of collisions between fundamental market freedoms and 
fundamental rights. In doing so she first referred to the  judgments of the 
CJEU in Viking and Laval. According to her, the Court established a 
hierarchy between fundamental freedoms and fundamental social rights by 
characterizing the freedom of coalition as a mere overriding reason of the 
public interest instead of a fundamental right. According to her, there was no 
hierarchical relationship between fundamental market freedoms and 
fundamental rights, on the contrary,  both legal positions had equal status514. 
She stated that: 
"The approach adopted in Viking Line and Laval un Partneri, 
according to which  Community fundamental social rights as such may 
not justify- having due regard to the principle of proportionality - a 
restriction on a fundamental freedom but that a written or unwritten 
ground of justification incorporated within that fundamental right must, 
in addition, always be found, sit uncomfortably alongside the principle 
of equal ranking for fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms". 
Departing from this assumption she went on and made clear how the equal 
ranking of fundamental freedoms and fundamental social rights in the present 
case must be reflected in the case law of the Court515: 
Therefore, if in an individual case, as a result of exercising a 
fundamental right, a fundamental freedom is restricted, a fair balance 
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between both of those legal positions must be sought. In that regard, it 
must be presumed that the realization of a fundamental freedom 
constitutes a legitimate objective which may limit a fundamental right. 
Conversely, however, the realization of a fundamental right must be 
recognized also as a legitimate objective which may restrict a 
fundamental freedom. 
For the purposes of drawing an exact boundary between fundamental 
freedoms and fundamental rights, the principle of proportionality is of 
particular importance. In that context, for the purposes of evaluating 
proportionality, in particular, a three-stage scheme of analysis must be 
deployed where (1) the appropriateness, (2) the necessity and (3) the 
reasonableness of the measure in question must be reviewed. 
A fair balance between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms is 
ensured in the case of a conflict only when the restriction by a 
fundamental right on a fundamental freedom is not permitted to go 
beyond what is appropriate, necessary and reasonable to realise that 
fundamental right. Conversely, however, nor may the restriction on a 
fundamental right by a fundamental freedom go beyond what is 
appropriate, necessary and reasonable to realise the fundamental 
freedom". 
From this approach the difference of characterizing the freedom of coalition 
as a self standing rule of reason and not merely as an overriding public 
interest can be clearly seen. According to this approach a one sided precept 
of rule and exception in which the realization of the freedom of coalition must 
justify a derogation from a fundamental freedom finds no application. On the 
contrary, according to the Advocate General both, fundamental freedoms and 
fundamental rights can restrict each other. Accordingly, fundamental 
freedoms might be restricted in the interest of fundamental rights but also 
vice versa, the exercise of fundamental freedoms might justify a restriction on 
fundamental rights. In stating that, the AG leant on the Schmidberger case of 
the CJEU, in which as is well known the Court not only balanced the 
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contradicting fundamental rights in the relevant case but went even further to 
reconcile them. 
 According to Trstenjak, the present conflict between Directives 92/50 
and 2004/18 on the one hand and the fundamental rights to bargain 
collectively and to autonomy in collective bargaining on the other  must be 
resolved on the basis of the principle of proportionality. She proposed the 
following innovative approach: 
 "The assessment of whether freedom of establishment and 
freedom to provide services may justify a restriction on the 
fundamental rights to bargain collectively and to autonomy in collective 
bargaining constitutes, ultimately, the mirror image of the assessment 
of whether those fundamental social rights may justify a restriction on 
freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services. As the 
latter option for analysis facilitates a thorough evaluation of the 
arguments advanced by the German Government, in the following 
section I will examine whether for the attainment of the objectives 
pursued by the fundamental rights to bargain collectively and to 
autonomy in collective bargaining it was necessary to restrict 
fundamental freedoms in the manner contested by the Commission516. 
 Thus, having regard to the principle of proportionality, the 
restriction on freedom of establishment and freedom to provide 
services arising as a result of the preliminary selection in Paragraph 6 
of the TV EUmw/VKA in favour of certain pension scheme providers 
would have to be considered justified by the fundamental rights to 
bargain collectively and to autonomy in collective bargaining, if that 
preliminary selection of pension scheme providers was appropriate 
and necessary to permit voluntary and independent negotiations on 
terms and conditions of employment with a view to the conclusion of a 
collective agreement and the infringement of fundamental freedoms 
 thereby occasioned was proportionate to the attainment of 
those objectives517 
This approach is insofar remarkable as the Advocate General did not assess 
whether the restriction of fundamental freedoms in the present case was 
                                                             
516 AG Trstenjak, Commission vs. Germany, para 204. 
517 AG Trstenjak, Commission vs. Germany, para 206. 
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justified, but whether the German regulation justified a restriction of the 
fundamental freedoms.  
 Trstenjak found that the preliminary selection in Paragraph 6 of the 
TV-EUmw/VKA in favour of certain pension scheme provider was a suitable 
measure to ensure  the attainment of the interests protected by the 
fundamental rights to bargain collectively and to autonomy in collective 
bargaining518. However, a preliminary selection of pension scheme providers 
was in her point of view not necessary since an implementation measure 
conforming more closely to Community law could have been achieved519. 
According to the AG it was possible " to conceive of an alternative scheme 
compliant with Community law in which, within the framework of the 
implementation methods provided for the BetrAVG, conversion of earnings 
would have to be implemented through one or more pension scheme 
providers selected by local authority employers in accordance with the 
primary law obligation of transparency or, where the conditions for their 
application are satisfied, with the procurement law directives."520 
The Advocate General answered the question of the proportionality in the 
narrow sense  of the German regulation in the negative. According to her, the 
requirements included in Paragraph 6 of the TV-EUmw/VKA constituted only 
technical implementing provisions and did not refer to terms and conditions of 
employment. As a matter of fact, the fundamental right to bargain collectively 
was not affected. To the same time, however Paragraph 6 of the TV-
EUmw/VKA had the effect  to exclude the requirements resulting from the 
principles of freedom of establishment and freedom to provide service. 
Accordingly, she found that the restriction of the fundamental freedoms 
resulting from Paragraph 6 of the TV-EUmw/VKA must be categorized as 
unreasonable.  
 As a result, the Advocate General came to the conclusion that the 
fundamental rights to bargain collectively and to autonomy in collective 
bargaining was incapable of justifying the restriction on freedom of 
establishment and freedom to provide services resulting from the preliminary 
selection adopted by the social partners in Paragraph 6 of the TV-
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EUmw/VKA in favour of certain pension scheme providers because such 
restriction was not proportionate.  
 
4.2.3. Judgment of the Court   
The judgment of the Court is in comparison to the opinion of Advocate 
General  Trstenjak less promising. The CJEU ruled  that Germany, in the 
present case, had failed to fulfill its obligations resulting from secondary 
procurement law.   
 The Court first pointed out that  the award of contracts to bodies and 
insurance companies referred to in Paragraph 6 TV-EUmw/VKA did not fall 
outside the scope of application of Directives 92/50 and 2004/18.  The Court 
first  made it clear that the collective agreement TV-EUmw/VKA had a social 
objective and  was as such covered by the fundamental right to bargain 
collectively. Like in Viking and Laval the CJEU acknowledged  the 
fundamental right status of the right  to bargain collectively, in particular by 
making reference to Article 6 ESC, Article 28 CFREU and Article 12 of the 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers . The Court 
then went on to state that this however  could not be understood to mean that 
local authority employers were automatically excluded from the obligation to 
comply with the requirements stemming from Directives 92/50 and 2004/18, 
which implement freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services in the field of public procurement"521.  Other than in Albany522 and 
van der Woude523 and in accordance with its reasoning in Viking  the Court 
agreed with the opinion of the Advocate General Trstenjak and stated that 
the relevant collective agreement did not fall outside the scope of European 
law524.  
 The Court proceeded and made it clear that the right to bargain 
collectively was not absolute and accordingly could be restricted. The CJEU 
stated that  the right to bargain collectively had to  be "exercised in line with 
European Union law525". This is exactly what the Court stated in Viking and 
Laval. The Court then continued and stated that it was necessary to reconcile  
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the exercise of the fundamental right to bargain collectively with the 
requirements stemming from the freedoms protected by the FEU Treaty, 
which in the present instance Directives 92/50 and 2004/18 were intended to 
implement, and be in accordance with the principle of proportionality"526.  
The Court proceeded and made clear how this reconciliation must look like. It 
stated that "it must therefore be examined whether the contract awards at 
issue  fall within the conditions for application of Directives 92/50 and 
2004/18"527. In regard of the reconciliation of the conflicting interests the 
Court again applied the exception to the rule principle and assessed on the 
basis of the principle of proportionality in how far a derogation from Directives 
92/50 and 2004/18, which implement freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services in the field of public procurement due to the 
fundamental right to bargain collectively was in compliance with EU law. 
From this approach it becomes clear that the fundamental right to bargain 
collectively is still subject to the fundamental market freedoms. But, in the 
following, the Court did not employ an usual proportionality test to balance 
the conflicting interests at stake. Rather, the CJEU stated that it was 
"possible to reconcile the application of the procurement procedures with the 
application of mechanisms, stemming, in particular, from German social law, 
which ensure that workers or their representatives participate, in the local 
authority or the local authority undertaking concerned, in the taking of the 
decision concerning selection of the body or bodies to which implementation 
of the salary conversion measure will be entrusted"528.  
The approach of the Court to resolve the conflict in the present case is 
promising when comparing it with the line of reasoning in Viking or Laval. The 
CJEU first declared the call for tender as compulsory in order to address the 
concerns of the parties to the collective agreement in the present case, 
namely to guarantee local authority employees a safe and secure pension 
and thus to achieve the envisaged objective of the salary conversion. By 
doing so the Court aimed to make sure that public authorities not only chose 
one partner which secures the pensions of the local authority employees, but 
issue before a public tender at European level  and select from among 
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several tenders. This has the effect that social partners are no longer able to 
choose their financial partners for converting earnings into pensions savings 
without a call for tender. However, the CJEU did not touch upon  the very 
essence of the fundamental right to bargain collectively. The social partners 
are still allowed to determine the content of the collective agreements and 
thus to make use of their right to bargain collectively. Furthermore, the social 
partners are still entitled to guarantee local authority employees a safe and 
secure pension and thus to achieve the objective envisaged in the collective 
agreement, namely the conversion of earnings into pension savings. The 
Court further pointed out that local authority employers could specify in the 
terms of the call for tenders, the conditions to be complied with by the 
tenders. In this way the essence of the right to bargain collectively was in the 
point of view of the Court not limited.  
 
4.2.4. Analysis of the Case 
This case is significant due to the approach of the Advocate General to 
reconcile the social and the economic dimension of the internal market and 
shows how a future reorientation of the CJEU could look like. Trstenjak 
provides clarification on how collisions of fundamental rights have to be 
resolved. Although she gives rules on European procurement law priority 
over national labour law, the approach is very promising. Her approach 
eliminates the hierarchy found in Viking and Laval between fundamental 
market freedoms and fundamental social rights. The parity of economic and 
social rights is reflected in the fact that she does not apply a one sided 
precept of rule and exception for the resolution of the conflict. Furthermore, 
she applies a three step proportionality test. Furthermore, She did not only 
balance the conflicting interests, but also reconciled the conflicting rights at 
stake. The CJEU on the other hand has maintained the precept of rule and 
exception between the market freedoms and social state interventions. 
However, the reasoning of the CJEU reveals that it engaged not only to 
balance the conflicting interests at stake, but also to reconcile them to a 
certain extend. But this should not obscure the fact that the both, the CJEU 
and the Advocate General gave the European procurement rules priority over 
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the fundamental right to free collective bargaining as the margin of freedom 
for negotiations and collective bargaining was narrowed down.  
 
5.  Interim conclusion 
It can be concluded from these two cases that the move from the open 
market economy towards the social market economy as an objective of the 
EU has so far not created a new situation as compared to the reconciliation 
of fundamental market freedoms and fundamental social rights before 1 
December 2009. In particular, the application of the precept of rule and 
exception as well as the principle of proportionality remained unchanged. 
Moreover, the valorization of the social dimension of the European Union  
has not been reflected in the legal reasoning of the Court. This could be 
interpreted as meaning that the move from the open market economy 
towards the social market economy has no implications on the Lisbon version 
of the European economic constitution. On the other hand, however, it might 
be argued that it is too early to give an final assessment on this question, 
since the Court has so far only handed down two rulings. This view finds 
support by the Opinions of the Advocate Generals in Palotha and 
Commission vs. Germany. As was shown, Villalon and Trstenjak have both 
taken the valorization of the social dimension more serious than the CJEU 
and showed that the Lisbon Treaty has the potential to bring about a social 
market economy in the sense of Article 3 III 2 TEU.  
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G. By Way of a Conclusion- What Future For The Social Market 
Economy?   
 
It has been placed very great hopes in the Lisbon Treaty to move the social 
dimension of the internal market  onwards. However, the expectations so far 
have not been met. A substantial change  has not occurred so far.  There is a 
discrepancy between the  constitutional framework of the Lisbon Treaty  and 
the judgments of the CJEU as the former is not reflected in the latter.  
Despite this fact,  the social market economy in the sense of Article 3 III 2 
TEU might have the  potential to develop the social dimension of the EU 
internal market further. In accordance with the previous analysis it can be 
argued that the most appropriate way to realize the social market economy 
will be to limit the effects of negative integration by allowing the Member 
States more derogations form the fundamental market freedoms. As pointed 
out, the Member States have quite diverse national social models and 
associated therewith the socio-economic conditions are not the same. 
Against this background, it seems very unlikely to reach an unanimous 
decision in the Council to adopt new secondary law in the sense of the social 
market economy529. The Lisbon Treaty offers room for strengthening the 
autonomy of the Member States and their social models. Undeterred by the 
fact that the Member States have not regained new competences it is more 
likely than before that social state interventions of the Member States in 
future will comply with the values of the EU within an evolving social market 
economy"530. The further development of the social market economy 
depends very much on the legal reasoning of the CJEU as the guardian of 
the European economic constitution.  In particular the social values of the EU 
but also the social fundamental rights of the CFREU are  important  means to 
combat negative integration and thus to bring about a social market 
economy. The CJEU is required to take the valorization of the social 
dimension  into consideration when interpreting and applying EU law. As an 
institution of the European Union, also the CJEU has to contribute to achieve 
the goal of the social market economy.  As was pointed out before, the open 
                                                             
529 See for this Fritz Scharpf, Socio-Economic Review 8, 211-250 (2010). 
530 See for this, Malcom Ross , SSGIs and Solidarity: Constitutive Elements of the EU´s 
Social Market Economy? 2013, 98.  
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market economy according to the Nice Treaty found reflection in the 
fundamental market freedoms and the European competition rules as the 
backbone of the European economic constitution. Derogations from these 
rules were allowed on the basis of a strict precept of rule and exception. The 
logical consequence of replacing the "open"  by  a "social" market economy 
in Article 3 III 2 TEU must be to allow social derogations from these rules to a 
greater extent than this was the case before the 1st December 2009. The 
Advocate Generals in Santos Palotha and Commission vs. Germany 
respectively have already indicated where the valorization of the social 
dimension must find reflection, namely in the frame of justification of 
restrictions and the principle of proportionality respectively. This refers also 
the precept of rule and exception as applied by the CJEU since it is directly 
linked to the principle of proportionality. In the following, the potential for 
further development of the social market economy in the sense of Article 3 III 
2 TEU will be illustrated.  
 
1. Narrowing Down the Scope of Application of  EU Law  
The social market economy might have the effect to allow exclusions of 
certain areas of social policy from the scope of application of EU law and 
thus from the derivable rights of the European economic constitution531. This 
would give national policy makers more room for maneuver  to solve the 
social question autonomously. In Albany532 the CJEU has chosen exactly this 
way. This case concerned the relationship between the EC rules on 
competition in Article 101 TFEU ex Article 85(1) and collective agreement in 
the Netherlands negotiated  between representatives of employers and 
employees concerning the set up of a pension fund system for workers in the 
textile sector. The question at stake was533: is Article 101 TFEU (ex Article 
81(1) EC) infringed where representatives of employers and employees 
within a particular sector of the economy agree collectively to set up a single 
                                                             
531Azoulai is of the opinion that the exclusion of labour law from the scope of application of 
Community law would have the advantage of protecting  the integrity of national social 
systems. On the other hand, however, it would "create the risk of appropriating forms of 
social action in order to avoid the applcation of the Treaty rules in transnational situations." 
See for this Azoulai 2008,1353; Catherine Barnard , Free Movement and Labour Rights: 
Squaring the Circle, 2013. 
532 CJEU Case C-67/96 Albany[1999] ECR I- 5751. 
533 CJEU, Albany , para 68.  
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sectoral pension fund with an exclusive right to administer the collected 
contributions and apply jointly  to the authorities to make affiliation to the fund 
compulsory  for all persons belonging to that sector?"     
The CJEU came to the following conclusion: 
It is beyond question that certain restrictions of competition are 
inherent in collective agreements between organizations representing 
employers and workers. However, the social policy objectives pursued 
by such agreements would be seriously undermined if management 
and labour were subject to Article [101(1)] of the Treaty when seeking 
jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions of work and 
employment534. 
It therefore follows from an interpretation of the provisions of the 
Treaty as a whole which is both effective and consistent that 
agreements concluded in the context of collective negotiations 
between management and labour in pursuit of such objectives must, 
by virtue of their nature and purpose, be regarded as falling outside 
the scope of Article [101(1)]535. 
Thus, the Court was of the opinion that competition law found no application, 
on condition that the aim of the collective agreement was to improve the 
conditions of work and employment. The Court applied the same line of 
reasoning  in Van der Woude536 when it stated that a collective agreement 
establishing a health care insurance scheme contributed to improving the 
working conditions of employees. 
 Albany has to be seen as one of the most important decisions of the 
CJEU in the field of labour law. However, when taking into consideration the 
recent case law of the CJEU, the probability that the court will follow the line 
of reasoning taken in Albany again, is low. In Viking, Laval, but also in 
Commission vs. Germany the Court has rejected an analogous application of 
the line of reasoning in Albany to the fundamental market freedoms and thus 
                                                             
534 CJEU Albany, para 59. 
535 CJEU Albany, para,60. 
536 Case C- 222/98, Van der Woude v. Stichting Beatrixoord[2000] ECR I-7111. 
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has subordinated the national labour law regimes to the European economic 
constitution. 
 
2. Widening the Justification of Restrictions 
The constitutionalisation of the social market economy makes it necessary to 
reconsider the yardstick to allow interventions in the market process, too. As 
was shown, the yardstick used by the CJEU for assessing the justification of 
restrictions in the fundamental market freedoms are in general written and 
unwritten  public interest concerns. As regards this subject,  there are several 
considerations which have the potential to bring about a change of reasoning 
of the CJEU. The move from the open market economy towards the social 
market economy  speaks in favor of allowing  more justifications of 
restrictions of fundamental market freedoms but also European competition 
rules. As already pointed out, derogations from the derivable rights of the 
European economic constitution are allowed if public interest concerns have 
more weight than the fundamental market freedoms or the European 
competition rules. At first sight, the justification of a restriction looks like a 
conflict between supranational economic rights and non-economic national 
public interest concerns. But this is only half of the story. The internal market 
fulfills a double function as a public interest concern. On the one hand, it 
pursues the objective of the maximization  of the overall welfare of the 
people. In this sense it constitutes a  communitarian public interest concern. 
On the other hand, the internal market is based on the fundamental market 
freedoms and the European competition rules, and thus serves individual 
interests. Moreover, the public interest concerns of  Member States to 
derogate from the fundamental freedoms must in any case comply with the 
public interest concerns of the EU. Therefore, in a conflict between 
fundamental market freedoms and social state interventions,  the CJEU not 
only has to find a balance between the public interest of the EU and the 
Member States, but also between the interest of the individual in being 
protected by the European economic constitution and the public interest 
concern of the Member State. The move from the open market economy 
towards a  social market economy suggest to give in this situation more 
attention to the social public interest concerns of the Member State as  
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before. This view is supported by the social values of the European Union, 
the fundamental social rights but also by the many social objectives 
enshrined in Article 3 TEU. 
 A comparison of the Rüffert judgment of the CJEU with the judgment 
of the BVerfG in the Collective Agreement Compliance Clause case537 shall 
illustrate how the interpretation of the internal market in the light of the social 
market economy could look like538.  As was shown, the facts of these cases 
are almost identical. Both cases concerned the legality of a collective 
agreement compliance clause. The BVerfG assessed the constitutionality of 
the compliance clause on the basis of Article 12 I GG, the freedom of 
occupation and the CJEU on Article 56 TFEU(ex Article 49 EC). Both 
provisions are part of the relevant economic constitution and give employers 
the right to freely negotiate employment conditions with employees. Similar to 
Article 12 I GG , Art. 56 TFEU is a right guaranteeing freedom from state 
intervention. However, in regard of the provided justification of restriction, the 
line of reasoning of the  CJEU and the BVerfG differs essentially. Thus, the 
BVerfG took the view that the legislators aim of adopting the compliance 
clause was constiutionally unobjectionable as it served the common good. 
The BVerfG concretized the common good as follows: the protection of 
employers paying standard wages against any disadvantages resulting from 
competition with employers not paying such wages, fighting unemployment 
and maintaining social standards,  financial stability of the social security 
system and support of a system of autonomous regulation of the labour 
market. The legislator could invoke the social state principle, human dignity 
and the freedom of self development to restrict Article 12 I GG. In contrast, 
the CJEU did not accept any of the concerns of the common good mentioned 
by the BVerfG. By applying the market access approach the CJEU did 
neither pay attention to the constitutional status of the objective to fight 
unemployment nor to the discretion and responsibility of the German 
legislator to regulate the economy. Moreover, also the aim of the compliance 
clause  to support the system of autonomous regulation of the labour market 
found no consideration.  The reasoning of the BVerfG in this case shows 
clear, how an internal market interpreted in the light of a social market 
                                                             
537 See Case 6. 
538 see for the following Bücker/Warneck 2011, 323. 
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economy could look like. In future cases the CJEU should  acknowledge the 
new framework brought about by  the Lisbon Treaty. Against the background 
of the valorization of the social dimension of the EU, the social public interest 
concerns of the Member States are now more likely to comply with the 
European public interest concerns. It is now the task of the CJEU to take the 
social dimension of the internal market  into consideration when interpreting 
and applying EU law and thus to extend the reasons for justifying restrictions 
of fundamental market freedoms539.  
 
 
 3. Invocation of Fundamental Social Rights in the European Multilevel 
Governance System  
One effective way to combat the detrimental effects of negative integration 
and associated therewith to realize the social market economy in the sense 
of Article 3 III 2 TEU is the invocation of social fundamental rights in the 
European multilevel governance system. The legally binding CFREU  makes 
it more difficult to argue that fundamental market freedoms enjoy priority over 
fundamental social  rights, like the Court has decided in the Laval quartet. It 
is now more reasonable to argue that the relationship between them is on 
parity"540. As already mentioned, in the European multi-level governance 
system the protection of fundamental social rights consists of mutually 
dependent and interacting orders that together constitute one encompassing 
constitutional order, namely the CFREU, the ECHR – once the EU has 
acceded to it – and fundamental rights as general principles of law. At this 
point it is important to note, that all Member States of the EU are signatories 
to the ECHR, the (R)ESC as well as numerous ILO Conventions which 
results in the fact that the Member States are not only bound to apply 
fundamental rights$ belonging to the sphere of the EU but also to 
international standards belonging to the  Council of Europe and the ILO. 
Moreover, it must be emphasized that according to Article 52 (3) CFREU the 
meaning  and the scope of fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter shall 
be the same as those laid down by the ECHR. It shall be recalled that the 
primary objective of the EU is to promote its values and associated therewith 
                                                             
539 See for this Bücker/Warneck 2011, 322. 
540 See also Deakin, 2012, 42.  
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human rights. The CFREU, the ECHR and the (R)ESC are such human 
rights instruments. In addition, the ILO takes the view that labour rights 
constitute human rights541. The ILO adopted in 1998 the Declaration of 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work542. The Member States of the 
ILO which are to the same time Member States of the EU are bound by the 
Declaration even if they have not ratified the relevant Conventions. The 
declaration covers four fundamental principles and rights at work, namely  
the freedom of association and the right  to collective bargaining543, the 
elimination of forced labour544, the abolition of child labour 545and equality of 
opportunity and treatment in employment546. The right to strike finds no 
explicit mentioning  in the text of the Constitution of the ILO or in any other 
ILO conventions. However, it has been acknowledged in the case law 
developed by the ILO´s Freedom of Association Committee, interpreting 
Convention No. 87547. From this it becomes clear that there is an interaction 
between the different legal sources of the fundamental social rights in the 
European multilevel governance  system.  In the European multi-level 
governance system legal standards stem from distinct legal orders, namely 
the constitutional orders of the Member States, the European Union and the 
Council of Europe548. Each legal order defines its relations to other legal 
orders and the resulting hierarchies of legal orders can conflict. Potential 
clashes between legal orders might be softened if legal orders recognize the 
human rights instruments of other legal orders and more importantly, if these 
instruments are interpreted in accordance with the legal order from which 
they originate. A stronger dialogue between Courts belonging to different 
levels of governance might be an appropriate means of reconciling 
fundamental social rights and economic freedoms. Reference must be made 
                                                             
541 Virgina Mantouvalou, Are Labour Rights Human Rights? 2012  
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/lri/papers/VMantouvalou_Are_labour_rights_human_rights.p
df. 
542 http://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang--en/index.htm 
543 ILO Convention No. 87 - Freedom of Association and Protection of the RIghtto Organize, 
ILO Convention No.98-Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining. 
544 ILO Convention No. 29- Forced Labour, 1930, ILO Convention No. 105- Abolition of 
Forced Labour, 1957. 
545 ILO Convention No. 138- Minimum Age Convention 1973; ILO Convention No. 182- 
Worst Forms of Child Labour. 
546 ILO Convention No. 111- Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 1958; ILO 
Convention No. 100- Equal Remuneration , 1951.    
547 See for this: Catherine Barnard, A proportionate response to proportionality in the Field 
of Collective Action, European Law Review 37 , 2012, 119. 
548 See for this Dorssemont, 2010, 12.  
192 
 
to the judgment of the ECtHR in the case Demir and Baykara  where the 
ECtHR stated that in defining the meaning of the terms and notions of the 
ECHR, the Court can and must take into account elements of international 
law other than the ECHR, such as  the ESC, the RESC or ILO Conventions 
and their interpretation549. This innovative approach of the ECtHR  might  
also influence the interpretation of EU law for the benefit of social 
fundamental rights.  Against the background of the foreseen accession of the 
EU to the ECHR  the CJEU would be requested  to interpret  legal standards 
in accordance with the interpretation of the ECtHR. In addition, since the 
values of the EU are also addressed to the EU Member States, the CJEU 
would be required to take the membership of the Member States  in other 
international organisations into consideration when interpreting and applying 
primary and secondary EU law. These prospects do have the potential to 
combat the detrimental effects of negative integration for the Member States. 
 
4. Reforming the Application of the Principle of Proportionality  
It was shown, that both, the CJEU and the BVerfG use the principle of 
proportionality to manage disputes involving an alleged conflict between two 
rights claims, or between a rights provision or private interest and a 
state/public interest. It should be noted, that  the principle of proportionality 
and associated with that the balancing procedure  is not uncontested550. The 
most outspoken critic has been Jürgen Habermas551 who argues that the 
balancing procedure deprives constitutional rights of their normative power 
and  downgrades them  to the level of goals, policies and values552  As a 
result of this, he argues,  rights lose their  "strict priority": "For if in cases of 
collision all reasons can assume the character of policy arguments, then the 
fire wall erected in legal discourse by a deontological understanding of legal 
                                                             
549 European Court of Human RIghts, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, no. 34503/97, rec. 85.; 
see also Bruun Niklas, Bücker Andreas, Dorssemont Filip, " Balancing Fundamental Social 
Rights and Economic Freedoms: Can the Monti II Initiative  Solve the EU Dilemma? ; The 
International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 28, no.3 (2012) 
279- 306. (305). 
550 E.-W. Boeckenfoerde 1991, Grundrechte als Grundsatznormen. Zur gegenwärtigen Lage 
der Grundrechtsdogmatik: in Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie 
551 Jürgen Habermas 1996, Between Facts and Norms, trans. W Rehg(Cambridge, Mass., 
1996) 
552 Habermas 1996, 256. 
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norms and principles collapses553. Habermas further argues that there are no 
rational standards for balancing which increases the risk of irrational 
rulings.554 "Because there are no rational standards for this, weighing takes 
place either arbitrarily or unreflectively, according to customary standards 
and hierarchies".555 Habermas´ view echos the liberal understanding of the 
concept of law as theorized by Ronald Dworkin556. In this concept,  there is 
not room for weighting mechanisms like the one laid down in the 
proportionality principle557. According to Dworkin, individual rights as 
principles cannot be outweighed by politics.  
 The application of the principle of proportionality  is also criticized by 
the trade union movement. As stated before, the Court was criticized in 
Viking and Laval for  having carried out a proportionality test only in name but 
not in substance. It comes therefore as no surprise that after Viking and 
Laval the balancing of rights  on the basis of the principle of proportionality  
particularly in industrial action cases has become  highly disputed558. 
Exemplary, the European Trade Union Confederation(ETUC) is of the 
opinion, that the rights of trade unions and their members should enjoy 
priority over economic rights. Accordingly, in the "proposal for a social 
protocol" the ETUC calls for  reversing the priority of right by stating that:  
 "Nothing in the Treaty, and in particular neither fundamental freedoms 
 nor competition rules shall have priority over fundamental social rights 
 and social progress. In cases of conflict, fundamental social rights 
 shall take precedence"559.  
The European Economic and Social Committee(EESC)  shares the same 
view:  
"Regarding the principle of the equal value of fundamental social 
rights vis-à-vis economic freedoms, the EESC is of the opinion that 
primary law in particular must ensure this approach. The EESC notes 
that the third recital of the preamble, and specifically Article 151 of the 
                                                             
553 Habermas 1996, 258. 
554 Habermas 1996, 259. 
555 Habermas 1996, 259. 
556 See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 1977. 
557 See for this Tor Inge Harbo, 2008, 168. 
558 Lukas Oberndorfer,  for example, is of the opinion, that the  criticisms in Viking and Laval  
concerned only on  the way how the Court employed the principle of proportionality but the 
principle as such was not called into question,  
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TFEU, are intended to promote improved living and working conditions 
"so as to make possible their harmonisation while the improvement is 
being maintained" and expressly calls for a "Social Progress Protocol" 
to be included in the Treaties in order to enshrine the principle of the 
equal value of fundamental social rights and economic freedoms and 
thereby make it clear that neither economic freedoms nor competition 
rules should be allowed to take precedence over fundamental social 
rights, and also to clearly define the impact of the Union’s objective of 
achieving social progress560".  
Brian Bercusson takes the view that the EU fundamental right to collective 
action should have priority over fundamental market freedoms. Derogations 
from the fundamental right to collective action should  only be allowed 
exceptionally, applying the principle of proportionality561. In order to 
strengthen their view , the trade unions also refer to the recent case law of 
the ECtHR in Demir and Baykara562 and Enerji Yapi -Yol563 where it was 
found that any interference with the freedom of association is presumptively 
unlawful and needs to be justified.  Here, it is important to pay attention to  
the different approaches of the CJEU and ECHR when dealing with 
derogations from the right to strike.564 Under European human rights law, the 
point of departure in the assessment of the ECtHR is the principle of freedom 
of association as enshrined in Article 11 of the ECHR, which extends to the 
right to collective bargaining and the right to strike. Any derogation from the 
right to strike must be justified by economic arguments. From this it becomes 
clear that the approach of the CJEU is at odds with the approach of the 
ECtHR, as in the case law of the CJEU any derogations from economic rights 
have to be justified on human rights grounds. The trade unions take the view, 
the CJEU should adopt the approach of the ECtHR.565  
 The Viking and Laval judgments are also  critisized by the ILO. The 
ILO´s Committee of experts considered that " it has never included the need 
to assess the proportionality of interests  bearing in mind a notion of freedom 
                                                             
1 OJ C 376, 22.12.2011, p. 74. 
561 See for this Christophe Vigneau 2009, 389. 
562 ECtHR, Demir and Baykara, no. 34503/97. 
563 ECtHR, Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v. Turkey, no. 68959/01. 
564 see for this Deakin, Rogowski, Reflexive labour law, capabilities and the future of social 
Europe 2011, 246.  
565 See for this: Barnard, Free Movement and Labour Rights, Squaring the Circle 2013, 17. 
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of establishment or freedom to provide services 566. The Committee 
"considered that the doctrine that is being articulated in these CJEU 
judgments is likely to have a significant restrictive  effect on the exercise of 
the right to strike in practice in a manner contrary to the Convention. 
 The approach suggested from behalf of the ETUC after which social 
rights should prevail over economic freedoms seems to be from the point of 
view of the trade union movement comprehensible as they were hit hardest 
by the rulings of the CJEU in the  Laval quartet.  But this approach is rather 
not compatible with  the concept of the social market economy  in the sense 
of Article 3 III 2 TEU.  The social market economy in the sense of Article 3 III 
2 TEU stands for the parity of social and economic interests. "A simple 
reversal of priority would leave its proponents open to similar accusations 
made by trade unions against the current approach: it is asymmetrical and 
formalistic and embodies a one- dimensional view of the European Union567" 
 In addition, against the background of the improbability of  European 
policy responses in the social field it is rather doubtful whether a protocol with 
the above described content will ever be adopted. As a matter of fact and 
from the point of view of the social market economy in the sense of Article 3 
III 2 TEU it is more reasonable  to adhere with the principle of proportionality  
and to further develop its application, in particular to industrial relation 
cases568. As regards this subject, Barnard proposes to urge the CJEU to 
adopt a margin of appreciation approach569. In her point of view, the Court  
could delegate the decisions on proportionality to the national courts to be 
decided  according to their domestic standards, albeit while complying with 
their duties of cooperation under Article 4(3) TEU to consider the EU 
implications.  
 A more promising approach would be to make changes to the 
application of  the principle of proportionality itself. As regards this subject, 
the principle of proportionality as applied by the BVerfG could serve as a 
model for the CJEU. The BVerfG sees fundamental rights as principles which 
necessitates to balance the conflicting fundamental rights. It is important to 
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recall, that the application of the proportionality in the narrow sense requires 
that the suitability and necessity of the relevant measure are affirmed570. 
When comparing the principle of proportionality as applied by the  CJEU to 
assess  the compatibility of national legislation with EU law and the 
application of the proportionality test by the BVerfG it becomes clear that the 
CJEU is not balancing at all, as it only applies a two limbed test to 
proportionality. The application of the proportionality in the narrow sense has 
the potential to bring about more comprehensible  judgments. The illustrated 
case law of the BVerfG showed that concerns of fundamental rights holders 
find particular consideration in the last step of the proportionality test. Thus, 
the application of the proportionality test in the narrow sense would 
strengthen the efforts of the Member States to meet their social commitments 
resulting from their constitutions as well as international human rights 
instruments they are signatories to. The Advocate General Trstenjak in 
Commission vs. Germany has shown that the application of a three limbed 
proportionality test to assess national legislation is quite possible to be 
practiced in internal market law. 
 
 
5.Application of Practical Concordance  
The CJEU has been accused of having created a hierarchy between 
fundamental economic freedoms and fundamental social rights571. A way to 
correct this situation would be to not apply the precept of rule and exception 
in situations where fundamental market freedoms and fundamental rights are 
in conflict. The constitutionalization of the social market economy but also the 
legally binding CFREU  supports this view. The German experience could 
also here serve as a model. To recall, the European economic constitution 
and the economic constitution of the Basic law have in common, that both 
are based on a precept of rule and exception. In both jurisdictions economic 
freedoms constitute the rule and social state interventions exceptions 
requiring justification. Under German law, as was shown, the precept of rule 
                                                             
570 Although rejecting the necessity of the Tarifumwandlungsgesetz,  the Advocate General  in 
Commission vs. Germany continued to apply the last step of the proportionality test, the 
proportionality in the narrow sense. The same approach is followed by Catherine Barnard, 
see  This approach does not comply with the application of the principle of proportionality as 
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and exception finds only application in cases where the state encroaches 
upon fundamental rights, in other words, if the public interest is in conflict with 
private interests. Conversely, the precept of rule and exception finds no  
application when two fundamental rights collide. In such a situation, the Court 
applies the doctrine of practical concordance. The advantage of this 
approach is, that there is no hierarchy between the colliding fundamental 
rights but both fundamental rights have the same value. Moreover, both 
fundamental rights are considered as rules and accordingly the strict  
proportionality test finds no application. The legally binding character of the 
CFREU makes it necessary to treat  fundamental rights and fundamental 
market freedoms equal. The doctrine of practical concordance might  also  be 
employed by the CJEU. As was shown,  the aim of practical concordance in 
situations of conflicting rights,  is to avoid to the fullest extent possible, 
sacrificing one right against the other, and instead seeking a compromise 
between the rights in conflict which will respect their respective claims, by 
optimizing each of the rights against each other.  It should be noted that the 
application of the principle of practical concordance is like the principle of 
proportionality not uncontested. De Schutter argues that in the frame of 
practical concordance  judges have privileged access to where the 
equilibrium between the conflicting  rights is to be found572. According to that, 
it is for the judge  to decide whether  or not the rights in conflict have been 
reconciled by the legislator to the fullest extent possible. Hös sees things 
similarly. She argues, that the practical concordance is problematic as it 
gives the Court and also national authorities a constitutional role, that of 
taking a value judgment in the name of a constitutional ideal573. From this it 
becomes clear, that, the critique mainly refers to the requirement of 
optimization of rights which is not only reflected in the principle of 
proportionality but also in the doctrine of practical concordance.  
 Notwithstanding this critique, the idea of practical concordance found 
already entrance in the case law of the CJEU, namely  in Schmidberger and 
to a certain extent in Commission vs. Germany.  In the latter,  the idea of 
practical concordance is also reflected in the opinion of the Advocate General 
Trstenjak who referred in her opinion also to Schmidberger. As was shown, 
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Schmidberger was about a conflict between a fundamental market freedom 
and a political fundamental right. In its reasoning, the Court did not apply the 
precept of rule and exception in favour of the relevant fundamental market 
freedom but treated the conflicting rights as having equal rank. The 
valorization of the social dimension of the EU speaks in favour of extending 
this line of reasoning of Schmidberger to conflicts between fundamental 
market freedoms and fundamental social rights.  
 
6. Fundamental Social Rights as Self-Standing Justification Grounds  
As was already pointed out, the CJEU considers the freedom on the market 
as a rule and social state interventions as exceptions requiring justification. In 
this regard it is of utmost importance under what type of exception ground 
social state interventions are classified. The CJEU does not pursue an 
uniform line. In Viking, the right to strike  was not considered as a self-
standing justification ground574 but only as a an overriding reason of the 
public interest. The Court pursued the same way of reasoning in Laval. 
Against the background of the legally binding CFREU, it is arguable whether 
the degradation of fundamental social rights to overriding public interest 
concerns can be still maintained. As stated before,  the CFREU contains 
fundamental social rights like Article 28 or Article 31 which  do not have the 
character of mere principles but are considered proper rights. These 
fundamental social rights  offer protection against the EU and the Member 
States and they can  be directly invoked by fundamental rights holders. The 
categorization as a fundamental right gives the relevant position more weight  
than a "rule of reason" which has amongst others implications on the 
application of the principle of proportionality. The CJEU is required to take 
the CFREU serious. Accordingly, the Court should classify fundamental 
social rights as self-standing justification grounds. By doing so it would 
eliminate the established hierarchy between fundamental market freedoms 
and fundamental social rights. In this regard reference must be made to 
Schmidberger. As was shown, the Court treated in this case the  freedom of 
expression and the freedom of assembly not as a rule of reason, but as a  
self standing justification ground. This approach should be extended to 
                                                             
574 See for this Vries, The protection of fundamental rights within Europe´s internal market 
after  Lisbon- An endeavour for more harmony 2010, 7.  
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fundamental social rights. It would dogmatically imply that the strict precept of 
rule and exception will not find application between fundamental market 
freedoms and fundamental social rights. This approach would contribute to 
achieve the objective of the social market economy in the sense of Article 3 
III 2 TEU. 
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